Abstract
This chapter explores the potential of distributed ledger technology (DLT) in addressing supply chain shortages and competition for scarce resources. Specifically, we assess the effect of strategic information sharing on supply chain efficiency and the creation of virtual markets to improve supply chain performance. To facilitate this research, we designed a simulation platform called DISASTER (DLT In Sourcing And Strategic Trading Experimental Research), which hosts web-based, dynamic, and customizable supply chain simulations that leverage concepts of blockchain technology, and permit capturing of information regarding players’ ordering strategies and behavioral traits.
In this chapter, we describe the DISASTER platform and discuss two selected DISASTER simulations that probe supply chain retailers’ order behavior: the first investigates the role of information sharing among competing retailers; the second allows for the trading of tokens among competing retailers. In the first simulation, we find that decision makers act more strategically and closer to Nash equilibrium predictions as more information about historical orders of competitors is shared; however, the observed outcome is not invariably an improvement in efficiency as measured by profits across participants. In the second simulation, we observe that initial order quantities remain unchanged as compared to the baseline (non-trading) scenario, despite the possibility to trade on virtual markets; however, over time, more equitable distribution of inventory is achieved, and the supply chain efficiency as measured by profits increases.
Our findings highlight the value of empirical research and management games in shedding light on the role of decision makers’ behavioral characteristics and investigating real-life supply chain challenges and the potential of adopting blockchain-specific capabilities in that space.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsNotes
- 1.
- 2.
See Appendix C for a list of questions used to assess behavioral characteristics.
- 3.
Institutional Review Board, a committee responsible for the review of research involving human subjects.
- 4.
Questions can be added to the underlying spreadsheet with a fast and easy plug-and-play approach
References
AlixPartners (2021) Shortages related to semiconductors to cost the auto industry $210 billion in revenues this year. Retrieved November 5, 2021, from https://www.alixpartners.com/media-center/press-releases/press-release-shortages-related-to-semiconductors-to-cost-the-auto-industry-210-billion-in-revenues-this-year-says-new-alixpartners-forecast/
Babich V, Hilary G (2019) Blockchain and other distributed ledger technologies in operations. Found Trends Technol Inf Oper Manag 12(2–3):152–172. https://doi.org/10.1561/0200000084
Babich V, Hilary G (2020) OM forum—distributed ledgers and operations: what operations management researchers should know about blockchain technology. Manuf Serv Oper Manag 22(2):223–240. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2018.0752
Babich V, Hilary G (2022) Tutorial on blockchain applications in supply chains. In: Babich V, Birge J, Hillary G (eds) Innovative technology at the interface of finance and operations. Springer Nature, S.l.
Baganha MP, Cohen MA (1998) The stabilizing effect of inventory in supply chains. Oper Res 46(3):72–83. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.46.3.S72
Berg J, Dickhaut J, McCabe K (1995) Trust, reciprocity and social history. Games Econ Behav 10(1):122–142. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1995.1027
Blais AR, Weber EU (2006) A domain-specific risk-taking (DOSPERT) scale for adult populations. Judgm Decis Mak 1(1). https://ssrn.com/abstract=1301089
Bolton GE, Katok E (2008) Learning by doing in the newsvendor problem: a laboratory investigation of the role of experience and feedback. Manuf Serv Oper Manag 10(3):519–538
Cachon GP, Lariviere MA (1999) An equilibrium analysis of linear, proportional, and uniform allocation of scarce capacity. IIE Trans 31:835–849. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007670515586
Chen Y, Su X, Zhao X (2012) Modeling bounded rationality in capacity allocation games with the quantal response equilibrium. Manag Sci 58(10):1952–1962. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1120.1531
Cohen MA, Kouvelis P (2020) Revisit of AAA excellence of global value chains: robustness, resilience and realignment. Prod Oper Manag 30(3):633–643. https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.13305
Cohen MA, Lee HL (2020) Designing the right global supply chain network. Manuf Serv Oper Manag 22(1):15–24. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2019.0839
Cohen MA, Kleindorfer PR, Lee HL (1986) Optimal stocking policies for low usage items in multi-echelon inventory systems. Naval Res Logist Q 33(1):17–38. https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.3800330103
Cooper D, Kagel JH (2016) Other regarding preferences: a selective survey of experimental results. In: Kagel J, Roth A (eds) The handbook of experimental economics, vol 2. Princeton University Press
Cox JC (2004) How to identify trust and reciprocity. Games Econ Behav 46(2):260–281. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00119-2
Croson R, Donohue K (2006) Behavioral causes of the bullwhip effect and the observed value of inventory information. Manag Sci 52(3):323–336. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1050.0436
Cui TH, Zhang Y (2018) Cognitive hierarchy in capacity allocation games. Manag Sci 64(3):1250–1270. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2655
Deshpande V, Cohen MA, Donohue K (2003) A threshold inventory rationing policy for service differentiated demand classes. Manag Sci 49(6):683–703. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.49.6.683.16022
Fahimnia B, Pournader M, Siemsen E, Bendoly E, Wang C (2019) Behavioral operations and supply chain management - a review and literature mapping. Decis Sci 50(6):1127–1183. https://doi.org/10.1111/deci.12369
Falk A, Becker A, Dohmen T, Huffman D, Sunde U (2016) The preference survey module: a validated instrument for measuring risk, time, and social preferences. IZA Discussion Paper 9674. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2725035
Fathomd (2022) Business Games for better learning. Retrieved December 14, 2021, from https://www.fathomd.com/
Federgruen A, Zipkin P (1984) Approximations of dynamic, multilocation production and inventory problems. Manag Sci 30(1):69–84. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.30.1.69
Fehr E, Goette L (2007) Do workers work more if wages are high? Evidence from a randomized field experiment. Am Econ Rev 97(1):298–317. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.326803
Fehr E, Schmidt KM (1999) A theory of fairness, competition and cooperation. Q J Econ 114(3):817–868. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.106228
Forsythe R, Horowitz JL, Savin NE, Sefton M (1994) Fairness in simple bargaining experiments. Games Econ Behav 6(3):347–369. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1994.1021
Fox CR, Tversky A (1995) Ambiguity aversion and comparative ignorance. Q J Econ 110(3):585–603. https://doi.org/10.2307/2946693
Frederick S (2005) Cognitive reflection and decision making. J Econ Perspect 19(4):25–42. https://doi.org/10.1257/089533005775196732
Gächter S, Johnson EJ, Herrmann A (2021) Individual-level loss aversion in riskless and risky choices. Theory Decis. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-021-09839-8
GDPR (2022) Complete guide to GDPR compliance. Retrieved January 08, 2022, from https://gdpr.eu/
Halevy Y (2007) Ellsberg revisited: an experimental study. Econometrica 75(2):503–536. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4501998
Hellwig DP, Huchzermeier A (2022) Next generation information sharing in a blockchain-enabled supply chain. In: Babich V, Birge J, Hillary G (eds) Innovative technology at the interface of finance and operations. Springer Nature, S.l.
Hellwig DP, Karlic G, Huchzermeier A (2020) Build your own blockchain: a practical guide to distributed ledger technology. Springer Nature, S.l. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40142-9
Holt CA, Laury SK (2002) Risk aversion and incentive effects. Am Econ Rev 92(5):1644–1655. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3083270
INFORMS (2004) Morris Cohen, MSOM Fellow, 2004. Retrieved January 22, 2022, from https://connect.informs.org/msom/msom-resources/fellows/cohen
Kahneman D, Tversky A (1979) Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica 47(2):263–292. https://doi.org/10.2307/1914185
Katok E, Villa S (2021) Centralized or decentralized transfer prices: a behavioral approach for improving supply chain coordination. Manuf Serv Oper Manag. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2020.0957
Katok E, Leider S, Donohue K (2018) The handbook of behavioral operations. Wiley & Sons
Lee HL, Padmanabhan V, Whang S (1997) Information distortion in a supply chain: the bullwhip effect. Manag Sci 43(4):546–558. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.43.4.546
Lotfi Z, Mukhtar M, Sahran S, Zadeh AT (2013) Information sharing in supply chain management. Procedia Technol 11:298–304. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.protcy.2013.12.194
Mayer RC, Davis JH (1999) The effect of the performance appraisal system on trust for management: a field quasi-experiment. J Appl Psychol 84(1):123. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.84.1.123
oTree (2022) oTree - the most powerful platform for behavioral research and experiments. Retrieved December 14, 2021, from http://www.otree.org/
Ren ZJ, Cohen MA, Ho TH, Terwiesch C (2009) Information sharing in a long-term supply chain relationship: the role of customer review strategy. Oper Res 58(1):81–93. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1090.0750
Roland (2021) Pacemaker, ultrasound companies seek priority amid chip shortage. Retrieved October 10, 2021, from https://www.wsj.com/articles/pacemaker-ultrasound-companies-seek-priority-amid-chip-shortage-11633258802
Rudi N, Kapur S, Pyke DF (2001) A two-location inventory with transshipment and a local decision making. Manag Sci 47(12):1668–1680. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.47.12.1668.10235
Russo JE, Schoemaker PJ (1992) Managing overconfidence. Sloan Manag Rev 33(2):7–17
SoPHIELabs (2022) Your partner for online experiments, behavioral research and serious games. Retrieved December 14, 2021, from https://www.sophielabs.com/
Sterman JD (1989a) Teaching takes off flight simulators for management education – “The Beer Game”. Retrieved December 16, 2021, from https://web.mit.edu/jsterman/www/SDG/beergame.html
Sterman JD (1989b) Modeling managerial behavior: misperceptions of feedback in a dynamic decision making experiment. Manag Sci 35(3):321–339. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.35.3.321
Tagaras G, Cohen MA (1992) Pooling in two-location inventory systems with non-negligible replenishment lead times. Manag Sci 38(8):1067–1083. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.38.8.1067
Terwiesch C, Ren ZJ, Ho TH, Cohen MA (2005) An empirical analysis of forecast sharing in the semiconductor equipment supply chain. Manag Sci 51(2):208–220. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0317
van Damme E, Binmore KG, Roth AE, Samuelson L, Winter E, Bolton GE, Ockenfels A, Dufwenberg M, Kirchsteiger G, Gneezy U, Kocher MG, Sutter M, Sanfey AG, Kliemt H, Selten R, Nagel R, Azar OH (2014) How Werner Güth’s ultimatum game shaped our understanding of social behavior. J Econ Behav Organ 108:292–318. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2014.10.014
van Engelenburg S, Janssen M, Klievink B (2018) A blockchain architecture for reducing the bullwhip effect. In: Shishkov B (ed) Business modeling and software design, vol 319. Springer International Publishing, pp 69–82
Wang X, Disney SM (2016) The bullwhip effect: progress, trends and directions. Eur J Oper Res 250(3):691–701. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2015.07.022
WEF (2021) What’s the bullwhip effect and how can we avoid crises like the global chip shortage. Retrieved May 20, 2021, from https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2021/05/what-s-the-bullwhip-effect-and-how-can-we-avoid-crises-like-the-global-chip-shortage/
Xue X, Dou J, Shang Y (2020) Blockchain-driven supply chain decentralized operations – information sharing perspective. Bus Process Manag J 27(1):184–203. https://doi.org/10.1108/BPMJ-12-2019-0518
Zhao Y (2022) Games and experiential learning in supply chain management. Retrieved December 16, 2021, from http://zhao.rutgers.edu/Games-Hunger-Chain.pdf
z-Tree - Zurich Toolbox for Readymade Economic Experiments (2022) Zurich toolbox for readymade economic experiments. Retrieved December 14, 2021, from https://www.ztree.uzh.ch/en.html
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Appendix
Appendix
1.1 A. Comparison of Existing Platforms
1.2 Comparison of BWE Simulation Games
1.3 C. List of Pre-defined Questions for Eliciting Behavioral Characteristics
Characteristic | Measurement instrument | Reference |
---|---|---|
Ambiguity aversion | Willingness to pay (WTP) game | |
Cognitive abilities | Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) | Frederick (2005) |
Fairness (inequality aversion) | (Hypothetical) Dictator game questionnaire | Forsythe et al. (1994), Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and van Damme et al. (2014) |
Loss aversion | Lottery choice task Willingness to accept (WTA) game Willingness to purchase (WTP) game | Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Fehr and Goette (2007) and Gächter et al. (2021) |
Positive reciprocity | (Hypothetical) Investment game questionnaire | Berg et al. (1995), Cox (2004), Cooper and Kagel (2016) and Falk et al. (2016) |
Negative reciprocity | (Hypothetical) Ultimatum game questionnaire | Forsythe et al. (1994), van Damme et al. (2014) and Falk et al. (2016) |
Overconfidence | Questionnaire | Russo and Schoemaker (1992) |
Risk preferences | Multiple price list method DOSPERT questionnaire | |
Trust and trustworthiness | Questionnaire Investment game | Berg et al. (1995), Mayer and Davis (1999) and Falk et al. (2016) |
1.4 D. Simulation Instructions for the Information Sharing Among Competing Retailers Game (Scenarios 2–4)
Step 1: Past order observation
You can observe the past order(s) of the other two players against whom you are playing in the current round. Similarly, your past order(s) is (are) visible to the players in your group.
Step 2: Order submission
For your order, you can choose an integer number between 0 and 10,000 units.
Once you have submitted your order, you cannot change it.
Step 3: Supplier stock allocation and cost
The supplier has 120 units available in total, which are divided among all three retailers in your group.
The allocation is determined as follows.
-
(a)
The system calculates the total order received from the retailers (i.e., the sum of your order and the orders from the other two retailers).
-
(b)
If the total order is less than or equal to 120, you will receive the number of units you ordered.
-
(c)
If the total order is greater than 120, you will receive:
Your allocation = (your order/total order) × 120
Please note that you may receive fractions (decimals) of units.
For example,
-
If you order 60 units and the total order from all retailers in your group is 110, then you will receive 60 units. The other two retailers will receive 50 units in total.
-
If you order 60 units and the total order from all retailers in your group is 150, then you will receive 48 units [=(60 ÷ 150) × 120]. The other two retailers will receive 72 units in total.
The order cost is $10 per unit. The order cost applies only to units you receive. So, for example, if you receive 60 units then your order cost would be $600 but if you receive just 48 units then your order cost would be $480.
Step 4: Sales and revenues
The number of units you sell is equal to the minimum of (i) the demand from your customers (50 units) and (ii) your supply, or the number of units allocated to you by the supplier (as described in Step 3).
Unsold items are discarded at the end of the round; they are not carried over to the next round. Unsatisfied demand is lost and cannot be backlogged to the next round.
For example,
-
if the supplier allocated 40 units to you, then your sales are 40 units (=min(40, 50)) and the unsatisfied demand for 10 units is lost at the end of the round;
-
if the supplier allocated 52 units to you, then your sales are 50 units (=min(52, 50)) and the leftover 2 units are lost at the end of the round.
Revenue amounts to $20 per unit. Therefore, if your sales are 40 units then your revenue is $800.
Step 5: Profit
Your profit per round = revenue per round – cost per round.
Your total profit over the entire simulation is the sum of profits per round.
1.5 E. Simulation Instructions for the Trading Tokens Among Competing Retailers Game
Step 1: Observation of your sales price for the current round
Observe the realization of your sales price, which is randomly drawn from the range of $51 to $100 per unit and with an equal likelihood of every integer value (a number without any decimals, such as $51, $63, $95).
The sales price of other retailers is also randomly drawn from the range of $51 to $100 per unit.
Sales prices are independent between rounds and across retailers.
Step 2: Submit your order to the supplier
For your order, choose an integer number between 0 and 400 units.
You can use the simulation tool to support your decision on how many tokens to order from the supplier. This tool will provide you with the expected pre-trade profit after you enter your estimated demand and specified order quantity.
Step 3: Demand realization
Your customer demand is randomly drawn from the range of 0 to 200 units, with an equal likelihood of every integer value (a number without any decimals, e.g., 13, 105, 186).
Other players face their own levels of customer demand (i.e., you are not competing for the same customers), which is also randomly drawn from the range of 0 to 200 units.
Customer demands are independent between rounds and across retailers.
Step 4: Cost, sales, and revenue
You can observe your pre-trade profit projection. If you do not submit any trading orders, then that projection would be your final profit in this round. The following text describes how the projected pre-trade profit is calculated.
The order cost is $10 per token. For instance, if you order 130 tokens then your cost is $1300.
The number of units you can sell to your customers is equal to the minimum of (i) the demand from your customers (see Step 3) and (ii) how many tokens of the supplier’s capacity that you hold (see Step 2). Suppose, for example, that you hold 130 tokens and that your customer demand is 90 units; in that case, your potential sales quantity is 90 units (=min(130, 90)).
Your projected pre-trade revenue is equal to the sales price multiplied by the sales quantity. So if your sales price is $60 and you sell 90 units, then your projected pre-trade revenue is $5400.
Finally: Projected pre-trade profit = projected pre-trade revenue – order cost.
Step 5: Perform trades with other retailers in your group
You can change how many tokens you hold by trading with other retailers.
To trade, you specify whether you want to buy or sell tokens, the quantity, and the price. You can sell all tokens that you hold (even if you can then not fulfill your customer demand as the result). You can submit multiple trade orders per round, up to a maximum of five.
At the end of the trading period, the market clears given all orders that the retailers in your group have submitted.
Trading and market-clearing processes (see table below)
-
A.
Sell orders are ranked in price from lowest to highest and buy orders in price from highest to lowest.
-
B.
Units are matched in buy and sell orders whenever the buy price is greater than the sell price of the matched units.
-
C.
The average of the lowest buy price and the highest sell price at which the last match happens is the market-clearing price: all buy orders pay this price and all sell orders receive this price.
Consider the following example. The steps just described are marked by A, B, and C in the table.
After the trading phase is completed, you sell to your customers using the new number of tokens you have.
This marks the end of the round, and the final profits for this round are then calculated. Your total profit over the entire simulation is the sum of profits per round.
Any unsold tokens are voided at the end of the round; they are not carried over to the next round.
Unsatisfied customer demand is lost, and it cannot be backlogged to the next round.
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2022 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Hellwig, D., Wendt, K., Babich, V., Huchzermeier, A. (2022). Playing with DISASTER: A Blockchain-Enabled Supply Chain Simulation Platform for Studying Shortages and the Competition for Scarce Resources. In: Lee, H., Ernst, R., Huchzermeier, A., Cui, S. (eds) Creating Values with Operations and Analytics. Springer Series in Supply Chain Management, vol 19. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08871-1_9
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08871-1_9
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-031-08870-4
Online ISBN: 978-3-031-08871-1
eBook Packages: Mathematics and StatisticsMathematics and Statistics (R0)