- Department of Humanities and Social Sciences (HSS)
Indian Institute of Technology-Bombay (IIT-B)
Powai, Mumbai 400076, INDIA
- Concordia University (Canada), Religion, AlumnusIstituto Universitario Orientale, Napoli, Italy, Dipartimento Asia Africa Mediterraneo, Department Member, and 6 moreadd
- Indian Philosophy, Tantric Studies, Buddhist Philosophy, South Asian Studies, Indology, Sanskrit, and 33 moreSanskrit language and literature, Indian studies, Hinduism, Buddhist Studies, Philosophy of Mind, Epistemology, Metaphysics, Philosophy Of Language, History of Philosophy, Philosophy, Indian religions, Religion, Indian ancient history, Philology, Yoga Philosophy, Sanskrit Grammar and Linguistics, Kashmir Shaivism, Manuscript Studies, Aesthetics, Kashmir, Tantra, Shaivism, Kashmiri Literature, Nyaya, Advaita Vedanta, Comparative Philosophy, Islam, Islamic Studies, Philology, Codicology, Critical Edition, Textual Criticism and Editing, Philosophy Of Religion, Hindu Studies, and Bhartrhariedit
- Mrinal Kauledit
This essay is one more attempt of understanding the non-dual philosophical position of Abhinavagupta viz-a-viz the problem of reflection. Since when my first essay on 'Abhinavagupta on Reflection' appeared in JIP, I have once again... more
This essay is one more attempt of understanding the non-dual philosophical position of Abhinavagupta viz-a-viz the problem of reflection. Since when my first essay on 'Abhinavagupta on Reflection' appeared in JIP, I have once again focused on the non-dual Ś aiva theory of reflection (pratibimbavāda) (3.1-65) as discussed by Abhinavagupta (fl.c. 975-1025 CE) in the Tantrāloka and his commentator Jayaratha (fl.c. 1225-1275 CE). The present attempt is to understand their philosophical position in the context of Nyāya realism where a reflection is simply caused by an erroneous apprehension of an entity. For Naiyāyikas, according to both Abhinavagupta and Jayaratha, a reflection (pratibimba) does not have a real existence at all. There are only two ways of looking at a reflection: it can either simply be an original image (bimba) or an illusion (bhrānti). There is no scope for any third entity apart from something being an error or a non-error. In contrast to this, establishing a Ś aiva theory of reflection, Abhinavagupta is corroborating a valid ontological status for the seemingly illusory objects of perception or imagined objects, such as, to use Abhinavagupta's own language, 'an elephant with five trunks and four tusks who is running in the sky'. In other words, he is pleading for the valid cognition of objects which are otherwise deemed to be an error or external to consciousness. While Abhinavagupta's system has generally been referred to as 'idealism', I argue that by establishing the dynamism of reflective awareness that is deemed to be absolutely real, his system should be referred to as 'dynamic realism' i.e., the 'dynamism' that is common to both 'real' and 'ideal'. This is why he uses the metaphor consciousness-as-mirror (ciddarpaṇa) in establishing a non-erroneous ontological status for otherwise illusive idea of reflection.
Research Interests: Philosophy, Logic, Indian Philosophy, Sanskrit, Consciousness, and 10 moreShaivism, Indology, Religion and Art, Sanskrit Studies, Sanskrit Aesthetics, Indian Philosophy, Indian Music, Dance and Arts, Kashmir Shaivism, Indian Philosophy and Religion, Classical Indian Philosophy, Indology: Indian Philosophy, Abhinavagupta, Kashmir Saivism, and Trika Shaivism
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This volume could connect the results of the work done in the past with the work to be done in the future, by adding to knowledge in the present because of the articles it attracted from the veteran as well as upcoming researchers.
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... Page 26. xx / The Variegated Plumage : Encounters with Indian Philosophy Section-C : Bhakti, Yoga and Poetics 34. Bopadeva and His Contribution to Bhakti Cult 289 - Dr. V.Kameswari 35. Bhakti in Bhagvadglta 294 - Dr. Ujjwala Pause Jha... more
... Page 26. xx / The Variegated Plumage : Encounters with Indian Philosophy Section-C : Bhakti, Yoga and Poetics 34. Bopadeva and His Contribution to Bhakti Cult 289 - Dr. V.Kameswari 35. Bhakti in Bhagvadglta 294 - Dr. Ujjwala Pause Jha 36. ...
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The present thesis studies the theory of reflection (pratibimbavāda) as discussed by Abhinavagupta (fl.c. 975-1025 CE), the non-dualist Trika Śaiva thinker of Kashmir, primarily focusing on what is often referred to as his magnum opus:... more
The present thesis studies the theory of reflection (pratibimbavāda) as discussed by Abhinavagupta (fl.c. 975-1025 CE), the non-dualist Trika Śaiva thinker of Kashmir, primarily focusing on what is often referred to as his magnum opus: the Tantrāloka. The present study has as its foundation a new critical edition of a small, nonetheless important, passage of the Tantrāloka—chapter-3, verses 1-65 and the commentary titled -viveka thereon by Jayaratha (fl.c. 1225-1275 CE)—along with an annotated English translation. The edition here presented represents the very first philologically exhaustive edition of any part of the Tantrāloka or Tantrāloka-viveka. The textual critical exercise undertaken in this thesis based on the examination of twenty-nine manuscripts has shown that the textual transmission of the Tantrāloka and -viveka (at least of the small part that I have studied) thereon has undergone corruption, but of a minor sort. The present edition is a much improved version over the...
2022, F. Sferra, V. Vergiani (eds.) Verità e Bellezza. Essays in Honour of Raffaele Torella. Series Minor XCVII. Università degli Studi di Napoli, Dipartimento Asia, Africa e Mediterraneo, Series Minor, Napoli, pp. 679–750.
Research Interests: Indian Philosophy, Sanskrit language and literature, Sanskrit Literature, Classical philology, Sanskrit Philology, and 7 moreIndian Manuscripts, Kashmir Shaivism, Indian Philosophy and Religion, Classical Indian Philosophy, Kashmir Shaivism, Sanskrit language, Abhinavagupta, Abhinavagupta, and Kashmir Saivism
Abhinavagupta (fl.c. 975-1025 CE) is a tantric philosopher whose rigorous epistemological discussions are deeply rooted in his Śaiva metaphysics. In order to strongly withhold the Trika doctrinal principle of non-duality, Abhinavagupta... more
Abhinavagupta (fl.c. 975-1025 CE) is a tantric philosopher whose rigorous epistemological discussions are deeply rooted in his Śaiva metaphysics. In order to strongly withhold the Trika doctrinal principle of non-duality, Abhinavagupta like his predecessor Utpaladeva (fl.c. 925-975 CE), is struggling to interpret the philosophical question of Causality that rests in the analysis of cause and effect or subject and object duality. In this chapter, a short example from his magnum opus tantric manual, the Tantrāloka (9.1-44) and its elaborate commentary titled-viveka by Jayaratha (fl.c. 1225-1275 CE), is discussed while also contextualising the process of philosophical rationalisation in the history of Trika Śaivism. The champions of the Theory of Causality (kāryakāraṇabhāva), the Buddhists, are precisely targeted and following rational enquiry, Abhinavagupta and Jayaratha want to prove that Śiva alone is the supreme agent (kartā) or cause (kāraṇa) and He indeed is also the effect (kārya) since both cause and effect are the manifestation of and in a single consciousness. Even though the Tantrāloka is based on the revealed knowledge from early scriptures like the Mālinīvijayottaratantra, yet at every step compelling efforts are being made to justify the revealed (āgama) knowledge with reason (yukti).
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In the celebrated tantric manual, the Tantrāloka, Abhinavagupta (fl.c. 975-1025 CE) and his commentator Jayaratha (fl.c. 1225-1275 CE) establish a non-dual S ´ aiva theory of reflection (pratibimbavāda) (3.1-65) using the key metaphors of... more
In the celebrated tantric manual, the Tantrāloka, Abhinavagupta (fl.c. 975-1025 CE) and his commentator Jayaratha (fl.c. 1225-1275 CE) establish a non-dual S ´ aiva theory of reflection (pratibimbavāda) (3.1-65) using the key metaphors of light (prakāśa) and reflective awareness (vimarśa). This paper attempts to explain the philosophical problem of reflection from the standpoint of these non-dual S ´ aivas. It also evaluates the problem in its hermeneutical context, analysing multiple layers of meaning and interpretation. Is the metaphor of reflection only a way of explaining the particular currents of the S ´ aiva phenomenology represented by the concepts of prakāśa and vimarśa? What philosophical problem does Abhi-navagupta seek to solve by complicating the category of reflection and giving it a quasi-paradoxical status? Why does he use the model of the subtle elements (tanmātras) to explain the theory of reflection? What does the 'untaintedness (nairmalya) of the mirror of consciousness' mean for his system? These questions form the focus of this paper.
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Don Quixote of Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra (chapters 1.45, 1.46, 1.50, 2.6, 2.12). An edition of a Kashmiri Translation by Nityananda Shastri and Jagaddhar Zadoo (edited from a single manuscript preserved in Houghton Library, Harvard... more
Don Quixote of Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra (chapters 1.45, 1.46, 1.50, 2.6, 2.12). An edition of a Kashmiri Translation by Nityananda Shastri and Jagaddhar Zadoo (edited from a single manuscript preserved in Houghton Library, Harvard University) (to be published in the Marburg-Pune Indological Series).
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Abhinavagupta’s (fl.c. 975-1025 CE) tantric system holds quite a unique position within the classical South Asian philosophical discourse wherein a predominant essential presupposition is not conceived as ‘suffering’, but an idea of... more
Abhinavagupta’s (fl.c. 975-1025 CE) tantric system holds quite a unique position within the classical South Asian philosophical discourse wherein a predominant essential presupposition is not conceived as ‘suffering’, but an idea of everlasting ‘bliss’ or ‘joy’. In fact, even what is often understood as ‘suffering’, as Abhinavagupta would say, is a kind of intense form of ‘bliss’ or ‘joy’ that one needs to cultivate a ‘taste’ for. This phenomenon that a certain taste reflects unto the tasting agent (the one who tastes it) is the experience of ‘joy-full-ness’. There is no distinction created between the transcendental and empirical states of ‘joy’. The substratum of this experience is the knowing and experiencing subject alone (not in the same sense as that of the Buddhist idealists). As one would expect, a number of potent philosophical problems of cognition, perception, imagination, error, and consciousness are involved in here, and their mapping needs further profound probing. However, I am gradually becoming convinced that the larger project of Abhinavagupta was an ‘aesthetic project’ wherein his critical epistemology had an underlying mission of achieving an aesthetic goal.
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This paper presents a part of my critical investigation into the concept of 're ection' as discussed by Abhinavagupta (.c. 975-1025 CE) in some of his seminal works. I have argued that 're ection' forms a fundamental philosophical concept... more
This paper presents a part of my critical investigation into the concept of 're ection' as discussed by Abhinavagupta (.c. 975-1025 CE) in some of his seminal works. I have argued that 're ection' forms a fundamental philosophical concept in Abhinavagupta around which not only a critical epistemological approach is built in dialogue with his opponents such as the dualists and non-dualists, realists and idealists those formed the predominant voices of his own time, but thereby his own position of non-duality of absolute subjectivity is also advocated and established. Pleading for the ubiquity of consciousness, the age old question of objectivity and subjectivity is brought to scrutiny and a complex territory is mapped across metaphysics, rational theology, aesthetics, epistemology, phenomenology, language etc. Not being satis ed ever with only one interpretation, Abhinavagupta puts forth a colossal and intricate apparatus of philosophical rationalisation that sometimes becomes di cult to navigate through. His own hermeneutic tools involve a strong philosophical appropriation of the sources he makes use of. This presentation while excavating and mapping the philosophical territory of Abhinavagupta seeks to interrogation him in his own words analysing his own position. The rst part will contextualise the problem of 're ection' and the subsequent part will o er an example of his encounter with a realist who rejects the real-ness of 're ection' empirically.
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There is a certain level of complexity attached to the idea of 'reflection' in Abhinavagupta (fl.c. 975-1025 CE) and it is discussed by him at various intellectual platforms. At one level it is a debate between the realists and the... more
There is a certain level of complexity attached to the idea of 'reflection' in Abhinavagupta (fl.c. 975-1025 CE) and it is discussed by him at various intellectual platforms. At one level it is a debate between the realists and the absolute idealists where Abhinavagupta is obviously seeing 'reflection' as an absolutely idealistic notion. However, realism is not rejected by these Śaiva non-dualists. Following the tradition of his masters Abhinavagupta is attempting to establish the 'realism of idealism' or as K.C.Pandey (1963) would call it 'Realistic Idealism'. Abhinavagupta uses mirror-trope to explain away this fundamental idea. His idea of reflection should be understood as a subjective idea of self-reflexive awareness that has the autonomous potential to exist or manifest by itself. It does not need external support like, for instance, an image of face cannot exist in a mirror if there is no face in front of it. To put it in other words that even the so called illusory objects are understood to be as real as the real objects themselves.
At another level it becomes the problem of subject and object where apart from radically shifting the hermeneutic reins into the hands of 'a' subject there is a strong attempt to establish the absolutely autonomous and self-sufficient nature of 'the' subject that should be understood as beyond the binary of the realistic notion of both subject and object. From the absolute point of view it is the undifferentiated Consciousness alone that is beyond the notion of subject and object yet containing within itself the differentiated nature of both.
The question I have posed is if at all we should ignore the novelty of Abhinavagupta's Śaiva theory of reflection in his works other than those related to the Pratyabhijñā epistemology of recognition where only the pure analytical justification for reflection is discussed. As I have argued that Abhinavagupta's basic philosophical intuition is embedded in the Krama tradition. His vision of reality is both mystical and erotic following a deep symbolic-ritual scheme. And this depth can only be overcome when Abhinavagupta is studied across the scriptural traditions that he is a part of.
At another level it becomes the problem of subject and object where apart from radically shifting the hermeneutic reins into the hands of 'a' subject there is a strong attempt to establish the absolutely autonomous and self-sufficient nature of 'the' subject that should be understood as beyond the binary of the realistic notion of both subject and object. From the absolute point of view it is the undifferentiated Consciousness alone that is beyond the notion of subject and object yet containing within itself the differentiated nature of both.
The question I have posed is if at all we should ignore the novelty of Abhinavagupta's Śaiva theory of reflection in his works other than those related to the Pratyabhijñā epistemology of recognition where only the pure analytical justification for reflection is discussed. As I have argued that Abhinavagupta's basic philosophical intuition is embedded in the Krama tradition. His vision of reality is both mystical and erotic following a deep symbolic-ritual scheme. And this depth can only be overcome when Abhinavagupta is studied across the scriptural traditions that he is a part of.
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Abhinavagupta (fl.c. 975-1025 CE), the non-dualist Trika Śaiva thinker of Kashmir and an unusual literary figure belonging to pre-modern South Asia, is recognized for his major contributions to diverse domains of knowledge, primarily... more
Abhinavagupta (fl.c. 975-1025 CE), the non-dualist Trika Śaiva thinker of Kashmir and an unusual literary figure belonging to pre-modern South Asia, is recognized for his major contributions to diverse domains of knowledge, primarily philosophy, theology, and aesthetics. He is usually associated either with what is popularly known as ‘Kashmir Śaivism’ or with the Sanskrit aesthetic theory of rasa (“relish”). The former is an historically problematic designation for non-dualist Śaivism, of which Abhinavagupta is one of the main representatives.
This talk attempts to look at Abhinavagupta’s ‘Rasa Theory’ through his Anuttara Trika Śaivism. Abhinavagupta’s fundamental philosophical intuition is basically rooted in Krama and his polemical discussions are deeply embedded in his Śaiva theological metaphysics. He cannot be seen only confined to the Pratyabhijñā system and thus his logical-epistemological interpretations are just a single dimension of what his larger project was. While in the Īśvara-pratyabhijñā-vimarśinī and the Īśvara-pratyabhijñā-vivṛti-vimarśinī Abhinavagupta was building upon the Pratyabhijñā-based Trika, in the Tantrāloka he engaged in crafting a Trika grounded in the Krama cult of Kālī. In addition to this in his Anuttaraprakriyā that is basically represented by the Parātriśikā-vivaraṇa, he is shaping the Trika immersed in Kula-prakriyā. In the light of above we will look at what Abhinavagupta is aiming to do in the Nāṭya-śāstra-abhinava-bhāratī. Is he appropriating the idea of rasa to fit within his Śaiva soteriology? If he is, how is he achieving this aim. This would be the topic of our exploration.
This talk attempts to look at Abhinavagupta’s ‘Rasa Theory’ through his Anuttara Trika Śaivism. Abhinavagupta’s fundamental philosophical intuition is basically rooted in Krama and his polemical discussions are deeply embedded in his Śaiva theological metaphysics. He cannot be seen only confined to the Pratyabhijñā system and thus his logical-epistemological interpretations are just a single dimension of what his larger project was. While in the Īśvara-pratyabhijñā-vimarśinī and the Īśvara-pratyabhijñā-vivṛti-vimarśinī Abhinavagupta was building upon the Pratyabhijñā-based Trika, in the Tantrāloka he engaged in crafting a Trika grounded in the Krama cult of Kālī. In addition to this in his Anuttaraprakriyā that is basically represented by the Parātriśikā-vivaraṇa, he is shaping the Trika immersed in Kula-prakriyā. In the light of above we will look at what Abhinavagupta is aiming to do in the Nāṭya-śāstra-abhinava-bhāratī. Is he appropriating the idea of rasa to fit within his Śaiva soteriology? If he is, how is he achieving this aim. This would be the topic of our exploration.
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Research Interests: Philosophy, Indian Philosophy, Sanskrit language and literature, South Asian Literature, Indology, and 4 moreReligion and Art, Sanskrit Studies, Sanskrit Aesthetics, Indian Philosophy, Indian Music, Dance and Arts, Indian Philosophy and Religion, Classical Indian Philosophy, and Indology: Indian Philosophy
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Forum on Contemporary Theory, Baroda
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In the recent past there have been several attempts at defining, redefining and engaging with what one may call 'Indian Aesthetics'. Certainly this term is very broad and the scope of engagement with any specific topic under this label is... more
In the recent past there have been several attempts at defining, redefining and engaging with what one may call 'Indian Aesthetics'. Certainly this term is very broad and the scope of engagement with any specific topic under this label is challenging. This seminar is an effort to establish scholarly engagement with aesthetics in it's South Asian context keeping in mind both the theoretical and the performative aspects. Both the theoretical and the performative aspects are important for they are the significant methods for understanding theatrics and dramaturgy, philosophy of arts and aesthetics, and performing arts. It should interest scholars of Indian music, theatre, and literature, as well as intellectual historians and philologists. A critical engagement with these concepts is an extraordinary attempt towards the development of Indian intellectual history. The aim of the seminar is not only to familiarize the participants with the principal questions and debates in Indian aesthetics, but also to discuss the philological and philosophical challenges posed by such concepts with experts in the field.
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Research Interests: Buddhism, Indian Philosophy, Buddhist Philosophy, Buddhist Studies, Tibetan Buddhism, and 15 moreIndian Buddhism, Theravada Buddhism, Indian History, Classical Indology, Indology, Religion and Art, Sanskrit Studies, Sanskrit Aesthetics, Indian Philosophy, Indian Music, Dance and Arts, Indian Philosophy and Religion, early Buddhism, Indian Epistemology, Classical Indian Philosophy, Indian Logic, Indian Buddhism, Indology, Asoka Edicts, Buddhist Epistemology, Indology: Indian Philosophy, and Religious Studies /Indology
Research Interests: Buddhism, Indian Philosophy, Buddhist Philosophy, Buddhist Studies, Indian studies, and 15 moreSanskrit language and literature, Buddhist Sanskrit, Tibetan Buddhism, Indian Buddhism, Theravada Buddhism, Yogacara Buddhism, Yogacara, Religious Studies, Indian History, Indology, Indian Epistemology, Indian Logic, Dharmakīrti, Religious Studies /Indology, and Pali/Sanskrit Literature
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This workshop will principally include a close textual reading of selections from the Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana—the celebrated work on Indian literary theory—together with the Locana commentary of Abhinavagupta. The Dhvanyāloka deals... more
This workshop will principally include a close textual reading of selections from the Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana—the celebrated work on Indian literary theory—together with the Locana commentary of Abhinavagupta. The Dhvanyāloka deals with the entire gamut of signification in poetic language, arguing that great literature always communicates through suggestion (dhvani). Another salient feature of the work is that it offers a broad-based aesthetic theory relevant in other art forms like music, drama and painting. The workshop will focus on select passages of the text and explain its sense in English putting Ānandavardhana’s work in proper perspective. The aim of the workshop is to familiarize the participants with core themes in the text of the Dhvanyāloka so that the necessary theoretical background could be created to explore its aesthetic dimensions, which could broaden their horizons of thought and enhance their artistic sensibilities as creative artists and connoisseurs of art.
Research Interests: Aesthetics, Art History, Indian Philosophy, South Asian Studies, Yoga Philosophy, and 27 moreSanskrit language and literature, Hermeneutics, Sanskrit, Poetics, Sanskrit Literature, South Asian Literature, Dance and Aesthetics, Indian Art, Bharatha Natyam, Indian Classical Dance (Kathak), Indian Aesthetics, History of Indian Painting, Oriental Studies, Natyasastra, Classical Indology, Indology, Religion and Art, Sanskrit Studies, Sanskrit Aesthetics, Indian Philosophy, Indian Music, Dance and Arts, Kashmir Shaivism, Indology, sanskrit Studies, Indian History, Premodern literature, Indian Painting, Ancient Rhetoric and Poetics, Abhinavagupta, Pali/Sanskrit Literature, Sanskrit Poetics (Particularly School of Dhvani, Anandavarddhan & Abhinavgupta), and Dhvani and Rasa Theory
Research Interests: Religion, Hinduism, Comparative Religion, Cultural Studies, Aesthetics, and 71 morePhilosophy Of Religion, Indian Philosophy, History of Religion, Indian studies, South Asian Studies, Textual Criticism, Sanskrit language and literature, Hermeneutics, South Asia, Manuscript Studies, Sanskrit, Poetics, Sanskrit Aesthetics, Vedic Sanskrit, Music Aesthetics, Theological Aesthetics, Malayalam, Indian English Literature, Sanskrit Literature, Aesthetics and Ethics, South Asian Literature, Dance and Aesthetics, Indian Literature, Indian Culture, Tantra, Aristotle's Rhetoric and Poetics, Indian classical Dance (BhârataNatyam, Hindu Philosophy, Aesthetics and Theory of Arts, Malayalam Literature, Indian Writing in English, Shaivism, Sanskrit Philology, Sanskrit Grammar and Linguistics, Kashmir, Hindustani music, Natyasastra, Hindu Studies, Religion and Art, Sanskrit Studies, Sanskrit Aesthetics, Indian Philosophy, Indian Music, Dance and Arts, Rasashastra, Kashmir Shaivism, Rasa and bhakti, Shaiva Tantra, Kashmiri Shaivism, Bharata Natyashastra, Indian Poetics, Rasa Shastra, Tantra & Kashmir Saivism, History of Alankarashastra, Theory of Rasa and Design Education, Rasa, Śaivism, Anthropology of Religion, Kashmir Shaivism, Sanskrit language, Abhinavagupta, Rasa Theory, Indian Intellectual History, Hindu Shakta Tantra, Abhinavagupta, Kashmir Saivism, Śaiva and Buddhist tantras, Sanskrit Poetics (Particularly School of Dhvani, Anandavarddhan & Abhinavgupta), Dhvani and Rasa Theory, History of Tantra In India, Rasaśāstra, Pre modern South Asian Intellectual History, Natyasastra and Dramatics, Sanskrit Manuscript, Natya Sastra, Natyasastra and Abhinavabharati, and Indian Intellectual Traditions
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There have been a number of attempts at editing and translating the text of the Nāṭyaśāstra and Abhinavabhāratī, including most recently Professor K.D. Tripathi’s first volume of the Nāṭyaśāstra (2015) and a selection of translations... more
There have been a number of attempts at editing and translating the text of the Nāṭyaśāstra and Abhinavabhāratī, including most recently Professor K.D. Tripathi’s first volume of the Nāṭyaśāstra (2015) and a selection of translations included in Professor S. Pollock’s Rasa Reader (2016). Despite a relatively long history of scholarly engagement, however, much about this tradition remains poorly understood, and the texts themselves remain very difficult to establish conclusively: both texts are technical, and to add to this, the Nāṭyaśāstra is available in widely-divergent forms in several families of manuscripts, while the Abhinavabhāratī is available only in a highly corrupt form in a single family of manuscripts.
This workshop will principally include a close textual reading of selections from the Rasādhyāya (chapter 6) of the Nāṭyaśāstra of Bharatamuni—the celebrated work on Indian aesthetics—together with the Abhinavabhāratī commentary of Abhinavagupta. The discussion in the Abhinavabhāratī includes a critical overview of the history of Indian aesthetics up to Abhinavagupta himself in the tenth century, including such thinkers as Śrī Śaṅkuka, Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, etc. The aim of the workshop is not only to familiarize the participants with the principal questions and debates in Indian aesthetics, but also to discuss the philological challenges posed by these texts with experts in the field. We will therefore work with parallel texts and manuscripts in our readings of the Abhinavabhāratī.
This workshop will principally include a close textual reading of selections from the Rasādhyāya (chapter 6) of the Nāṭyaśāstra of Bharatamuni—the celebrated work on Indian aesthetics—together with the Abhinavabhāratī commentary of Abhinavagupta. The discussion in the Abhinavabhāratī includes a critical overview of the history of Indian aesthetics up to Abhinavagupta himself in the tenth century, including such thinkers as Śrī Śaṅkuka, Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, etc. The aim of the workshop is not only to familiarize the participants with the principal questions and debates in Indian aesthetics, but also to discuss the philological challenges posed by these texts with experts in the field. We will therefore work with parallel texts and manuscripts in our readings of the Abhinavabhāratī.
Research Interests: Religion, Sociology of Religion, Aesthetics, Philosophy Of Religion, Art History, and 33 morePerforming Arts, Art Theory, History of Religion, Dramaturgy, Philosophy of Art, History of Religions, Theological Aesthetics, History of Art, Indian Art, Kashmir, Natyasastra, Kashmiri Literature, Religion and Art, Sanskrit Studies, Sanskrit Aesthetics, Indian Philosophy, Indian Music, Dance and Arts, Rasashastra, Kashmir Shaivism, Rasa and bhakti, Kashmiri Shaivism, Bharata Natyashastra, Rasa Shastra, Tantra & Kashmir Saivism, Theory of Rasa and Design Education, Rasa, Kashmir Shaivism, Sanskrit language, Abhinavagupta, Rasa Theory, Abhinavagupta, Non dual Śaivism of Kashmir, Kashmir Saivism, Sanskrit Poetics (Particularly School of Dhvani, Anandavarddhan & Abhinavgupta), Dhvani and Rasa Theory, Rasaśāstra, Kashmiriology, and Natyasastra and Abhinavabharati
The aim is to examine tantric scriptural and post-scriptural literature, much of which is unpublished or must be studied using numerous manuscripts. The Ratnatrayaparīkṣā is a ninth-century Kashmirian work in over 300 stanzas that deals... more
The aim is to examine tantric scriptural and post-scriptural literature, much of which is unpublished or must be studied using numerous manuscripts. The Ratnatrayaparīkṣā is a ninth-century Kashmirian work in over 300 stanzas that deals at length with all manner of tantric notions connected with sound, language and sonic creation. A short commentary by the famous twelfth-century South Indian theologian Aghoraśiva has been published, but large fragments of what seems to be an older, more exploratory and theologically intriguing commentary of unknown authorship survive in a manuscript in Mysore. The Sarvajñānottara is a non-dualist tantra that survives in a fragmentary ninth-century codex from Nepal, as well as in many damaged South Indian manuscripts. Its text can only fully be reconstructed, however, with the additional help of Aghoraśiva's dualist commentary, a further interest of which is that it consistently subverts the text's non-dualism by ingenious distortions. The Mokṣakārikā is a work on liberation by the earliest tantric theologian of whom works are known to survive, Sadyojotiḥ (c. 675–725). A tenth-century commentary by the Kashmirian thinker Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha has been published, but a recourse to manuscripts reveals that it can be improved on every page.
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Lecture by Keshavan Veluthat
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Parul Dave Mukherji
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This talk will introduce a newly developed method of structural analysis of Sanskrit commentaries on belletristic literature and discuss possible fields of its practical application. The logical starting point, but, actually speaking, the... more
This talk will introduce a newly developed method of structural analysis of Sanskrit commentaries on belletristic literature and discuss possible fields of its practical application. The logical starting point, but, actually speaking, the real historical finding and the probandum of the current analysis, is the observation of a parallelism between two phenomena, which have previously been noted and studied separately. These are: (1) the formulaic style of Sanskrit commentaries on mahākāvya- (observed from the point of view of literary analysis); and (2) the peculiar scribal habits exhibited within the manuscript transmission of individual commentaries (observed on the basis of their text-historical examination). In order to provide a wider picture of the proposed methodology, the lecture will discuss both the phenomena separately and eventually show how their combined notion evolved into the method of structural analysis. It will, furthermore, look at several related concepts developed within the Sanskrit tradition, and refer to additional considerations concerning the composition and the style of the commentarial literature on mahākāvya- in Sanskrit.
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Lecture by Professor John Nemec
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Lecture by Dr Elaine Fisher
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Lecture by Dr Andrew Ollett
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Lecture by Dr Daniele Cuneo
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Lecture by Professor Gary Tubb
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Lecture by Prof Prashant Keshavamurthy
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Lecture by Dr Michael Slouber
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Inaugural Lecture by Prof Deepak Sarma
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Lecture by Prof Ashok Aklujkar
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Lecture by Prof Ashok Aklujkar
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Research Interests: Languages and Linguistics, Language Policy and Politics of Identity, Hindi/Urdu, Linguistic Diversity (Languages And Linguistics), Politics of Language Policy & Planning, and 5 moreThe politics of Language, Culture and Identity, Politics of Language, Language of Politics, Language Politics; Cultural Institutions;history of Indian Social Sciences, and Hindi Urdu Language and Literature
Posted on 12 August 2019 by elisa freschi-For past couple of decades, the idea of liberal arts in higher education in India is going through a process of churning. As a part of this a number of educational platforms, both public and... more
Posted on 12 August 2019 by elisa freschi-For past couple of decades, the idea of liberal arts in higher education in India is going through a process of churning. As a part of this a number of educational platforms, both public and private, have come to the forefront. One could not imagine exclusive world class universities only catering to liberal arts some twenty years back in India. But they are a reality now. One such experiment was made by the well-known philosopher and public intellectual Sundar Sarukkai at Manipal in 2010 where I teach now. His idea was to create a committed space for the study of philosophy, both eastern and western. Unfortunately, that did not happen. Sarrukai decided to leave the institution in 2016 and recently philosophy was also removed from the curriculum. The question is not about philosophy or not-philosophy. 'Philosophy will survive far better outside these institutions', as Sundar Sarukkai would put it. The question is why are institutions afraid of serious engagement with philosophy? Of course, the question could also be why are institutions vary of engaging with serious philosophy. Who are they afraid of? This question holds importance for me because I think our commitment, as academics, towards our disciplines should be over and above the allegiance we share towards an institution or an authoritative individual. Philosophy is the backbone discipline for all other disciplines. All disciplines work under the rubrics of a philosophy. Thus, we have philosophy of history, philosophy of economics or philosophy of sociology etc. and when Philosophy itself is discussed as a discipline, we talk about the meta-philosophical investigations, in other words-how is the philosophy of philosophy done. I think a subject like philosophy is particularly seen as intimidating by institutions because it teaches us the art of questioning with rigour. Philosophical robustness, for instance, also teaches us how to question hegemony-that is traditionally so deeply ingrained in the 'philosophy' of educational institutions in India. A democratic institution is an organized idea in a structured form. Institutions should not be afraid of ideas, rather they should learn how to engage with ideas and also create opportunities for others for discussing ideas from different points of view. Institutions need vision. And this vision is not cultivated overnight. A number of struggling minds over a longer period of time with the help of all like-minded supporters gradually develop into a vision that eventually takes the shape of an ideal institution. These institutions need to develop their own vision over a period of time without which they would be running a mindless mind. I recently took closer cognizance of this when I was invited for a lecture in Shimoga, a city in the central part of the Karnataka State. I was to speak on the
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This course will closely investigate one of the major currents of the classical Indian non-realistic (Idealistic) school/s viz. the non-dualistic or Advaita Vedānta through its textual sources. One of the champions of non-realistic and... more
This course will closely investigate one of the major currents of the classical Indian non-realistic (Idealistic) school/s viz. the non-dualistic or Advaita Vedānta through its textual sources. One of the champions of non-realistic and non-dualistic philosophical systems in pre-modern South Asia has been Śaṅkara (or Śaṃkara, c. 8th century CE). His non-dualistic Vedanta comprehends both the last major portion of the Vedas, the Upanishads, and their systematization in the terse Brahma-Sūtras. As the author of the first extant commentary on these sutras and other core Vedanta texts, including the Bhagavad Gita, Śaṅkara largely set the terms for later debates among the exponents of different theological positions within the broader Vedanta tradition. Due to his insistence on the ultimate non-difference (advaita) of the highest brahman and the innermost self (ātman) of each and every conscious being, Śaṅkara has often been labeled as a "Buddhist in disguise" by theist Vedantins and other rivals; yet, in later hagiographical traditions, he is credited with defeating many Buddhist opponents and contributing to its disappearance from the subcontinent. The first half of the course will investigate the non-dual Vedānta epistemology largely focusing on the works of Śaṅkara. The prescribed readings will set the tone for our investigation into the Advaita epistemology exploring how Śaṅkara maps the discourse about true cognition versus false cognition. This will gradually pave a way for the investigation of a 17th century Advaita-Vedānta text titled the Vedānta Paribhāṣā by Dharmaraja Adhvarindra. The latter half of the course will follow the close reading of this text in translation. This course will focus on the following objectives:-Provide a coherent understanding of non-dual epistemology in classical Indian philosophy.-Critically evaluate the major theoretical perspectives and debates on Indian epistemology.-Highlight the major thinkers in non-dual tradition of Vedānta.
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With the rapid technological advancement in the area of media communication, speech like a piercing arrow, moves fast to get viral and leaves its gruesome scar in the mind of the hearer; thus giving the impression that speech has only a... more
With the rapid technological advancement in the area of media communication, speech like a piercing arrow, moves fast to get viral and leaves its gruesome scar in the mind of the hearer; thus giving the impression that speech has only a devastating role. But for a tradition which speaks of worshipping speech, the role of speech is believed to be something beneficial. Accordingly, in the Indian philosophical tradition, formulation of the conditions for a proper or right communication has been highlighted from the beginning. In this lecture, my objective is to present the Buddhist view in this regard.
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To invoke another mind is to 'relate' to it; it is to draw the encounter with the other mind into the orbit of one's own conceptuality; it is to draw 'the' concept (so to speak) in its otherness into the concept in its return to itself... more
To invoke another mind is to 'relate' to it; it is to draw the encounter with the other mind into the orbit of one's own conceptuality; it is to draw 'the' concept (so to speak) in its otherness into the concept in its return to itself after this encounter. Can relation-as-concept be thought from outside the sphere of (the movement of) the negative? By the same token, this paper tries to think 'relation' from out of historicity (as in the line of thought between Hegel and Heidegger). It does this by hewing close to certain moments in Dharmakirti and then by backward recourse to Bhartrhari. In passing the paper addresses some issues raised in recent debates in the study of Kashmir Saivism, and in the recent book on the 'the social' by Guru and Sarukkai; in closing I make reference to Bahina(bai).
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There is a persisting ambiguity in distinguishing one individual from another. The physical boundaries of a body might seem to ‘localise’ an individual but even in this case such a view is dependent on a theory of matter. In the case of... more
There is a persisting ambiguity in distinguishing one individual from another. The physical boundaries of a body might seem to ‘localise’ an individual but even in this case such a view is dependent on a theory of matter. In the case of minds, the boundary between one individual and another is much more fuzzy, and is well illustrated by the interconnectedness of the categories of the individual and the social. Given the empirical justification for collective action and collective thought among humans, as well as work on group intelligence particularly among other creatures, it might seem natural to make an ontological commitment to some version of ‘social mind’. However, problems of locating social agency - within an individual or within a group - continue to raise major difficulties. In this talk, I will explore the reasons for arguing for a meaningful understanding of ‘social minds’ and related terms like ‘social self’ and ‘social authority’, drawing upon my recent book, coauthored with Gopal Guru, titled Experience, Caste and the Everyday Social.
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In this talk I attempt to do two things. First, following Vasubandhu’s lead, I will suggest that there are interesting questions that are obscured when one foregrounds the problem of knowing other minds the way that Indian epistemology... more
In this talk I attempt to do two things. First, following Vasubandhu’s lead, I will suggest that there are interesting questions that are obscured when one foregrounds the problem of knowing other minds the way that Indian epistemology does after Dharmakīrti and the way that many European philosophers have learnt to do since the early-modern period. The interesting questions have to do with this: how shall we characterize self-knowledge accurately and without assigning it undue epistemological weight? The problem of other minds, Vasubandhu intimates, only gets going as a peculiar problem when one has offered a naïve characterization of what self-knowledge involves. We ought to resist such pictures of self-knowledge. But which pictures exactly? And how shall we resist them? Hence my second goal. I’ll ask you to set aside the learned epistemological treatises on other minds and invite you to pick up, instead, a certain kind of premodern narrative. To expand on Vasubandhu’s point, I believe that some of our problems are anthropological, not epistemological. I offer examples from Buddhist and Hindu narratives to get a better feel for why knowing one’s own mind can be modeled as knowledge of the mind of another, or knowledge from the point of view of another mind. I conclude by reflecting on what such ways of modeling self-knowledge (and thought) might mean for there being a problem of other minds. I also briefly discuss what lessons we might learn with respect to the idea of “problems” in philosophy more generally. In so doing, we shall take up A. K. Chatterjee’s meta-philosophical suggestion that philosophy, at the end of the day, might involve something other than a series of technical solutions to theoretical problems: it might, instead, have the flavor of myth or mystery.
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While writing his commentary on the first Nyāyasūtra, Vātsyāyana divides artha into four groups: the knower, the instruments of knowledge, the objects of knowledge, and knowledge itself. There are an infinite number of knowers. A... more
While writing his commentary on the first Nyāyasūtra, Vātsyāyana divides artha into four groups: the knower, the instruments of knowledge, the objects of knowledge, and knowledge itself. There are an infinite number of knowers. A reflection on other minds is actually a reflection on the other knowers. In Nyāya, three epistemologically connected and irreducible to one another tattvas are accepted: ātman, śarīra and manas. Usually, the mind is translated as manas but in the present context, the mind has to be understood as ātman. According to Nyāya, ātman is the knower and manas is an instrument of knowledge. Ātman is distinct from śarīra, hence, not perceptible through external senses as external senses require certain conditions to operate. The visual sense can grasp only the colour and coloured object. The tactile sense can grasp touch and the tactile object. Olfactory sense can grasp only the smell. The gustatory sense can grasp only the taste. The auditory sense can grasp only the sound. Ātman is devoid of colour and touch hence cannot be grasped by any external sense organ. But ātman is not completely imperceptible, rather it is perceptible by our internal sense organ, the manas. However, the ātman is perceived, only when there is a perceptible special quality like cognition, desire, pleasure, or pain. We all know that without employing any of our external senses we are aware when we are happy, when we desire, when we know or when we are in pain. We know ourselves through internal perception as 'I know', 'I desire’, ‘I am happy', 'I am in pain'. But how do we know the other knowers? There is no possibility of external perception as the knower cannot even know himself through external perception. Nyāya says that we know others through inference. We do not become aware of other knowers through perception rather through inference. rathagatyeva sārathiḥ—when we see a chariot moving, we infer the presence of the rider in the chariot because the chariot cannot move on its own without a rider. In the same way, we become aware of the other knowers in the other bodies. Śarīra is very much similar to a chariot; it is in need of a controller to move. Only a knower can control. Śarīra cannot act on its own.
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According to the popular understanding of Cārvāka-darśana, Cārvākas accept only perception as the authentic means to knowledge, that is, pramāṇa. Cārvākas because of such a restrictive epistemology have often been criticised for not... more
According to the popular understanding of Cārvāka-darśana, Cārvākas accept only perception as the authentic means to knowledge, that is, pramāṇa. Cārvākas because of such a restrictive epistemology have often been criticised for not accounting satisfactorily for everyday practices. That is because non-acceptance of inference is inconsistent with communicative relation with the other. That is why Dharmakīrti in his theory of inference cites ‘Inference is not a pramāṇa’, as an instance of fallacious thesis, which commits the fallacy of pragmatic contradiction. The author holds that the charge of pragmatic contradiction cannot be levelled against all epistemological models of Cārvākas. Though the popular Cārvāka view accepts only perception as pramāṇa, the sophisticated Cārvāka view accepts a certain type of inference also. Now the question arises whether the sophisticated Cārvāka epistemology can provide epistemic grounds to common sense practices in general and other-mind-realism in particular. The author shows that Purandara’s version of Cārvāka epistemology according to which Cārvākas accept lokaprasiddha-anumāna along with perception, is the most suitable model for justifying the existence of other minds. The paper concludes by asking whether lokaprasiddha-anumāna can give a conclusive proof of other minds. He argues that belief in the existence of other minds is a necessary presupposition of communicative and social practices. It is doubtful whether it enjoys the status of knowledge.
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If you take the stand, as Mahimabhaṭṭa and the great majority of Indian poeticians do, that literature is a form of communication rather than a mode of self expression, your philosophy becomes inexorably bound with the problem of ‘Other... more
If you take the stand, as Mahimabhaṭṭa and the great majority of Indian poeticians do, that literature is a form of communication rather than a mode of self expression, your philosophy becomes inexorably bound with the problem of ‘Other minds’. Henceforth the institution of letters becomes a message transmitted by the addresser to the addressee. Mahimabhaṭṭa argues that all literature is like any other form of linguistic communication and all communication is intended to influence others. The aim of linguistic communication is to create certain behavioural effects in the addressee. According to Mahimabhaṭṭa an addresser can influence an intelligent addressee only through logic and not through the force of oratory. When the addressee is convinced of the logic of the argument, he accepts the proposition and decides to act accordingly. All language thus becomes argumentative in function and inevitably takes the form of a syllogism. The corollary of this view is that without the assumption of ‘other minds’ at the receiving end (no pun intended), it is meaningless to speak about literature and other forms of language. But unfortunately, we know next to nothing about the ontological status of other people and their minds in Mahimabhaṭṭa’s scheme, especially as his extant Vyaktiviveka is silent about the problem and the ‘śāstra’ called Tattvoktikośa written by him which could have discussed the topic is not available to us except in a sole quotation. However, there is not an iota of evidence to assume that the other minds were conceived as projections or extensions of the subject in his scheme. On the other hand, a plurality of selves is implicit in such a scheme. Mahimabhaṭṭa conceives of other minds as rational entities, which can follow logical steps inherent in a syllogism. Inference, especially the one for others, presupposes certain axiomatic knowledge on the part of the language user who is the addresser about the mindset of the addressee. The speaker assumes that the addressee on the basis of which invariable concomitance is demonstrated as plausible. In other words, our self and the selves of others can be linked through language which always appeals to a universal realm of logical relations.
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According to the Śaiva nondualists Utpaladeva (fl. c. 925-975 CE) and Abhinavagupta (fl. c. 975-1025 CE), nothing exists apart from a single, infinite and omnipotent consciousness that assumes the countless forms of the phenomenal... more
According to the Śaiva nondualists Utpaladeva (fl. c. 925-975 CE) and Abhinavagupta (fl. c. 975-1025 CE), nothing exists apart from a single, infinite and omnipotent consciousness that assumes the countless forms of the phenomenal universe. While defending this position against various adversaries who believe that there is an external world, they borrow much from their Buddhist rivals, particularly Dharmakīrti (c. 600) and his commentators; but they also endeavour to distinguish their own idealism from the Buddhist Vijñānavāda. In the course of this debate the Śaivas discuss the arguments put forward by Dharmakīrti in his Santānāntarasiddhi so as to deal with the problem of other minds in a system designed to explain the totality of human experience without presupposing the existence of any object outside consciousness. The goal of this lecture is to show how Śaiva sources can help us understand Dharmakīrti’s treatise (according to which our knowledge of others is inferential) as well as the ways in which it was interpreted and criticized in Buddhist works that were available in medieval Kashmir but have not come down to us. It will also examine the Śaiva nondualists’ claim to present a better account of the process through which we become aware of the existence of other conscious entities – a process that, according to them, is neither perceptual nor inferential, and yet partakes of both perception and inference.
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In both Indian and Western philosophy, the spectre of solipsism haunts the discussion of other minds: how can we justify the vanishingly small credence we typically attach to the likelihood of solipsism? In both traditions, moreover, the... more
In both Indian and Western philosophy, the spectre of solipsism haunts the discussion of other minds: how can we justify the vanishingly small credence we typically attach to the likelihood of solipsism? In both traditions, moreover, the difficulty is often thought to be compounded for idealists, since solipsism is frequently taken to be an undesirable implication of idealism. Advaita Vedānta is standardly presented as a monistic idealism that seeks to avoid any such commitment to solipsism: the Self (ātman) is one, but the selves (jīva) are many. There is, however, one famous exception to this general trend: the sixteenth-century Advaitin preceptor Prakāśānanda, who holds both that seeing precedes creating (dṛṣṭisṛṣṭivāda) and that there is only one self (ekajīvavāda). I explore Prakāśānanda's motives for his self-avowedly radical position and the nature of his justificatory strategy.
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The purpose of this paper is to explore how Hegel, Husserl and Sartre grapple with the issue of existence or reality of other minds. Hegel works out his answer to this issue by showing that if there is a discovery of self-consciousness,... more
The purpose of this paper is to explore how Hegel, Husserl and Sartre grapple with the issue of existence or reality of other minds. Hegel works out his answer to this issue by showing that if there is a discovery of self-consciousness, then its mediating forms must take for its "object" nothing less than another selfconsciousness. This discovery is exemplified in the "struggle for recognition", which culminates into his dialectic of master and slave. Through his discussion of the allied notions of recognition and spirit, Hegel shows that it is only in another consciousness that I become "radically" conscious of myself. Husserl seeks his solution to solipsism through his notion of "inter-subjectivity". He begins by grounding his postulation of "transcendental ego" on the basic distinction between "natural attitude" and "phenomenological attitude". Against the charge of solipsism, he explains how one transcendental ego can experience another transcendental ego on par with itself. Husserl, however, ultimately does not think of others' existence except "analogically". Sartre's starting point in thinking about the existence of others is also, like Hegel and Husserl, via consciousness. Though he regards consciousness-especially pre-reflective cogito-as subject-less or selfless , he holds that all consciousness is also consciousness of consciousness at the same time. Calling Hegel's solution as a "significant" improvement over Husserl's, Sartre thinks that the appearance of the other is indispensable for the very existence of my self-consciousness. Yet, he finds fault with Hegel for formulating this ontological problem in terms of knowledge. He famously resolves this using "The Look" or "Shame". In a conscious subject, shame is an experience of being "looked at" while engaging in some vulgarity. In this experience, one recognizes that I am as the other sees me.
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The lecture will discuss the role solipsism played in the Buddhist philosophical discussion in ancient India and will set out to analyze some of the main positions Buddhist thinkers adopted on the existence of other minds.
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Philosophers and Cognitive Scientists have become accustomed to distinguishing the first person perspective from the third person perspective on reality or experience. This is sometimes meant to mark the distinction between the... more
Philosophers and Cognitive Scientists have become accustomed to distinguishing the first person perspective from the third person perspective on reality or experience. This is sometimes meant to mark the distinction between the “objective” or “intersubjective” attitude towards things and the “subjective” or “personal” attitude. Sometimes, it is meant to mark the distinction between knowledge and mere opinion. Sometimes it is meant to mark the distinction between an essentially private and privileged access to an inner world and a merely inferential or speculative access to that world. No doubt there are other uses as well. But I don't care about this dichotomy here, or indeed any of these putative distinctions it is alleged to mark. Instead, I want to call attention to the central role of the less often acknowledged grammatical and phenomenological category, that of the second person. This category is essential not only for understanding the development of self- understanding, but also for the development of the moral sense that allows us to participate in the societies that constitute us as persons. The task of moral education is the cultivation of care for second persons. But we do so by extending not self-regard (for that is inextensible—others are not oneself), but by extending the spontaneous caring response we have for those with whom we immediately interact—second persons. Our moral lives, I will argue, like our cognitive lives, cannot be understood without understanding the special nature of second person relationships. In short, I will argue that the second person perspective is in fact essential to the constitution of human subjectivity, and that it permeates all forms of interpersonal consciousness and even self-consciousness.
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After Peter Strawson, contemporary Western analytic philosophy discredited the classic analogical argument explaining our knowledge of other minds. Dharmakirti (6 th century CE) proposes an ingenious version of the analogical argument... more
After Peter Strawson, contemporary Western analytic philosophy discredited the classic analogical argument explaining our knowledge of other minds. Dharmakirti (6 th century CE) proposes an ingenious version of the analogical argument which Abhinavagupta dismantles piece by piece. After sketching out the problems faced by the theorytheory, simulation-theory and direct empathy theory which have come to replace the analogical argument in the recent Western philosophy of mind, this lecture will recreate one argument given by Abhinavagupta (early 11th century Kashmiri Shaiva philosopher of the Tri-Powered Recognition School) to the effect that even in another's body one can feel and recognize one's own self, if one is able to address that embodied person as a "you". The otherness of you does not take away from its subjectivity. In so far as every second person whom one can address is, first, a person, they are also a first person. Even to regret that I do not know how exactly another person is feeling right now, I must have some general access to the subjective experience of that other person, for otherwise what is it that I feel so painfully ignorant about? Supplementing Abhinavagupta's theory of addressing-elaborated by Ramachandra Gandhi-with K.C. Bhattacharya's phenomenological analysis of the judgment: 'This is you'-as a de-objectifying/ subjectivizing vocative speech act, which-as it were-'selves the other', the lecture will end with a suggested theory of the I as the you of you, as addressable by an addressee.