ESPAS Foresight Reflection
Paper Series
June 2018
Foresight Reflection Paper on
The Future of
Mobility and
Migration Within
and From SubSaharan Africa
Loren B Landau &
Caroline Wanjiku Kihato
AN INTER-INSTITUTIONAL
EU PROJECT
Disclaimer
This publication was prepared for the European Political Strategy Centre (EPSC) in the context of the forthcoming European Strategy and Policy
Analysis System (ESPAS) Global Trends to 2030 Report. The views expressed in this publication represent only the views of the authors. This
publication does not bind, nor may be attributed to, any of the European Union institutions and bodies participating in ESPAS, namely the European
Commission, the European Parliament, the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU and the European External Action Service, as well as the
Committee of the Regions, the European Economic and Social Committee and the European Investment Bank.
The report argues that global economic inequality and
demographic trends have already ‘locked in’ the general
patterns of sub-Saharan African migration for the
next thirty years. For sub-Saharan African economies
to absorb surplus labour, African states would almost
universally need to sustain two decades of economic
growth at a pace previously unseen in global history.
Moreover, those likely to enter the labour force in the
next 15-20 years are already being born or will be in
the coming five years. Even if the general trends are
likely to continue, three ‘second order’ variables will
importantly influence the consequences of human
mobility.
Executive summary
African migration – its drivers, dynamics, and
consequences –increasingly features in global policy
debates. Concerns vary widely, including everything
from economic and human development, human rights,
and human and state security. For OECD countries,
particularly members of the European Union, there
are additional concerns. These include securing labour
required to support an aging European population
and expensive social welfare system; upholding
commitments to human dignity; maintaining a positive
reputation and influence throughout the ‘global south’;
and politically derived imperative to starkly limit
spontaneous movements of Africans across Europe’s
external boundaries. As illustration, despite a growing
need for labour, the number of newly issued long-term
work permits (12+ months) for African labour migrants
has been reduced from 80.000 in 2008 to 20.000 in
2016.
1. The degree of socio-spatial inequality within subSaharan Africa. Greater equality (of wealth or
poverty) may limit movement while socio-spatial
inequality will likely exacerbate migration. The
latter is more likely as greater resource-based
wealth and the concentration of resources in elite
enclaves create concentrations of wealth. Even
modest economic growth across a country will likely
enable people to move while spatially concentrating
opportunities. Education and vocational training
may help generate small increases in African-based
employment, but are more likely to generate earning
potential and unmet earning expectations. This will
subsequently encourage movements towards more
diversified, high-wage, labour-poor locales.
Through an examination of existing data and drivers
of African mobility, this paper suggests there are few
reasons to expect dramatic changes in the sources,
directions, or nature of migration within and from
sub-Saharan Africa. Economic inequality (within the
continent and between Africa and Europe), climate
change, persecution, and conflict will continue to
encourage ever diversifying movements to cities, to
neighbouring countries, and beyond Africa. The vast
majority of those moving will stay within their countries
of citizenship or move to neighbouring countries. About
one-fifth of sub-Saharan migrants will seek passage to
Europe, Australasia, or North America (the percentage
from North Africa is much higher). Although the
proportion of Africans migrating internationally may
not substantially increase in the decades ahead, the
onset of the continent’s demographic boom will result
in many more Africans on the move. Ironically, current
development investments intended to sedentarize
would-be migrants or reduce fertility (and hence the
number of potential migrants) are only likely to intensify
movements.
2. Europe’s willingness to accept significant numbers
of African migrants and the strategies pursued to
regulate such movements. Recognising that African
incentives to enter Europe will remain strong, policies
enabling movement will reduce the costs of doing so
and the degree of violence, corruption, and organised
crime associated with migration.
3. African state strategies to facilitate or control
movements. These strategies – exercised at national,
regional, or continental scales, will produce a number
of externalities connected with political tensions,
human rights abuses, and criminalisation of public
institutions and business within Africa and Europe.
The paper ultimately outlines three plausible scenarios
stemming from demographic, economic, and political
variables. Within The Cosmopolitan Concord, European
and African leaders promote openness in ways that
limits corruption and violence while promoting sociospatial equality and migrant inclusion. Europe’s
openness to black Africans retains popular good will,
investment opportunities, and European political
influence. Under The Containment Compact, European
and African leaders seek to limit mobility without
countering heightening socio-spatial inequality. This
results in widespread violence, criminalisation, and
conflict across Africa and into Europe. Underground
migrant communities in Europe will be met by hostile,
Looking forward, Europe’s need for labour and its
relatively high wages (even if the absolute demand
decreases) will continue making it an attractive
destination for Africans from across the continent.
Increases in African education and experience increase
relative earning potential in Europe. Small increases in
Africans’ income within the continent will also make
possible longer-distance journeys. Given the Middle East’s
inability to produce surplus labour of the kind required,
Europe will need to call upon Africa as a primary source
of migrant labour. Eastern Europe may help ease that
dependence, but is unlikely to eliminate it.
2
nationalist mobilisations while China, Turkey, and
Russia gain economic and political influence across
sub-Saharan Africa. By contrast, Militerranean, results
from continued European closure to African migrants
countered by African openness with moderate levels of
inequality within Africa. While sub-Saharan Africa will
face reduced violence and corruption, the Mediterranean
will become militarised while Europe becomes an
ideological battleground. Overt and organised political
hostility to Europe by African political leaders leads
to economic closure and declining European influence.
Russia, China, and Turkey capitalise on and actively
encourage these hostilities through heightened aid and
trade.
The policy questions that remain are not whether people
will continue to come, but what will be the long-term
economic, political, cultural, and criminal consequences
of Europe’s efforts to prevent, contain, or redirect
movements.
Contents
Executive summary
List of abbreviations
Introduction
Methods and approach
Key findings and analysis
African migration to Europe
Primary African mobility drivers
Africa’s demographic trends
Overall wealth:
African migration governance
Scenario mapping African migration dynamics in 2035
Scenario One: Containment Compact
Scenario Two: Militerranean
Scenario Three: Cosmopolitan Concord
Concluding reflections
2
7
8
13
14
18
20
20
22
27
31
35
36
38
39
Tables
Table 1:
Table 2:
Table 3:
Table 4:
Table 5:
Emigrants as percentage of population, world regions (2017)
Number and annual rate of change of the international migrant stock by development group,
income level and region, 1990-2017
Migration within Sub-Saharan Africa, 2017
Regional population change (projected), 2015-2100
Labour market outlook for Africa (%) 2000-2016
3
15
16
16
22
26
Figures
Figure 1:
Figure 2:
Figure 3:
Figure 4:
Figure 5:
Figure 6:
Figure 7:
Figure 8:
Figure 9:
Figure 10:
Figure 11:
Figure 12:
Geographic distribution of African emigrants, percent of 2017 Total
Regional Origin of sub-Saharan African Migrants in the European Union (Total)
Regional Origin of sub-Saharan African Migrants in the European Union (per capita)
UN Population forecast in billions by world regions 2015-2100
Sub-Saharan African emigrant stocks vs GDP (Global and in European Union)
Intra-African emigrant stocks vs GDP (excluding island states)
Global African emigrant stocks vs youth employment (global and European Union)
Intra-African migrant stocks vs youth employment (excluding island states)
Real GDP growth by region 1996-2019
International migrant stocks vs urbanisation in sub-Saharan Africa and EU
Drivers of intra- and inter-African migration in 2035
Eight African migration outcomes
List of abbreviations
AU
COMESA
EAC
ECOWAS
EU
FMP
Frontex
GCM
GCR
IDP
IGAD
ILO
IOM
MENA
OECD
REC
SADC
SSA
UNDESA
UNECA
UNHCR
African Union (formerly the Organisation of African Unity)
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
East African Community
Economic Community of West African States
European Union
Free Movement of Persons Protocol of the African Union
The European Border and Coast Guard Agency
Global Compact on Migration
Global Compact on Refugees
Internally Displaced Person
Intergovernmental Authority on Development
International Labour Organisation
International Organisation for Migration
Middle East and North Africa
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Regional Economic Community
Southern African Development Community
Sub-Saharan Africa
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
4
17
19
19
21
23
24
24
25
26
27
31
34
The future of mobility and migration within and from Sub-Saharan
Africa
illegal entries was also not without precedent: the
numbers of African migrants crossing the Mediterranean
and claiming asylum in Europe rose sharply following
the Arab Spring (2011) and the fall of Libyan leader
Muammar Gaddafi.2 Most of these were from North
Africa, but consistently included people from further
south. As options for legal channels into Europe
decline, people sought entry by other means. Without
legal means to move, people took extraordinary risks.
According to the International Organisation for Migration
(IOM) 3,784 people died in 2015 as they made the
perilous journey from Africa to Europe. Although the
figures are uncertain, many more have died crossing the
Sahara.3
Introduction
This paper considers the future of international
migration within and from Africa. It is primarily
concerned with people from sub-Saharan Africa
moving within the continent and to other world regions.
It concentrates specifically on current and future
movements to or towards the European Union.
Many factors are likely to shape these movements
and understanding responses to African migration – in
Europe and elsewhere – demands situating Africans’
movements within global social and political trends.
Among these are varied movements towards Europe. In
2015, over 1 million people arrived in Italy and Greece
by boat after crossing the Mediterranean Sea.1 Almost
none of these people had entry visas and only about
20% were from the African continent. With increasingly
restrictive European immigration policies, most would
make asylum applications or disappear into the
underground economy. Most of those arriving since June
2016 were Africans.
Demographics and other material dynamics have been
less important than media representation and political
framing in shaping Europe’s response to sub-Saharan
African migration. The possibility of Greece leaving
the Eurozone; ongoing economic challenges stemming
from the 2008 global recession; ongoing political
negotiations with Russia and Turkey; and terrorist
shootings in France, Germany, Belgium and Denmark
infused European politics with a sense of insecurity.
Political leaders have exploited fears of globalisation
and cultural threats, unemployment, and inequality to
position themselves in the political mainstream with
xenophobic and racist ideas that would have been
shunned a decade ago.4 As centrist parties stave off
challenges from the far-right (or form coalitions with
them), the migration ‘crisis’ further exposed tensions
within European Union as countries debated who was
responsible for migrants and refugees.
When compared with 280,000 arrivals in 2014 or
60,000 in 2010, this spike in unauthorised movements
towards Europe has represented a moment of crisis
for European politicians and policymakers. Many of
those arriving were seeking protection from conflicts in
the Middle East. A smaller number were moving north
from Africa to seek safety and economic security. In the
subsequent years, the numbers moving from the Middle
East have dwindled while those from sub-Saharan
African continue to reach the European Union albeit in
declining numbers (190,000 in 2016; 146,000 in 2017;
and only 33,000 in the first six months of 2018). These
arrivals have not been uniform across the European
coastline with Italy remaining at the centre of these
movements.
In attempting to restore a sense of order, the European
Union and EU member states launched a series of
efforts intended to slow, divert, or halt unauthorised
movements of people towards Europe. Initial responses
were oriented towards those fleeing crisis in the Middle
East and Asia (e.g., Syria, Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan).
Subsequent activities centred on those originating in
Africa. These include a diverse set of initiatives, too
varied to discuss here in any detail. However, heightened
border control and externalization strategies seem to
have had the desired short-term effects: Although the
numbers of unauthorised entries remain higher than
pre-2014 totals, there was a 35% decline in irregular
Mediterranean crossings in 2016 (to 363,504). The
numbers fell still further in 2017 (to 171,635) and in
2018.5
Even if European citizens, politicians, and media outlets
viewed the 2015-2016 numbers of unauthorised
immigrants as extraordinary, sub-Saharan African
migration to Europe is by no means novel. Indeed, the
number of arrivals to Europe have remained relatively
constant although people are increasingly moving
outside of formal legal channels. Moreover, for many
years, countries such as France have actively sought
forms of ‘co-development’ designed to engage the
African diaspora in ways benefit Europe and sending
countries. The rise of undocumented migrants and
5
European attention to African mobility has generated a
‘crisis framing’ that demands almost immediate action
while obscuring a broader understanding of what is
driving African migration and who, how, and where
Africans are moving. Most importantly, it hides the fact
that African migration numbers to Europe are relatively
constant: although the numbers of Africans moving
without authorization to Europe increased dramatically
in 2015, the overall numbers did not. Moreover, the vast
majority of sub-Saharan Africans (upwards of 80%) are
continuing to move within the continent as they have
done for the past decades.6 (North Africans and people
from Jordan and the Gulf states also continue to move
as they have, largely towards Europe although there are
declines here as well.) This pattern is unlikely to change
substantially in the decades ahead.
opportunities to ensure that opportunities are available
to all families. This would reflect a marked break from
growth patterns in the resource-based economies that
have typically been among Africa’s best performers (e.g.,
Angola, Nigeria, and South Africa). More likely is that
even modest economic growth will spatially concentrate
opportunities with benefits accruing to the politically
connected. Although education and vocational training
are ends in themselves, without a structural shift in
Africa’s economies, these are likely to generate unmet
earning expectations. This will subsequently encourage
movements towards more diversified, high-wage,
labour-poor locales.
While heightened restrictions on crossing borders within
sub-Saharan Africa or along its external frontiers may
slow or distort movements, they will do little to change
absolute numbers. Rather, migration will become more
dangerous and permanent. Unauthorised overland and
maritime journeys will continue to represent a minority
of all moves. However, unless the European Union
is able to make entry to its territory extraordinarily
expensive – through a mix of coercion and penalties
– Africans will continue to journeying north. The policy
questions that remain are not whether people will
continue to come, but what will be the long-term
economic, political, cultural, and criminal consequences
of Europe’s efforts to slow movements.
Through an examination of existing data and drivers
of African mobility, this short paper suggests that
the current dynamics driving increased movements
in Africa will continue to create strong incentives that
will drive African mobility. At present, Africans remain
proportionally among the least migratory regions in
the world. Given prevailing poverty in many parts of
the continent, the percentage of Africans leaving their
homes is unlikely to rise sharply. Africans will largely
continue to move as they have in search of profit,
passage, and protection. However, given substantial
increases in the pool of potential movers – people
entering adulthood – this means substantial growth in
the absolute number of migrants. As is now the case,
the vast majority of those who leave their communities
of origin will stay within their countries of citizenship.7
Most will move to cities, secondary towns, or regions
with labour-intensive commercial agriculture or mining.
Those crossing borders are most likely to remain nearby,
typically within their respective regional economic
communities (RECs). Given the enhanced numbers of
people moving, destinations and duration are likely to
diversify in response to shifting migration policy, conflict,
and the concentration of economic opportunities.
This report argues that while global economic
inequality and demographic trends are unlikely to
change substantially within the next three decades,
three less stable ‘second order’ variables may shape
migration outcomes in important ways. The first is
economic equality within Africa. There is little evidence
that investments in African economic development
are likely to create the kind of labour absorption
required to halt movement.9 However, the extent
to which socio-spatial inequality is exacerbated or
reduced will shape movements going forward. Greater
inequality due to resource driven wealth and the
concentration of resources in elite enclaves will create
incentives for movement although may limit people’s
abilities to move. However, modest economic growth
across a country will likely enable people to move
while spatially concentrating opportunities. Similarly,
education and vocational training may help generate
small increases in African-based employment, but it is
more likely to generate earning potential and unmet
earning expectations. This will subsequently encourage
movements towards more diversified, labour-poor
locales.
Approximately 70% of sub-Saharan African
international migration remains within African Union
(AU) member states, down from 75% in 1990.8 This
change in percentage along with growing overall
populations foreshadows continued growth in absolute
terms of migrants headed towards the Middle East
and the European Union. There is little evidence that
internal or external investments in African economic
development are likely to create the kind of labour
absorption required to halt movement in the coming
decades. The residents of sub-Saharan Africa are so
poor that they would need two decades of sustained
economic growth at a pace almost previously unknown
in global history. Moreover, rises in GDP per capita
would need to coincide with an equalling of economic
The second two variables relate explicitly to migration
policy. The first is Europe’s willingness to accept
significant numbers of African migrants and the
strategies pursued to regulate such movements.
6
Recognising that African intention to enter Europe
will remain strong, policies enabling movement
will reduce the costs of doing so and the degree of
violence, corruption, and organised crime associate
with migration. Similarly, African state strategies to
facilitate or control movements will produce a number
of externalities connected with political tensions, human
rights abuses, corruption, and criminalisation.
As the data used for this report are exclusively historical,
they do not definitively demonstrate future paths for
any given country or for the region at large. Instead, they
capture past trends over time. This approach draws on a
growing literature on the relationship between migration
and development,11 and is the first to investigate
these trends for a specific world region. In many cases,
we exclude outliers from our analysis. These include
the island states (i.e., Mauritius, Seychelles) whose
populations are uncharacteristically wealthy and nonmobile. We also exclude countries that have experienced
dramatic displacement events due to natural or violent
crises. Rwanda, for example, is not included for the period
immediately following the 1994 genocide. Although
crises remain important in shaping migration, they are
largely unpredictable and skew generalised trends and
extrapolations.
The paper ultimately outlines three plausible scenarios
stemming from demographic, economic, and political
variables. Under The Containment Compact European
and African leaders seek to limit mobility without
countering heightening socio-spatial inequality. This
results in widespread violence, criminalisation, and
conflict across Africa and in to Europe. Underground
migrant communities in Europe will be met by hostile,
nationalist mobilisations. By contrast, within The
Cosmopolitan Concord, European and African leaders
promote openness in ways that limits corruption and
violence while promoting socio-spatial equality and
migrant inclusion. The final scenario, The Militerranean,
results from continued European closure to African
migrants countered by African openness with moderate
levels of inequality within Africa. While sub-Saharan
Africa will face reduced violence and corruption, the
Mediterranean will become militarised while Europe will
become an ideological battleground. China, Turkey, and
Russia will exploit Afro-European tensions for political
and economic advantage.
Building on an examination of past and current
migration drivers, we draw on standard scenario
planning techniques to explore possible future
projections. These distinguish between first and second
order variables likely to shape migration outcomes. The
first order variables – in this case European and African
demography and global economic inequality – shape
general trends and are likely to change dramatically
in the coming decades. The second order variables –
national economic inequality and African-European
immigration policies – will have secondary but important
mediating effects. There are an almost infinite number
of factors that could be included in such scenarios, most
of which must be overlooked in generating coherent
narratives. As our expertise is largely on African politics
and migration, we place greater emphasis on policies
and practices within or directly oriented towards Africa.
Internal European labour, social, and immigration
policies along with broader social attitudes and political
mobilization are all important but largely beyond the
scope of this analysis.
Methods and approach
This paper employs demographic and political analysis
to inform the outlined scenarios.10
The figures and maps draw on published sources,
largely United Nations (UNDESA) data and peerreviewed analyses. There are a series of original tables
and graphs offering insights into the relationships
among development, urbanisation, and mobility in subSaharan Africa. Many of the figures show nonparametric
cross-country regressions of sub-Saharan African
emigrant stock on various development indicators.
Data on emigrant stocks are from the United Nations
Population Division, income per capita is reported in
2005 constant USD from the Penn World Tables, and
other indicators are drawn from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators Database. Here, each country’s
emigrant stock is measured as the total number of
people born in that country residing outside that
country, divided by that country’s population. Trends
shown are separated by destination region – world total,
European Union, and African destinations excluding
internal migration – following the hypothesis that the
relationship between emigrant stocks and development
indicators may vary across different destinations.
Key findings and analysis
To provide historical background for future scenarios,
this section provides an overview of the key trends and
drivers shaping contemporary migration in Sub-Saharan
Africa. Where necessary, it incorporates data from North
Africa because shifts in regional dynamics may result in
new patterns of mobility between sub-Saharan Africa
(SSA) and that region. By way of summary:
• Between 2000 and 2017, the number of international
migrants in Africa increased from approximately
15 million to 25 million. Over this same period, the
percentage of all international migrants globally who
reside in Africa increased from 9 % to 10%.12 Due to
undercounting, the actual numbers may be considerably
higher.
7
• Urbanisation rates are not closely correlated with
international migration within sub-Saharan Africa, but
appear to be positively correlated to extra-continental
movements. This may also be explained by the strong
correlation between urbanisation and wealth;
• The growing number of people entering the labour
force will greatly increase the number of migrants
even if the percentage of people moving remains
constant;
• Strong economic growth and wealth are not generally
correlated with reduced international migration. Only
at levels of employment and income unlikely to be
achieved in the near future will Africa’s population
sedentarize.
• Viewed in global perspective, Africans are among
those least likely to move internationally (see Table
1). Much of this can be explained by generalised
poverty and poor transportation infrastructure
that denies people the resources to move towards
opportunities. When distinguishing between Africans
from North and South of the Sahara, sub-Saharan
Africans are even less likely to be on the move;
• Due to the relatively small numbers of sub-Saharan
African migrants, singular events (e.g., genocide, war,
climatic extremes) resulting in mass movement can
temporarily distort continental trends;
• Most sub-Saharan African migration is within Africa;
for those crossing international borders, most stay
within their regions, many in neighbouring countries;
• As elsewhere in the world, economic and spatial
inequality and demography are migration’s
primary drivers. However, conflict and persecution
disproportionately shape sub-Saharan African
mobility;
• Environmental events and broader patterns of
change are likely to exacerbate existing conflicts and
intensify patterns of mobility rather than mark a
dramatic break;
According to the United Nations, there were almost
258 million international migrants worldwide in 2017.
Africa hosts 24.7 million of these, about 10% of global
stock (See Tables 2 and 3). Between 2010 and 2017,
the continent experienced a 5.3% annual growth rate
in international migrant stocks – more the double the
world average and the largest increase amongst regions
of the world.13 Some of this is due to ongoing conflicts
(particularly in Somalia, South Sudan, and elsewhere).
Much is due to increased population.
Region
Emigrant stock (mil)
Population (mil)
Emigrants/population
Africa
36.3
1256.3
2.89%
Asia
105.7
4504.4
2.35%
Europe
61.2
742.1
8.25%
Latin America &
Caribbean
37.7
645.6
5.84%
North America
4.4
361.2
1.12%
World
257.7
7550.3
3.41%
International migrant stock
(millions)
1990
World
2000
2010
Average annual change in migrant
stock (per cent)
2017
19902000
20002010
20102017
20002017
152.2
172.6
2220.0
257.7
1.2
2.4
2.3
2.4
Developed region
82.4
103.4
130.7
146.0
2.3
2.3
1.6
2.0
Developing regions
70.2
69.2
89.3
111.7
-0.1
2.6
3.2
2.8
High-income countries
75.2
100.4
141.8
164.8
2.9
3.5
2.2
2.9
Middle-income countries
68.5
64.0
70.2
81.4
-0.7
0.9
2.1
1.4
8.5
7.7
7.5
10.9
-1.0
-0.2
5.3
2.0
Africa
15.7
14.8
17.0
24.7
-0.6
1.4
5.3
3.0
Asia
48.1
49.2
65.9
79.6
0.2
2.9
2.7
2.8
LAC
7.2
6.6
8.2
9.5
-0.9
2.3
2.02
2.2
NA
27.6
40.4
51.0
57.7
3.8
2.3
1.8
2.1
4.7
5.4
7.1
8.4
1.2
2.8
2.4
2.7
Low-income countries
Oceania
8
Origin 2017
Estimates
Destination (%)
Eastern Africa
Central Africa
Southern Africa
West Africa
Eastern Africa
82
15.10
59.96
0.07
Central Africa
17
66.39
8.30
2.59
1
1.87
29.65
0.03
0.21
16.63
2.10
97.32
Southern Africa
West Africa
Figure 1: Geographic distribution of African emigrants, percent of 2017 Total
Source: UNDESA
In line with global trends, most mobility in Africa
occurs within regions with the exception of North
Africa whose movements, for historical reasons, are
oriented towards Europe and the Middle East (see
Table 3 and Figure 1). Intense intra-regional mobility
is partly a factor of proximity – international migration
tends to occur between geographically proximate
countries. The figures also show that regions with free
movement and residency protocols tend to have more
intense circulation of people within them. This partially
explains why North Africa has so little movement
amongst countries while the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS) and the East African
Community (EAC) experience the most intense levels
of inter-regional mobility. North, Central, and Southern
Africa, which have no signed agreements on free
movement protocols, tend to have comparatively lower
levels of mobility then ECOWAS and the EAC (refer to
the following section for a discussion of regional and
continental governance frameworks).
While intra-regional movements dominate migration
patterns, fewer leave their regions. Contemporary
patterns of migration show that inter-regional
migration patterns are far less important than intraregional population movements. Where inter-regional
movements occur, it is typically between adjacent
regions, rather than disparate regions. For example,
Central Africa represents the second largest source of
migration for East Africa, whereas there is remarkably
little mobility between Southern and West Africa which
are on opposite ends of the continent. Again, these
patterns confirm the gravitational model hypothesis that
geographic distance plays a significant role in shaping
migration patterns.
African migration to Europe
Importantly, even if the majority of sub-Saharan
Africans still move within the continent, a greater
number are leaving Africa than in the past. Over the
past decades, the percentage of Africans reaching sites
9
outside the continent has risen.14 Regional analysis
reveals which regions are likely to be source countries
for intra- and extra-continental migration. Overall, North
Africans are far more likely to emigrate outside of the
continent, but the rate is decreasing. At its peak in 1980,
a North African was six times more likely to migrate
outside the continent than a sub-Saharan African.
Presently there is little difference in the propensity for
people in East, West, and Central Africa to move outside
the continent. The exception is South Africa, which saw
an acceleration in extra-continental movements linked to
political unrest in the 1980s and uncertainty during the
transition to democracy in the 1990s (See figures 2 and
3 below).
As Figure 2 (below) indicates, African migrants to
Europe are disproportionally from ECOWAS member
states (i.e., West Africans). As a proportion of total
migrants to the European Union, East Africa is almost
negligible. Although Figure 2 suggests West Africans are
increasingly prone to move, Figure 3 cautions against
regional generalisations. Rather, increases in migrants
from most regions generally track with population
growth. As populations increase, so too do the numbers
of people leaving their countries of birth within a given
region. As home to a significant and highly fertile
proportion of Africa’s population, West Africa is likely to
continue producing large numbers of regional and extraregional migrants.
As noted, most extra-continental emigration occurs in
North Africa as it has for decades. Yet since 1960, the
rate of emigrants leaving the continent from countries
like Ethiopia, South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, Angola, Sudan
and Somalia has intensified. Movements from Sudan,
Somalia, and Angola are attributable to war and civil
unrest within these countries. As a former settler colony
South Africa’s historical links with Europe, its high level
of economic development, and the country’s transition
from apartheid to democracy can explain the high
rates of extra-continental emigration (see the subsection below). Indeed, we continue to see large-scale
movements among highly unequal countries.
It is worth noting that Sub-Saharan migrants have not
spatially distributed themselves equally across Europe:
many move to areas where family members or other
migrant communities are already established. This
pattern is likely to continue, although there is a slow
diversification of destinations across the continent.
Specific settlements and destinations are determined, as
elsewhere, by a mix of regulatory frameworks, access to
social services and support, and economic opportunities.
Figure 2: Regional Origin of sub-Saharan African Migrants in the European Union (Total)
Source: UNDESA
10
Figure 3: Regional Origin of sub-Saharan African Migrants in the European Union (per capita)
Source: UNDESA
and political instability. These drivers are difficult to
separate or weight in order of importance and often fail
to explain specific instances of mobility that are shaped
by far more contingent factors. Moreover, secondary
drivers such as conflict can become enduring drivers of
sustained migration flows. Unlike demographic patterns
which can take generations to change, secondary
factors can conceivably shift faster and within a
generation. Disaggregating migration drivers in this way
provides a useful analytical frame for understanding
African migration and an opportunity for thinking
critically about effective policy interventions.
Primary African mobility drivers
Migration is a complex phenomenon and individual
choices are structured as much by perceptions as
material realities. Aside from people fleeing for their
safety because of war and violence, it is difficult to
identify single factors driving individuals to migrate.
People’s mobility is often entangled in complex socioeconomic, political, personal, and communal decisionmaking frameworks, which together determine
individual migration outcomes – why, where, and how
people move.
Although disentangling motivations for migration at
a micro level can be challenging if futile, at a macro
level it is important to distinguish between events that
trigger migration and the underlying factors providing
the conditions for migration. This section analyses the
drivers of African migration at two different levels.
The primary drivers of migration reflect the underlying
factors that create the conditions for long-term
sustained migration. These are deep-rooted structural
factors that are unlikely to change within the next one
to two generations and have strong causal links to
persistent mobility patterns. We identify two variables in
this category – Africa’s demographic dynamics and its
economic growth patterns.
Africa’s demographic trends
High fertility is perhaps the most important factor
shaping Africa’s population dynamics – including
migration. A recent study by Hanson and McIntosh
compares population projections in 2050 across global
regions. They find that between 2010 and 2050,
declining fertility rates in the Americas, Europe and East
Asia and stable rates in the Middle East and Africa will
result in substantial differences in population growth
between these regions.15 If current rates continue,
sub-Saharan Africa’s population (which is now about
40% larger than Europe) will be six times greater than
Europe’s population by 2100.16 Although growth rates
may slow in some of the continent’s more industrialised
or wealthier regions (particularly in Southern Africa),
most countries are unlikely to undergo a demographic
transition in the next generation. Improved education for
women is invaluable and potentially empowering, but
empirical analyses suggest that it has limited effects
on reducing fertility in Africa.17 Coupled with regional
income disparities, these population pressures are likely
to intensify intra- and inter-regional migration.
Secondary migration factors include events or structures
that have marginal impacts on migratory movements
and impacts. These may buttress or partially counteract
deep-rooted underlying patterns – especially when
viewed at the micro-level – but are unlikely to disrupt
overall trends. These include factors related to
governance and under-development such as, poverty,
inequality, unemployment, natural disasters, economic
11
Figure 4: UN Population forecast in billions by world regions 2015-2100
Source: UNDESA
Source: UNDESA
Table 4: Regional population change (projected), 2015-2100
Region
2015 Population
2100 Population
Populate change
(absolute)
Percentage
change
Africa
1,186,178,282
4,386,591,069
+3,200,412,787
+270
Asia
4,393,296,014
4,888,652,982
+495,356,968
+11
Northern America
357,838,036
500,143,198
+142,305,162
+40
Latin America
634,386,567
721,128,695
+86,837,620
+14
Oceania
39,331,130
71,128,695
+31,797,565
+81
Europe
738,442,070
645,577,351
-92,864,719
-13
Source: UNDESA
12
Even if Africa’s fertility rates drop, the total population
will continue to grow rapidly in absolute terms. Such
‘population momentum’ is due to sub-Saharan Africa’s
youthful age structure that means that the children
today will reach adulthood in future decades.
Figure 5: Sub-Saharan African emigrant stocks vs
GDP (Global and in European Union)
Africa’s share of global population, which is
projected to grow from roughly 17 per cent in
2017 to around 26 per cent in 2050, could reach
40 per cent by 2100… In all plausible scenarios
of future trends, Africa will play a central role in
shaping the size and distribution of the world’s
population over the decades to come
Overall wealth:
With contemporary policy discussions, prevailing
explanations for high-levels of African migration
typically focus on Africa’s prevailing poverty. Strategies
designed to slow migration subsequently focus on
improving generalised prosperity and employment (for
the latter, see below). However, such strategies run
counter to the evidence which generally indicates that
the wealthier Africans become (measured here as GDP
per capita), the more likely they are to emigrate. This
does not speak about individual or family wealth, but
only average wealth at the country level.
The picture is somewhat less clear when it comes to
movements within the continent, but in both emigration
within SSA and towards the EU it appears as if
migration increases overall along with GDP. In many
ways, this counters the classic development ‘hump’
hypothesis which indicates that people move regularly
to a point and then populations stabilise. This may be
due to the levels of poverty, the nature of economic
development, or other undetermined factors. While
the figures above reflect historical migrations and not
current flows, it nonetheless suggests that in terms
of containing migration, strategies aimed at creating
wealth within Africa may be counterproductive or take
decades to see substantive results.
Source: Author analysis of UNDESA data
towards the EU where countries have only seen declines
in emigration over approximately 70% employment
before emigration declines (See figure 7 below).
Employment: The quest for work remains one of the
perennial motivations for movement. Historically the
migration of young men has been a leading driver of
movement. As women increasingly enter the workforce,
they have significantly added to global migration stocks.
Across sub-Saharan Africa, the relationship between
youth employment and migration is ambiguous.
In most instances, there is a predictable decline in
emigration as countries move towards full employment.
However, this applies to only a select few countries
and is unachievable for most. Rather, we initially see
a sharp increase in emigration as youth employment
increases. This is particularly the case with migration
There is, of course, the theoretical possibility of
achieving the kind of growth needed to absorb large
numbers of would-be African migrants. However,
given current economic conditions and projections, this
would require a continental economic about-face for
which there is almost no precedent. The closest the
world has seen was due to the Marshall Plan following
the Second World War or in countries like Rwanda
following the genocide. However, these were targeted,
immensely expensive, and contingent on favourable
13
Figure 6: Intra-African emigrant stocks vs GDP
(excluding island states)
Source: Author analysis of UNDESA data
Figure 8: Intra-African migrant stocks vs youth
employment (excluding island states)
Source: Author analysis of UNDESA data
Figure 7: Global African emigrant stocks vs youth
employment (global and European Union)
Source: Author analysis of UNDESA data
14
Figure 9: Real GDP growth by region 1996-2019
Source: Reproduced from UNDESA, World Economic Situation and Prospects: January 2018 Briefing, No. 110.
Table 5: Labour market outlook for Africa (%) 2000-2016
2000-2007
2008-2014
2014
(Estimated)
2015
(Projected)
2016
(Projected)
Employment growth
3.0
2.8
2.9
2.9
2.9
Labour force
participation rate
68.8
69.4
69.6
69.7
69.7
Unemployment rate
9.9
9.4
9.2
9.2
9.2
Labour productivity
growth
2.7
0.9
4.0
1.2
2.3
Global labour
productivity growth
2.6
1.9
1.8
2.5
2.7
Source: ILO 2015
mobility and out-migration. While it is difficult to
determine the increases in urbanisation due to
migration (most is due to redistricting and natural
increase), there appears to be a limited correlation
between levels of urbanisation and international
emigration. As Figure 10 below indicates, urbanisation
and emigration tend to co-vary to a point at which
large-scale emigration largely drops off. This holds for
movements within sub-Saharan Africa and, particularly,
for movements of Africans towards the European Union.
political and economic conditions that are unlikely
to be replicated vis-à-vis Africa. Instead, widespread
economic investments in Africa will likely continue to
favour extractive industries under terms of trade that
that produce greater indebtedness and higher levels of
inequality.
Urbanisation: Within the public policy debates around
African mobility, there is considerable concern that
migration-driven urbanisation is connected to ongoing
15
that govern people’s movements and states’ obligations.
As these are beyond the remit of this piece, the
following paragraphs point to four key factors that
impact migration governance on the continent.
Figure 10: International migrant stocks vs
urbanisation in sub-Saharan Africa and EU
1. There is no continent-wide agreement on
how to address migration in Africa: The formal
governance of mobility within Africa is the product
of a dynamic set of intersecting and overlapping
initiatives and frameworks. Each of the continent’s
regional economic communities (RECs) has its own
initiatives, sandwiched between domestic policies
towards displaced people and migrant labour.18 At the
continental level, the African Union (AU) campaigns to
promote safe and free movement across its member
states.19 Thus, one of the challenges facing a coherent
migration governance framework across the continent
is the competing and at times contradictory interests at
the national, regional, and AU levels.
As currently conceived, the AU’s policies set the
normative terms for the free movement of people
within Africa and the basic protection of migrants when
outside their respective countries of nationality. The
AU’s Free Movement of Persons Protocol (FMP) is part
of Africa’s Agenda 2063 that urges member states to
‘achieve progressively the free movement of persons
to ensure the enjoyment of the right of residence and
the right of establishment by their nationals within
the Community.’ 20 Although the AU’s proposal offers
only weak guidance on protecting migrants’ rights
or ensuring state compliance, it presents a flexible
migration framework that could potentially be moulded
to diverse socio-economic and political landscapes.
However, as it now stands, the RECs and states are
far more important than the AU in shaping migration
policies and practices.
2. Regional economic communities are more
influential than the AU in governing African
mobility, but remain subservient to national
interests: While the AU has long offered overt policy
proposals for governing migration, these have been far
less effective than the RECs in shaping mobility on the
continent. However, even at this level, progress on free
movement has been uneven. Some regional economic
communities like ECOWAS and the EAC have made the
most progress in developing mechanisms that facilitate
the movements of people with relative ease within the
sub-regions. In late 2017, six francophone states within
the Central African Economic and Monetary Community
(Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Equatorial
Guinea, Gabon and the Republic of Congo) ratified an
agreement to allow visa-free movements.21 Within
sub-Saharan Africa, SADC is perhaps the least advanced
in developing a coherent sub-regional migration
framework. Here South Africa has pushed for bi-lateral
Source: Author analysis of UNDESA data
African migration
governance
Although demographic and economic factors are most
likely to shape African migration in the years ahead,
governance frameworks remain an important variable.
A full account of immigration and migration governance
requires a holistic analysis of the legal, socio-economic,
and institutional variables that affect mobility, in
addition to the bilateral and multilateral frameworks
16
rather than multi-lateral agreements, with relatively
wealthy Botswana and Namibia also resisting free
movement within the region.22
continent. This might ironically lead to greater pressure
for people to move.28 Third, migration and border control
policies do not guarantee effective implementation.
Empirical evidence across Africa consistently points to the
disjuncture between the law and its implementation. In
border areas, restrictions on movement serve only as an
opportunity for corruption and rent seeking –undermining
the efficacy of migration policies, and creating
opportunities for trafficking and smuggling networks.
At the domestic level, many Africans countries have
adopted relatively open policies towards refugees and
displaced persons, but have not made migration policy
or free movement a priority. A recent study undertaken
by the African Development Bank shows that barriers
to movement between regional economic blocks remain
high. Africans need visas to travel to 55% of other
African countries – in fact, North Americans have easier
access to the continent than Africans.23 When comparing
visa requirements between regions, Central and North
Africa are the most closed regions, while East and West
Africa have the most open inter-regional visa regimes.
In recent years – particularly since 2015 – many
African states are reasserting sovereignty through more
restrictive immigration regimes (see below.) With foreign
aid dedicated to strengthening border mechanisms and
limiting movement, such patterns are likely to outpace
efforts to facilitate sub-regional movement.
4. Despite their profile and global attention,
the Global Compacts for Migration (GCM) and
Refugees (GCR) are unlikely to mark a significant
departure in the formal governance of African
mobility: There has been limited involvement of
African States and civil society in the drafting of these
documents. Compared to the overt aid conditionality
placed by donor states – particularly those belonging
to the EU – the GCM and GCR provisions will have
only indirect influence on Africa’s policy frameworks.
Furthermore, the GCM is not binding and cannot
mandate states to comply. With the withdrawal of
the United States from the GCM, and disagreements
between Latin American countries, the EU, and Australia
on guiding principles, these global processes are unlikely
to shift the dynamics of migration governance in Africa.
3. European interests are encouraging migration
management policies in Africa in ways that
could weaken migrant rights, development,
and democratic institutions: With support from
the European Union (EU), many African countries
(particularly those north of the Equator) have begun
developing more comprehensive, often securityoriented migration policies. Since 2015, the continent
has witnessed a flurry of activity in migration policymaking through efforts funded by the European Union
and implemented by IOM and the International Centre
for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD).24 Such
policies vary, but involve bilateral agreements to provide
technical assistance, development aid and arms to
limit irregular migration,25 secure borders, register and
monitor populations, and implement ‘development
at home’ strategies intended to limit the need for
movement.26
Scenario mapping African
migration dynamics in 2035
In the following, we develop three scenarios based on
the data discussed in earlier sections of this report. The
scenarios stem from the questions framing this report:
• What are the major forces of change affecting interand intra-continental migration in Africa in 2035?
• What are the socio-political and economic
consequences of changes in migration dynamics on
sub-Saharan Africa and the European Union?
While EU bilateral agreements employ a language of
cooperation and win-win outcomes for both continents,
they aim to curtail Africans’ movements to Europe.
They do this in a number of ways. First, the bilateral
agreements between African countries and the EU
weaken the African Union’s plans to promote easier and
safer movement within the continent.27 This strategy may
have some impact on the numbers heading to Europe, but
risks creating negative externalities within the continent.
Second, bilateral EU agreements come with development
aid and arms packages that could undermine democratic
institutions and human rights. While aid conditionality
is not new, human rights organisations have raised
concerns that providing aid and arms to authoritarian
regimes will heighten insecurity and instability on the
Our analysis identifies a series of environmental,
political, economic, social, and technological factors
currently affecting African mobility within and beyond
the continent. We clustered these in terms of their
relative importance to or impact on migration, and
according to their relative uncertainty or predictability
(see Figure 12). Our scenarios build from three critical
uncertain variables likely to shape future migration on
the continent. These include European Union migration
and development policy; African governments’ policies
towards mobility, trade, and foreign relations; and sociospatial inequality within and between countries and
regions. For present purposes, we define these three as
follows:
17
Figure 11: Drivers of intra- and inter-African migration in 2035 29
African states’ ability to restrict movements across
their borders.
At the opposite end of the spectrum are policies
designed to facilitate the large-scale movement
of people within and beyond the continent. These
may include opening channels for asylum seekers,
permanent and temporary labourers, family
reunification, and students. To be viable, these
opportunities are not only available to the educated
and skilled elite or politically connected, but also
to significant numbers of skilled and semi-skilled
labourers from across the continent. Development
aid continues, but shifts its focus from containment
to equitable growth and political accountability.
This includes developing core nodes across the
continent, supporting African-based labour mobility
regimes, and enhancing responses to mobility. In
this model, development success ceases to be
measured by sedentarisation successes, but instead
by aggregate improvements in human development
measures (income, education, life expectancy and
equity). Where possible, investments that strengthen
institutions enhance people’s freedoms including
possibilities for migration.
• EU immigration and labour policy is an
aggregated variable describing the region’s suite
of migration, asylum, and development policies
towards Africa. These include border management,
migration entry channels (e.g., family reunification,
asylum, labour regimes), and strategies to promote
Africa development through technical and material
assistance. Placed along a spectrum of intention,
they range between openness and containment or
sedentarisation. On the latter end, there are strategies
that place severe limits on legal avenues for migration
including enhanced surveillance, the militarization
of land and sea borders, and the externalisation of
migration management south towards the Sahara.
Supporting the sedentarisation objectives are a
range of development initiatives intended to create
opportunities within Africa and prevent human mobility
within the continent. These include heavy investments
in rural agriculture and vocational training, among
other sectors. As part of this strategy, development
success is recalibrated. No longer are economic and
political inclusion the primary goals. Instead, aid is
dedicated to sedentarisation. To reinforce this strategy,
aid and trade arrangements become conditional on
18
• African policy refers to two aspects of policy
and practice: how African states address mobility
within the continent and generalised institutional
openness. At one end of the spectrum is generalised
openness vis-à-vis borders and politics. At the other
is a combination of enhanced autocracy and border
closure. The latter are supported by repressive
and exclusionary institutions, border closures
within Africa, restrictions in internal rural to urban
movements, inequitable economic policy, illiberal
trade and labour regimes. By contrast, openness
results in promoting the safe movement of labour
within Africa, stronger commitments to human
rights (including migrant rights), and development
investments intended to foster equitable
development and inclusion. Among these are efforts
to build communities’ ability to address and absorb
domestic and international migrants while fostering
rural-urban and transnational linkages.
Figure 12: Eight African migration outcomes
Scenario One: Containment Compact
• Economic equality presents a spectrum formed
by measuring not only economic equity across a
population but also across space. At one end is a
system in which people have relatively equal access
to economic opportunity even if it requires moving
within a country or across borders. At the other end
of the spectrum is a situation in which a relatively
narrow business or political elite (domestic and/
or foreign) benefits from economic production and
extraction. Moreover, opportunities are spatially
concentrated in ways that exclude access to some
based on their places of origin, ethnicity, or inability
to traverse territory.
European Union and European-African bi-lateral efforts
to stem mobility through coercion and development
cooperation have been embraced and implemented
across Africa. With enthusiastic compliance from
authoritarian African politicians capitalising on
military and financial aid, there has been an attempt
at population lockdown and mass sedentarisation.
Legal channels for movement to Europe are severely
curtailed. Asylum claims made within European
territory face almost immediate rejection based on a
widely accepted ‘first safe country’ principle holding
that people should seek sanctuary close to home.
The only Africans able to legally enter and remain
in Europe are those meeting high standards of skill,
education, or wealth. Within Africa, states have made
substantial investments in border controls and attempt
to restrict internal movements to cities through a mix
of surveillance, policing, and rural development/antiurbanisation strategies that freezes a burgeoning and
youthful population out of the areas with the greatest
resources. Economic, political, and military elites
capture development and military aid and direct it to
areas occupied by their primary ethnic and political
supporters (or where they can secure lucrative tenders
or kickbacks). Possibilities for cross-border supply chains
are greatly reduced and overall growth is supressed
as countries undertake policies of neo-autarky. This
intensifies class and spatial differentiation between
groups in ways that further heighten tensions and
create incentives for relocation.
As Figure 12 indicates, when positioned together, these
axes create eight potential outcomes. Each of these
reflects an aggregation of possibilities that are more or
less likely to coincide. For present purposes, we select
three to discuss below. These are:
• The Containment Compact: European and African
closure combined with existing or heightening sociospatial inequality;
• Militerranean; European closure countered by African
openness with moderate levels of inequality within
Africa and significant (but lessened) inequality
between Africa and Europe;
• The Cosmopolitan Concord: European and African
openness with growing socio-spatial equality.
The first and last of these represent the extreme ends
of all three spectra with the second reflecting a middle
ground or hybrid scenario.
These initiatives’ long-term results include the
widespread criminalisation of government institutions
within Africa and the incarceration or punishment of
those seeking to move within the continent. This would
include, widespread corruption and a shifting logic of
19
operation from one dedicated to enforcing laws to one
concerned with rent-seeking or supporting the work
of organised crime.30 Environmental change has made
small-scale farming less viable, necessitating youth
movement to economic centres. However, restrictions on
mobility and strong anti-urbanisation programmes often
locks people into impoverished areas with declining
economic opportunities. Vocational training programmes
further raise unmet expectations for earnings that
drives frustration and resentment and domestic
authorities who respond through increase suppression.
Such tensions ultimately heighten the possibility for
Rwanda- or Liberia-like conflicts resulting in mass
displacement and economic setbacks. Populist African
politicians foster anti-European sentiments, pointing
to their treatment of Africans even as they accept
European foreign aid. This turns popular sentiment
further against Europe and European values. China and
other external actors continue to collaborate with elites
to provide the resources necessary to maintain power
and potentially suppress population democratic demand
making.
result is greater urban discord and support for culturally
resurgent and authoritarian parties across the European
Union.
Scenario Two: Militerranean
The smuggling and trafficking networks that have
corrupted African officials now extend into Europe
where they arrange entry and manage African labour
within underground, deeply exploitative economies.
Such economies provide critical labour and skills to
certain European industries, but also undermine wages
and working conditions for the native workforce. The
limited supply of workers does little to add flexibility
in the labour market and an inability of the remaining
European industries to remain nimble and competitive.
The rising cost of workers in the care profession – where
regulation and licensing is enforced – places a severe
strain on public and individual finances. The absence
of young workers also limits new contributions to the
tax base, straining the state’s ability to maintain social
support for the elderly or infirm.
Despite the need for low and semi-skilled labour
across the Union, Europe remains fearful of large-scale
African migration and maintains strong restrictions
on entry. These are supported by an elaborate array
of containment mechanisms extending across the
Mediterranean and into parts of North Africa and
the Middle East. However, the African Union and its
member states now recognise that political stability and
economic vibrancy are enhanced by the facilitation of
intra-continental movements through visa free travel
and the almost universal right to employment and
residence. In the face of a youthful population entering
the labour market, this reduces political pressure in
poorer states while allowing better-positioned and
-resourced countries to capitalise on the demographic
dividend through flexible labour supply. The
opportunities afforded to migrants result in remittances
dedicated to social-reproduction in sending communities
(villages, secondary cities, small towns). While this
creates jobs for some outside of the cities, it ultimately
generates a more prosperous and educated population
that follows their relatives into cities. Economic
opportunities are relatively democratised, yet production
and global trade become centred on a relatively small
number of regional trading hubs. The full benefits
of such economic concentration remain limited by
European efforts to keep Africans from moving freely
outside of the continent. African political hostility to
Europe encourages strengthened relationships with
Turkey, Russia, China, and other emerging powers to
secure investment capital and market access. Spatial
inequality within the continent continues to drive both
prosperity and ongoing mobility.
Due to fear of institutional and social exclusion,
Africans living in Europe create defensive enclaves
where engagement with official institutions and host
populations are minimised. These form the basis
for socio-political radicalisation within Europe. This
includes mobilisation among immigrants who, unable
to participate in formal governance regime, opt for
forms of self-regulation and governance informed
by defensive or millenarian ideologies drawing on
discursive resources fostered through the diaspora. In
the face of an immigrant population seen as legally
illegitimate, and economically and culturally threatening,
native-born host populations respond with heightened
xenophobic sentiments channelled through policing,
vigilantism, and support for radically conservative
political parties. The heightening costs of caring for
aging generations further exacerbates frustrations. The
Africa’s improved mobility and prosperity results
in a better-educated, more ambitious, but widely
underemployed workforce. While the elites continue to
find their way to wealthy countries beyond Africa for
university studies and employment, those with only
secondary or vocational training are unable to capitalise
on such opportunities. Wage differentials between
Europe and Africa (European wages have climbed
significantly due to labour shortfalls outpacing gains
within African economies) provide incentives to move
northward. Given the ease of movement across the
continent, significant numbers of Africans pool in the
countries bordering the Mediterranean: Morocco, Libya,
and Algeria. Firmly committed to the African Union goal
of building an integrated African economy and resentful
of European interference, these countries allow entry
and seek to absorb those interested in living or working
20
there. However, significant numbers of people continue
to push for Mediterranean crossings. Unable to do so
legally, they turn to the extensive smuggling rings that
continue to operate around the Mediterranean basin,
helping people to achieve illegal entry into Europe. While
effective at bringing people to Europe, their illegality
and irregularity means they are unable to supply the
demand needed to supply European labour needs. This
results in rigidity within the labour market and the
ossification of European industry. However, the presence
of undocumented African immigrants, often maintaining
long-standing debts to the smugglers who facilitated
their entry (i.e., indentured labour), help generate
multiple underground economies within both North
Africa and Europe. This results in social fragmentation,
enclave living, police harassment, and enmity between
native-born and immigrant populations. Enclave
populations within Europe turn towards millenarian and
anti-European political ideologies. The militarization
of the Mediterranean through patrols, deportation,
surveillance, and other interventions is enormously
costly and harmful to Europe’s global reputation and
self-image as a region committed to rights and the rule
of law.
are better educated and more entrepreneurial. As noted
earlier, these movements largely occur through labour
recruitment agencies and formal channels.
The transfers of skills and finances create extended
supply chains across Africa and Europe that ultimately
improve the economic competitiveness of both regions
in ways that limit Chinese ability to capture African
resources. Strengthened relationships and goodwill
between the regions helps facilitate European access
to Africa’s land, labour, and natural resources. Africans
living in Europe continue to concentrate in areas with
long-standing immigrant populations, but are able to
engage with host communities and institutions in ways
not shaped by fear. They maintain some degree of
cultural distinction, but repeated engagement results in
a broader tolerance of multiple cultural practices bound
by the rule of law and respect for public institutions.
Although there continues to be anti-immigrant
sentiments within Europe, the economic benefits of
immigration and rising public engagement by people
of immigrant backgrounds ultimately generates more
cosmopolitan politics.
Concluding reflections
Scenario Three: Cosmopolitan Concord
Given the drivers and dynamics outlined in the previous
pages, migration policy questions need to be framed as
managing a response rather than shaping aggregate
flows. Continued development aid is potentially valuable
on many fronts. Ceteris paribus, such assistance is
unlikely to transform general migration patterns in a
five to ten year period. Given the structural variables at
work, transformations in general migration patterns will
be seen over the span of decades. For those leaving due
to political insecurity, deterrence is largely ineffective.31
The more substantial question is whether receiving
states and regional blocs will respond in ways that
capitalise on migration’s benefits or seek to repress it. In
this regard, there are effectively two principles that can
inform policy: containment or facilitation.
Recognising the benefits of more liberalised trade and
migration regimes, both the African and European
Union develop strategies to facilitate the widespread
movement of people within Africa and between Africa
and Europe. Managed through skill-matching and
other mechanisms, Europe is able to present its native
population with a sense of controlled and regulated
movement in ways that productively and equitably meet
European labour demand. Although some smuggling
continues, the possibility to move safe and legally into
Europe encourages Africans to use formal channels,
greatly reducing the costs and risks of travel.
Within Africa, relatively free movement creates
increased dynamism and a fluid population able to
return home and stay engaged in sending communities.
People’s ability to move reduces political pressure on
poorer states, fostering greater institutional stability.
Although initially challenging to municipalities and host
governments, officials ultimately develop coordinated
mechanisms for responding to population mobility.
These include new policy frameworks designed to
ensure that poorer countries are able to fund social
reproduction (education, health, and infrastructure)
through the benefits of remittances and mobile social
protection strategies. Such policies help overcome
economic nationalism, creating more diversified,
extended supply and production chains. The wealth
generated through such mobility initially accelerates
pressures to move towards Europe among those who
A containment approach – designed to reduce
movements through strict border controls and
restrictive legal frameworks – is unlikely to substantially
shift overall numbers. Based on experiences in the
United States, however, it will still have significant
consequences. In the first instance, it will prevent
circular or seasonal movement. By raising the costs
of entry, it will encourage people to remain once
they are within a jurisdiction. Moreover, rather than
maintaining translocal households, they will find ways
to bring close relatives and dependents to them. This
not only results in higher pressure for immigration,
but increased budgetary costs. Families under
such circumstances are likely to join informal and
21
Responding effectively to African migration – in ways
that are humane, developmental, and in both African
and European interests – requires realism and a
willingness to accept that history has bequeathed
sets of institutions and incentives that cannot be
quickly overcome. In moving forward, there is still
much we need to know about the movements of
people and the potential consequences of mobility for
communities, states, and individuals across Europe
and Africa. If nothing else, this paper calls for further
disaggregation of future analyses and policies. There
is no single African migration story. Each country,
sub-region and region face their own combination
of population, political, and economic dynamics.
Responding effectively means rethinking fundamental
presumptions about the possibility of redirection and
containment, as well as links between development
and mobility. Doing so requires a perspective informed
by empirics, pragmatism, and political analysis as
much as demographic projections. It also requires a
recognition that human behaviour on a macro-scale is
rarely shaped by a singular interest or set of political
institutions. Interventions intending to do so may work
with or against history but will certainly generate
unexpected and potentially undesirable outcomes.
underground economies, robbing the public coffers
of resources and creating varied forms of social
marginalisation and fragmentation. These are not the
only informal economies such movements will engender.
People’s inability to move (individually or collectively)
within the law will provide opportunities for smugglers
and traffickers. The slave markets in Libya are but an
early sign of larger criminal networks likely to emerge
should EU and AU states pursue a containment policy.32
The premium placed on refugee status or other
opportunities to move within the law will also generate
considerable corruption within states of origin and
destination.33 Direct aid for enhanced border control and
surveillance will also likely foster abuses at the hand
of state agents and the kind of insecurity that all but
necessitates movements.
An approach premised on accepting the inevitability and
potential desirability of African mobility will have little
effect on the numbers who move. However, creating
multiple legal avenues will help to capture the benefits
of migration by adding fluidity to labour markets and
improving taxation, industrial regulation, budgeting,
and planning. Perhaps most importantly, offering legal
pathways to movement can greatly reduce the costs
to economic and physical security by limiting the
profitability of smuggling networks.34 The greatest risk
to such a strategy is political – namely that reactionary
political forces will launch a backlash against politicians
and migrants themselves. However, analysis suggests
that hostility to immigration largely stems from a sense
of uncontrolled influx. Presenting the populous with a
reasonable, managed form of managed migration can
help to assuage popular anxieties.35 A well-framed case
about providing the skills necessary to support host
populations may also limit resistance.36
22
1. Figures cited by the International Organisation for Migration (https://www.iom.int/news/iom-counts-3771-migrant-fatalities-mediterranean-2015). See
also V. Squire, A. Dimitriadi, N. Perkowski, M. Pisani, D. Stevens, N. Vaughan- Williams. 2017. Crossing the Mediterranean Sea by Boat: Mapping and
Documenting Migratory Journeys and Experiences, Final Project Report, www.warwick.ac.uk/crossingthemed.
2. Pew Research Center, 2018. ‘Since 2010, Most Years Have Seen a Rising Tide of Migrants from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe and the U.S.’ (21 March
2018) http://www.pewglobal.org/2018/03/22/at-least-a-million-sub-saharan-africans-moved-to-europe-since-2010/ph-03-22-18_africa-final-00/.
3. See T. Miles and S. Nebehay. 2017. ‘Migrant Deaths in the Sahara Likely Twice Mediterranean Toll: U.N’, Reuters (12 October 2017): https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-sahara/migrant-deaths-in-the-sahara-likely-twice-mediterranean-toll-u-n-idUSKBN1CH21Y. see also O. Lauren
and S. O’Grady, 2018, ‘Thousands of Migrants Have Been Abandoned in the Sahara. This is What their Journey Looks like’. The Washington Post (28
June 2018): https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/06/28/thousands-of-migrants-have-been-abandoned-in-the-sahara-this-iswhat-their-journey-looks-like/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.d48750679dca
4. J. Park. 2015, ‘Backgrounder: Europe’s Migration Crisis,’ Council on Foreign Relations
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/europes-migration-crisis (23 September 2015).
5. Figures from the International Organisation for Migration (1 May 2018). https://www.iom.int/news/mediterranean-migrant-arrivals-reached-1716352017-deaths-reach-3116.
6. UNDESA. 2017. International Migration Report 2017, ST/ESA/SER.A/403, New York: UNDESA. http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/
migration/publications/migrationreport/docs/MigrationReport2017.pdf.
7. See Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, 2017. Evidence on Internal and International Migration Patterns in Selected African
Countries. Rome: FAO. For the data informing the report, see http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/ data/index.shtml
8. Pew Research, 27 February 2018, analysing UNDESA data. See http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/02/28/international-migration-from-subsaharan-africa-has-grown-dramatically-since-2010/ft_18-02-22_africanmigration_destinations/.
9. M. Clemens and H. Postel. 2018. ‘Deterring Emigration with Foreign Aid: An Overview of Evidence from Low-Income Countries,’ CDG Policy Paper
119. Washington: Centre for Global Development.
10. The authors wish to thank Hannah Postel of Princeton University for her invaluable support in collecting and collating the data used in this
report. We are also grateful to Barbara Buckinx and Wolfgang F. Danspeckgruber of Princeton’s Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination for
the opportunity to present an earlier draft of the paper and for their invaluable feedback.
11. M. Clemens. 2014. ’Does Development Reduce Migration?’ In R.E B Lucas, ed., International Handbook on Migration and Economic Development,
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing: 152–185; M. Clemens & H. Postel. 2018 ‘Deterring Emigration with Foreign Aid: An Overview of Evidence
from Low-Income Countries,’ Forthcoming, Population and Development Review.
12. UN Populations Division, 2017. ‘The World Counted 258 Million International Migrants in 2017, representing 3.4 per cent of Global Population’.
Population Facts No 2017/5. New York: United Nationals Department of Economic and Social Affairs.
13. UNDESA. 2017. International Migration Report 2017.
14. M-L. Flahaux and H. De Haas. 2016. ‘African Migration: Trends, Patterns, Drivers,’ Comparative Migration Studies 4 (January 22, 2016): 1, https://doi.
org/10.1186/s40878-015-0015-6.
15. G. Hanson and C. McIntosh. 2016. ‘Is the Mediterranean the New Rio Grande? US and EU Immigration Pressures in the Long Run.’ Journal of Economic
Perspectives 30(4): 1-25.
16. B. Milanovic. 2015. ‘Five Reasons Why Migration into Europe Is a Problem with No Solution,’ Social Europe (blog), June 24, 2015, https://www.
socialeurope.eu/five-reasons-why-migration-into-europe-is-a-problem-with-no-solution.
17. M. Garenne. 2012. ‘Education and Fertility in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Longitudinal Perspective,’ DHS Analytical Studies 33. Washington: USAID.
18. T.E. Achiume and L.B. Landau, ‘The African Union Migration and Regional Integration Framework,’ 2015, Policy and Practice Brief 36. Durban:
ACCORD. http://www.accord.org.za/publications/policy-practice-briefs/1422-the-african-union-migration-and-regional-integration-framework
19. Opening Remarks by Dr. Mustapha. S. Kaloko, Commissioner for Social Affairs at the Workshop on the Joint Program “Labour Migration Governance
for Development and Integration in Africa” (18 February 2015) https://au.int/en/speeches/20150218. Also, the African Union’s, Protocol to the Treaty
Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment, adopted 29
January 2018.
20. AU Chapter 6, article 43 of the Abuja Treaty.
21. M.E. Kindzeka, 2017. ‘Central Africa Regional Bloc Creates Six-country Visa-Free Zone,’ VOA News (2 November 2017), https://www.voanews.com/a/
central-africa-regional-bloc-creates-six-country-visa-free-zone/4096907.html.
22. Landau, Loren B.; Segatti, Aurelia. 2011. Contemporary migration to South Africa : a regional development issue (English). Africa development forum.
Washington, DC: World Bank. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/943521468101356700/Contemporary-migration-to-South-Africa-a-regionaldevelopment-issue
23. African Development Bank. 2016. Africa Visa Openness Report 2016. Tunis: African Development Bank Group & African Union.
24. The ICMPD implements migration management support in Africa through an EU funded facility MIEUX, the Migration EU Expertise.
25. E. Conteh-Morgan. 2017. ‘The Danger of Supplementing Aid to Africa with Weapons,’ IPI Global Observatory, (15 August 2017), https://
theglobalobservatory.org/2017/08/aid-weapons-merkel-ecowas-g-20/; A. Shalal. 2017. ‘Merkel Urges Greater Security Role in Africa Development
Policy,’ Reuters (June 12, 2017).
26. L.B. Landau. (Forthcoming.) ‘A Chronotope of Containment Development: Europe’s Migrant Crisis and the Reterritorialization of Africa, Antipode.
27. Africa Economic Platform, 2017. ‘Free Movement,’ African Union (24 February 2017) https://www.au.int/web/en/documents/20170224/aep-theme-4.
28. C.W. Kihato and L.B. Landau. 2017. ‘Securitising Africa’s Borders Is Bad for Migrants, Democracy, and Development,’ IRIN (5 July 2017) https://www.
irinnews.org/opinion/2017/07/05/securitising-africa-s-borders-bad-migrants-democracy-and-development; also Conteh-Morgan, ‘The Danger of
Supplementing Aid to Africa with Weapons’; Shalal, ‘Merkel Urges Greater Security Role in Africa Development Policy.’
29. This chart stems from the analysis presented in the preceding pages using standard scenario planning techniques. Vibranium refers to a fictional metal
that transforms technology and production in sub-Saharan Africa. It is employed here to indicate the kind of ‘black swan’ possibilities of technological
innovation. See https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2018/02/black-panther-vibranium-graphene-physics-explained-spd/.
23
30. The term ‘criminzalisation’ is used here as in J.F. Bayart, S. Ellis, and B. Hibou, 1999, The Criminalization of the State in Africa. Bloomington: Indiana
University Press.
31. V. Squire, et al., ‘Crossing the Mediterranean Sea by Boat: Mapping and Documenting Migratory Journeys and Experiences.’
32. N. Nyabola. 2017. ‘Europe Is Shocked — Shocked — By Libya’s Slave Markets,’ Foreign Policy (27 December 2017): http://foreignpolicy.
com/2017/12/27/europe-is-shocked-shocked-by-libyas-slave-markets/.
33. See E.I. Wellman and L.B. Landau. 2015. ‘South Africa’s Tough Lessons on Migrant Policy,’ Foreign Policy: Democracy Lab (14 October 2015): https://
foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/13/south-africas-tough-lessons-on-migrant-policy.
34. V. Squire. 2017. ‘Why Migration Will Not Destroy the Welfare State,’ Refugees Deeply, (31 May 2017) https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/
community/2017/06/02/why-migration-will-not-destroy-the-welfare-state.
35. See T.K Bauer, M. Lofstrom, and K.F. Zimmermann, K.F. 2001, Immigration Policy, Assimilation of Immigrants and Natives’ Sentiments towards
Immigrants: Evidence from 12 OECD-Countries, Working Paper No. 33, San Diego: University of California, www.ccis-ucsd.org/PUBLICATIONS/wrkg33.
pdf;
36. J. Hainmueller and M.J. Hiscox. 2010. ‘Attitudes toward Highly Skilled and Low-skilled Immigration: Evidence from a Survey Experiment,’ American
Political Science Review 104(1): 61-84.
24