MOHAMMED BIN ZAYED
Classified by Ambassador Richard Olson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Mr President: Shaykh Mohammed bin Zayed is looking forward
to renewing your acquaintanceship, established during his 2006 call
on you.
--------------------------------------------- ----
MbZ - The Man
--------------------------------------------- ----
2. (C) Shaykh Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, or MbZ in USG speak, is
the man who runs the United Arab Emirates. Officially he is the
Crown Prince of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi (the most important
principality of the seven emirate confederation) and his only federal
title is Deputy Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces; in fact he is
the key decision maker on national security issues. He will make
deferential noises about his "boss" (elder half-brother President
Khalifa, a distant and uncharismatic personage), but we assess that
he has authority in all matters except for final decisions on oil
policy and major state expenditures.
3. (C) Aged 47, MbZ is a leader not just in the UAE, but more
broadly in the Middle East, where he is seen as a particularly
dynamic member of the generation succeeding the geriatric cases who
have dominated the region for decades. He is a reformer, actively
seeking to improve the life of his citizens and the UAE's future
through better education and health care, and through economic
diversification, including investments in clean energy to prepare his
citizenry for a post-hydrocarbon future. He is proud of the fact
that despite having had the option of life of privilege, he rose
through the ranks of the UAE Armed Forces, earning his wings as a
helicopter pilot and retains a common touch that appeals to Emiratis.
--------------------------------------------- ----
MbZ and the Bilateral Relationship
--------------------------------------------- ----
4. (C) MbZ has staked his reputation, and his country's future, on
its relationship with the United States, especially since 1990, when
the UAE leadership saw that the United States was prepared to shed
blood in the interests of preserving international order and
stability in the Gulf. Since that formative experience, MbZ has
built armed forces (especially his Air Force) that are closely
aligned with the US. He is also a proponent of close economic,
commercial, and where possible political ties with the US. He has
generally tried to support us where he thinks we have been right
(Afghanistan), but also where he thinks we have pursued misguided
policies (Iraq). MbZ recognizes that partnership with the US is
fundamental to the UAE's continued success, but he also knows that
the relationship is controversial among his people, and that if the
US is perceived as an unreliable protector, his own power base will
erode.
--------------------------------------------- ----
Iran
--------------------------------------------- ----
5. (C) MbZ sees Iran as the primary external threat to the UAE and
his regime. To his eyes, Tehran's threatening rhetoric, dominance by
proxy, and pursuit of nuclear weapons is reminiscent of Saddam in
1990. Moreover, the confrontations with Iran during the late 1980s
tanker wars, long forgotten in the West, are vividly remembered here.
MbZ is probably the most passionately anti-Iran of the Arab leaders,
and the UAE's position is solidly with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan
in seeing the principal threat to the region as coming from Iran.
MbZ is particularly concerned at the divisions among the Gulf Arabs,
and sees Qatar's and Oman's decision to accommodate, rather than
challenge, Iranian power as troubling.
6. (S/NF) While MbZ is a hard liner on Iran, there are
accommodationists within his own system, especially in Dubai, where
the Ruler, Mohammed bin Rashid Al-Maktoum (Prime Minister of the UAE)
takes a position that is much closer to Qatar's. For this reason,
and because of the basic disparity in size and power between the UAE
and Iran, the Emiratis prefer to be seen as quietly supporting a
hard-line US position, rather than staking out their own views. MbZ
is skeptical that US engagement with Iran will be successful in
reversing Iranian positions on nuclear program, and believes that a
policy of engagement puts him in an awkward position, both
domestically and internationally. He will welcome thinking on next
steps on sanctions.
7. (S/NF) Regarding the nuclear issue, MbZ believes that the logic
of war now dominates the region. He regularly expresses his belief
that Israel will launch a pre-emptive strike against Iranian nuclear
facilities, most likely within next six months. This reflects his
own assessment of the Netanyahu Government, but also, probably, what
Israelis are telling UAE in their private exchanges. For this
reason, one of MbZ's highest priorities is to finalize his integrated
air defense system (including THAAD and Patriots) and advance
bilateral contingency planning with the US. Because of Qatari and
Omani wobbliness, he is uncomfortable with multilateral (GCC)
military solutions. MbZ may float the idea of extending the US
nuclear umbrella to the Gulf as a way of shoring up an anti-Iran
coalition, and preventing a regional arms race.
--------------------------------------------- ----
Israel and the Arabs
--------------------------------------------- ----
8. (S/NF) MbZ's pre-occupation with Iran (and his secondary concern
about Islamic fundamentalism) lead him to have a strategic view of
the region that is curiously close to the Israeli one. But domestic
politics flow the other way, and he feels constrained in what he can
say publicly. Also, for reasons that are not entirely clear, the UAE
still feels a need to hide behind Arab League and GCC consensus, and
in particular behind Saudi Arabia (even when, as is now the case,
bilateral relations with the Kingdom are rocky).
9. (S/NF) We should press MbZ to expend political capital in
resolving the century old Arab-Israeli conflict. The issue cries out
for leadership in the Arab world, not least so that the common
interests of moderate Arabs and Israelis in containing Iran can find
a political expression. So far, MbZ has not been prepared to run
real risks in this area, but we should press him to. He appreciates
the bold steps you have taken, and expects to be asked for help in
this area.
--------------------------------------------- ----
Afghanistan-Pakistan
--------------------------------------------- ----
10. (C) The discussion on Afghanistan and Pakistan should be an easy
one. The UAE has played a useful role since 2001, having deployed
Special Forces there since 2003, and recently sending a Battalion
sized task force during the elections. MbZ tried to organize a
pan-Arab force, but could not overcome the resistance of Moroccans
and Tunisians to send troops. In Pakistan, the UAE has been
supportive of Zardari and played a very useful role both as donor and
politically as one of the key members of the friends of Pakistan
grouping. MbZ agrees on the need to curtail Taliban financing, but
is frustrated by our seeming inability to generate actionable
intelligence.
--------------------------------------------- ----
CT/CP Cooperation
--------------------------------------------- ----
11. (C) The UAE has emerged as one of our principal partners in CT
Cooperation through intelligence channels, having rounded up a number
of cells over the past few years, and is moving toward cooperation
externally as well. In the counterproliferation area, the UAE has
interdicted 20 shipments over the past two years, including within
the past few days, seizing North Korean systems bound for Iran.
Domestic Export Controls have lagged somewhat, but the UAEG's
bureaucratic structure for implementing its export control laws is
finally emerging.
--------------------------------------------- ----
Conclusion
--------------------------------------------- ----
12. (C) MbZ views himself as one our closest partners in the Middle
East, and is keen to build on what has been an important aspect of
his life's work, a good relationship with the US. From my
perspective, our relationship with the UAE is one the most promising
and productive in the region.
OLSON
| SCENESETTER FOR THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH SHAYKH MOHAMMED BIN ZAYED | |
2009 August 31, 10:05 (Monday) |
09ABUDHABI862_a |
SECRET,NOFORN |
SECRET,NOFORN |
|
-- Not Assigned -- |
8576 |
-- Not Assigned -- |
TEXT ONLINE |
-- Not Assigned -- |
TE - Telegram (cable) |
|
-- N/A or Blank -- -- N/A or Blank -- |
-- Not Assigned -- |
-- Not Assigned -- |
|
Content
Raw content
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000862
NOFORN
DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR SRAP, S/SEMEP AND NEA.
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2018
TAGS: PREL, AE
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH SHAYKH
MOHAMMED BIN ZAYED
Classified by Ambassador Richard Olson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Mr President: Shaykh Mohammed bin Zayed is looking forward
to renewing your acquaintanceship, established during his 2006 call
on you.
--------------------------------------------- ----
MbZ - The Man
--------------------------------------------- ----
2. (C) Shaykh Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, or MbZ in USG speak, is
the man who runs the United Arab Emirates. Officially he is the
Crown Prince of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi (the most important
principality of the seven emirate confederation) and his only federal
title is Deputy Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces; in fact he is
the key decision maker on national security issues. He will make
deferential noises about his "boss" (elder half-brother President
Khalifa, a distant and uncharismatic personage), but we assess that
he has authority in all matters except for final decisions on oil
policy and major state expenditures.
3. (C) Aged 47, MbZ is a leader not just in the UAE, but more
broadly in the Middle East, where he is seen as a particularly
dynamic member of the generation succeeding the geriatric cases who
have dominated the region for decades. He is a reformer, actively
seeking to improve the life of his citizens and the UAE's future
through better education and health care, and through economic
diversification, including investments in clean energy to prepare his
citizenry for a post-hydrocarbon future. He is proud of the fact
that despite having had the option of life of privilege, he rose
through the ranks of the UAE Armed Forces, earning his wings as a
helicopter pilot and retains a common touch that appeals to Emiratis.
--------------------------------------------- ----
MbZ and the Bilateral Relationship
--------------------------------------------- ----
4. (C) MbZ has staked his reputation, and his country's future, on
its relationship with the United States, especially since 1990, when
the UAE leadership saw that the United States was prepared to shed
blood in the interests of preserving international order and
stability in the Gulf. Since that formative experience, MbZ has
built armed forces (especially his Air Force) that are closely
aligned with the US. He is also a proponent of close economic,
commercial, and where possible political ties with the US. He has
generally tried to support us where he thinks we have been right
(Afghanistan), but also where he thinks we have pursued misguided
policies (Iraq). MbZ recognizes that partnership with the US is
fundamental to the UAE's continued success, but he also knows that
the relationship is controversial among his people, and that if the
US is perceived as an unreliable protector, his own power base will
erode.
--------------------------------------------- ----
Iran
--------------------------------------------- ----
5. (C) MbZ sees Iran as the primary external threat to the UAE and
his regime. To his eyes, Tehran's threatening rhetoric, dominance by
proxy, and pursuit of nuclear weapons is reminiscent of Saddam in
1990. Moreover, the confrontations with Iran during the late 1980s
tanker wars, long forgotten in the West, are vividly remembered here.
MbZ is probably the most passionately anti-Iran of the Arab leaders,
and the UAE's position is solidly with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan
in seeing the principal threat to the region as coming from Iran.
MbZ is particularly concerned at the divisions among the Gulf Arabs,
and sees Qatar's and Oman's decision to accommodate, rather than
challenge, Iranian power as troubling.
6. (S/NF) While MbZ is a hard liner on Iran, there are
accommodationists within his own system, especially in Dubai, where
the Ruler, Mohammed bin Rashid Al-Maktoum (Prime Minister of the UAE)
takes a position that is much closer to Qatar's. For this reason,
and because of the basic disparity in size and power between the UAE
and Iran, the Emiratis prefer to be seen as quietly supporting a
hard-line US position, rather than staking out their own views. MbZ
is skeptical that US engagement with Iran will be successful in
reversing Iranian positions on nuclear program, and believes that a
policy of engagement puts him in an awkward position, both
domestically and internationally. He will welcome thinking on next
steps on sanctions.
7. (S/NF) Regarding the nuclear issue, MbZ believes that the logic
of war now dominates the region. He regularly expresses his belief
that Israel will launch a pre-emptive strike against Iranian nuclear
facilities, most likely within next six months. This reflects his
own assessment of the Netanyahu Government, but also, probably, what
Israelis are telling UAE in their private exchanges. For this
reason, one of MbZ's highest priorities is to finalize his integrated
air defense system (including THAAD and Patriots) and advance
bilateral contingency planning with the US. Because of Qatari and
Omani wobbliness, he is uncomfortable with multilateral (GCC)
military solutions. MbZ may float the idea of extending the US
nuclear umbrella to the Gulf as a way of shoring up an anti-Iran
coalition, and preventing a regional arms race.
--------------------------------------------- ----
Israel and the Arabs
--------------------------------------------- ----
8. (S/NF) MbZ's pre-occupation with Iran (and his secondary concern
about Islamic fundamentalism) lead him to have a strategic view of
the region that is curiously close to the Israeli one. But domestic
politics flow the other way, and he feels constrained in what he can
say publicly. Also, for reasons that are not entirely clear, the UAE
still feels a need to hide behind Arab League and GCC consensus, and
in particular behind Saudi Arabia (even when, as is now the case,
bilateral relations with the Kingdom are rocky).
9. (S/NF) We should press MbZ to expend political capital in
resolving the century old Arab-Israeli conflict. The issue cries out
for leadership in the Arab world, not least so that the common
interests of moderate Arabs and Israelis in containing Iran can find
a political expression. So far, MbZ has not been prepared to run
real risks in this area, but we should press him to. He appreciates
the bold steps you have taken, and expects to be asked for help in
this area.
--------------------------------------------- ----
Afghanistan-Pakistan
--------------------------------------------- ----
10. (C) The discussion on Afghanistan and Pakistan should be an easy
one. The UAE has played a useful role since 2001, having deployed
Special Forces there since 2003, and recently sending a Battalion
sized task force during the elections. MbZ tried to organize a
pan-Arab force, but could not overcome the resistance of Moroccans
and Tunisians to send troops. In Pakistan, the UAE has been
supportive of Zardari and played a very useful role both as donor and
politically as one of the key members of the friends of Pakistan
grouping. MbZ agrees on the need to curtail Taliban financing, but
is frustrated by our seeming inability to generate actionable
intelligence.
--------------------------------------------- ----
CT/CP Cooperation
--------------------------------------------- ----
11. (C) The UAE has emerged as one of our principal partners in CT
Cooperation through intelligence channels, having rounded up a number
of cells over the past few years, and is moving toward cooperation
externally as well. In the counterproliferation area, the UAE has
interdicted 20 shipments over the past two years, including within
the past few days, seizing North Korean systems bound for Iran.
Domestic Export Controls have lagged somewhat, but the UAEG's
bureaucratic structure for implementing its export control laws is
finally emerging.
--------------------------------------------- ----
Conclusion
--------------------------------------------- ----
12. (C) MbZ views himself as one our closest partners in the Middle
East, and is keen to build on what has been an important aspect of
his life's work, a good relationship with the US. From my
perspective, our relationship with the UAE is one the most promising
and productive in the region.
OLSON
Metadata
INFO LOG-00 EEB-00 AF-00 AID-00 AMAD-00 A-00 CIAE-00
INL-00 DOTE-00 PERC-00 DS-00 DHSE-00 FAAE-00 VCI-00
OBO-00 H-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 L-00 MOFM-00
MOF-00 M-00 VCIE-00 NEA-00 DCP-00 NSAE-00 DOHS-00
FMPC-00 IRM-00 SSO-00 SS-00 NCTC-00 CRYE-00 DSCC-00
PRM-00 SAS-00 FA-00 GSWA-00 SWCI-00 PESU-00 SRND-00
MEPP-00 SANA-00 /000W
O 311005Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2881
INFO SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
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