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TASKFORCOME: TRANSNATIONAL ACTION TO ADVANCE SKILLS AND
COMPETENCES FOR COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT AND SOCIAL MIGRANTS
ENTREPRENEURSHIP INITIATIVES IN THE CENTRAL EUROPE
LOCAL REPORT ON POLICY FRAMEWORKS
TARGETTING MIGRANT
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND SOCIAL
ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN POLAND
POLAND
AUTHOR(S): KONRAD PĘDZIWIATR, CRACOW
UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS
Final Version
September 2019
INDEX
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
IMMIGRANTS IN POLAND: GENERAL TRENDS ON NATIONAL AND MALOPOLSKA LEVELS
MIGRATION POLICIES AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRATION AT THE
NATIONAL LEVEL
POLICIES SUPPORTING ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP
MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION POLICIES ON REGIONAL AND LOCAL LEVEL: AN OVERVIEW
OF SELECTED CASES
REFERENCES
Page 1
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Poland has experienced in the last decades first, unprecedented outflow of
its citizens mostly to countries of Western Europe and more recently also
dynamic inflow of migrants. As a result of the processes of immigration
Poland ceases to be a country of emigration and emerges for the first time
in the modern history as a country of immigration. The first part of the
report sketches the key features of the migration trends in Poland since
1989 and then analyzes main characteristics of the immigrant population in
the country and in Malopolska region. It also sheds light on the policy
developments in the area of migration flows on the national level from the
beginning of the 1990s till today. It observes that growing mobility of
people across the Polish borders since the collapse of Communism and in
particular the migration transition taking place in Poland in the last years
has not been accompanied by a sufficient migration policy developments. In
spite of important efforts that were made in the last decades to develop
such policy, Poland lacks a comprehensive and coherent migration policy
document. The lack of it is especially noticeable since the suspension in
2016 of the key migration policy document „Poland’s migration policy –
current status and postulated actions” (2012), developed by the previous
government, and significant increase of the migratory flows to Poland.
Current phase of the migration policy development can be characterised by
the liberalization of the labour law regulations concerning the employment
of immigrants and by strong securitization of forced migration and
racialisation of some groups of migrants. Partially as a result of the later
processes, the attitude of the Polish society towards refugees from the
Middle East and North Africa has changed profoundly between May 2015 and
Page 2
April 2016 from predominantly positive to negative. At the same time,
attitudes of Poles towards migrants in general remained fairly positive.
After
pointing
out
the
main
features
of
the
policies
supporting
entrepreneurship and social entrepreneurship in Poland at the national and
regional level, the second part of the report is devoted mainly to the
analysis of the migration and integration policies developed at the local
level. In contrast to the central authorities, various municipalities across
Poland engaged particularly dynamically in the last years in migration and
integration policies development. The cities of Krakow, Gdansk and
Wroclaw are in a forefront of these processes and their instruments of
engagement with migrants are analysed in detail. The report concludes with
the observation that most probably other regions and cities across Poland
will soon follow the examples of Krakow, Gdansk and Wroclaw in attempt to
attract immigrants and more adequately manage migration processes.
Page 3
2. IMMIGRANTS IN POLAND: GENERAL TRENDS ON NATIONAL AND MALOPOLSKA
LEVELS
During the Communist period the migrations to and from Poland were
severely restricted (Stola, 2010). Thus, the dominant pattern of spatial
mobility was rural-to-urban exodus linked with the growing urbanisation of
the country and commuting to major industrial centres for work while living
outside of them (Kaczmarczyk & Okólski, 2007; Okólski, 2007). The
international migrations were confined mostly to the countries of the
socialist block with some small number of contractual labourers being
allowed to stay for a short period of time in one of the “fraternal”
countries of the Middle East and North Africa (e.g. Iraq or Algeria).
After the restrictions for moving abroad were abandoned and foreigners
were no longer discouraged from coming into the country, Poland reemerged on the maps of international human mobility. From the beginning
of the political and socio-economic transformations the country has
continued the pattern of migrations from before the Cold War era, namely
it became a country of emigration rather than immigration.
Every year
dozens of thousands of Poles were leaving the country in search for work
and better living conditions. One of the major drivers for this
unprecedented outflow on Polish citizens from the country was very high
unemployment that was close to 20% at the time when Poland was joining
the European Union (Brzozowski, 2019).
Most of Poles prior to 2004 were migrating to one the EU countries as
tourists but genuine purpose of their travel was a search for gainful
employment. As a result of limited access to the EU labour markets most
Page 4
migrants Poland, as well as other post-Communist countries, were forced
into irregular work. This has not discouraged more than 750 thousand of
them to leave the country prior to the EU accession and further several
hundred followed after 1st May 2004 when the EU started to gradually open
their labour markets. It is estimated that as a result of this emigration
around 2,5 million Poles live outside of the country and the largest
communities are formed in the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands
and Ireland (GUS, 2017a, 2018a). As shown below (Figure 1) the net
migration rate in Poland, that is the difference between the number of
immigrants and emigrants throughout the year, from the beginning of the
transformations was negative showing a clear emigration character of the
country1.
Figure 1. Net Migration Rate in Poland between 1989 and
2012
Source: Own elaboration of the GUS data 1990-2013
1
Here it is worth pointing out that the GUS data on migrations take into account persons who registered and de-registered
from a given locality and hence only partially reveal the real migratory flows.
Page 5
At the same from as early as beginning of the 1990s Poland has started to
emerge as an important destination for some groups of migrants. One of
them have been persons seeking asylum (Ząbek & Łodziński, 2008). It is
estimated that over 100 thousand Chechens have sought international
protection in Poland between 1992 – 2016 and their applications made
almost two thirds of all the asylum applications in the last decades. Most of
them have treated Poland only as a transitory country and left after
obtaining some form of international protection (or yet before obtaining it)
for Western European countries with significant Chechen diaspora including
Austria, Belgium, France and Germany). Other nationals applying in
significant numbers for international protection in the last decades came
from Armenia, Georgia and Afghanistan. Interestingly by the end of 2016
only 820 Syrians applied for asylum and 160 of them were Syrian Christians
invited to Poland in 2015 by a controversial Estera Foundation that quite
successfully lobbied the government to accept only Christian refugees
(Górny et al. 2017: 43-46 ).
However, most of the migrants arriving to Poland over the last decades
have been either seeking education, business opportunities or employment.
In fact foreign students have been almost the only sizable group of
immigrants who were arriving to Poland yet before the collapse of the
Communism. The largest groups of foreign students graduating from Polish
universities in the 1970s and 1980s came from Iraq (872 persons), Syria
(778), Nigeria (423), Sudan (311), Yemen (290), Jordan (188) and Tunisia
(125) (Chilczuk, 2001) (see Table 1 below). Most of them left the country
after the time spend during their students but some found partners in
Poland, decided to stayed and thus laid the ground for opening in 2001 of
Page 6
the first non-Tatar led Muslim minority organization – the Muslim League in
Poland (Pędziwiatr, 2011).
Table 1. The number of foreign graduates (G) at Polish
universities and the numbers of their countries (C) or origin
between 1950 – 2000.
Source: Own elaboration of the data provided by Chilczuk 2001
After 1989 the number of foreigners seeking education at Polish universities
has significantly increased from slightly over 3 thousand in 1990 to over 10
thousand in 2005. In the following years the popularity of Poland as a
destination for higher education has continued to rapidly grow. In the
academic year 2017/2018 a record number of foreign students (72,743)
pursued their studies in Poland (GUS, 2018b). Apart from the foreign
students enrolled as full or part time students at Polish universities over 16
thousand foreigners came to study in 2016 only as Erasmus exchange
students (FRSE, 2019).
Page 7
Table 2. Foreign Students at Polish Universities (excluding
the Erasmus exchange students)
Source: Own elaboration of the GUS data.
The largest number of immigrants arriving to Poland in the last years are
persons seeking employment. It is above all them who are contributing to
the historic migration transition of Poland, which became a country of net
immigration rather than net emigration. This transformation has been
closely linked with the changes of the Polish labour market elaborated in
earlier project report by Jan Brzozowski and its transition from “a market
of employer” to a “market of employee” with visible shortages in most of
the crucial sectors of the economy and political situation in Ukraine (2019).
According to the Eurostat, in 2016 Poland recorded the highest number of
employment-related residence permits (almost half a million) for third
country nationals among the EU Member States (Eurostat, 2017). In this
year the Polish Central Statistical Office for the first time in the country’s
statistical history recorded positive net migration rate that is a situation
when the number of persons arriving to live in Poland outnumbered those
who left the country (GUS, 2017b). In 2017 and 2018 this pattern of
migrations persisted (see table 3).
Page 8
Table 3. Net Migration Rate in Poland 2013-2018
Year
2013
Difference between the number -19,904
of immigrants and emigrants
2014
-15,750
2015
-15,750
2016
1,500
2017
1,400
2018
3,600
Source: Own elaboration of the GUS data 2013-2019
Apart from citizens of Ukraine making by far the largest group of
immigrants in Poland, other sizeable groups of immigrants came from such
countries as Belorussia, Germany, Russia, Vietnam, India and China.
According to the Office for Foreigners
(UDSC) the citizens of the
aforementioned countries form the largest groups of persons with valid
residence cards in Poland. There were 412,309 such persons in Poland at
the end of August 2019 and Ukrainians made up slightly above 50% of them
(UDSC, 2019). Here, however, it is worth reminding that the data provided
by the UDSC do not take into account a large number of immigrants who
reside in the country without valid residence cards (Pędziwiatr, 2014). One
may notice that while comparing for example UDSC data with the statistics
on immigrants in Poland in possession of the Polish Social Insurance
Institution (ZUS) or the Ministry of Family, Work and Social Policy
(Brzozowski, 2019). Yet, other estimations based on analysis of mobile
phone usage data pointed out that there were 1.25 million Ukrainians
residing in Poland at the beginning of 2019 (Kisiel, 2019).
As far as the holders of the resident cards are concerned, the majority of
them are either non-EU citizens with temporary residence permits (235
thousand at the end of August 2019) or foreigners with a permit for
permanent stay (75 thousand in 2019). Slightly over 73 thousand are
registered
EU
citizens
living
in
Poland.
Foreigners
who
obtained
Page 9
international protection constitute only a marginal part of holders of
residence cards issued by Polish authorities (slightly over 1% of all residentcards holders in 2019). Among the immigrants registered by the UDSC men
make up over 61% of all the foreigners residing in Poland. They are usually
in the age group 20-39 years old or 40-59 years old hence in the age of the
highest productivity. Among the youngest immigrants below 20 years old
are also those persons mentioned above who decided to come to Poland to
pursue their studies (UDSC, 2019).
Figure 2. Age Structure of Immigrants in Poland
Source: UDSC 2019
Page 10
Immigrants who come to Poland most often settle in large metropolises.
The capital city located in the Mazovia voievodship is clearly the most
popular among the immigrants. Nevertheless other regions of Poland have
been increasingly popular destinations over the last years among the
foreigners deciding to live in Poland. In this way, the current situation
significantly differs from the one in 2011 when the phenomenon of
immigration had clear insular character - it applied only to certain parts of
the country, when in others the presence of foreigners was incidental. Data
from the last census showed a clear correlation between the main areas of
immigrant concentration and their level of economic development and
prosperity (GUS, 2013). At the moment immigrants are more evenly spread
around the whole country and some types of migrants (for example highly
skilled) might be more present not necessarily in the Mazovian but other
regions (e.g. Malopolska).
Page 11
Map 1. The spatial distribution of immigrants registered by the UDSC
Source: UDSC 2019
Małopolska is after Mazovia one of the regions which has been attracting
the highest attention among immigrants searching for business, employment
or educational opportunities. At present there are over 42 thousand
foreigners holding residence permits living in the region whereas in 2010
Page 12
there were less than 7 thousand immigrants registered by the UDSC in
Malopolska (Ibid). ZUS data from March 2019 shows 51.4 thousand migrants
registered in the Polish social security system in the region (2019). If one
takes into account the presence of unregistered immigrants their number
might be at least twice as high and amount to around 10% of the population
of the largest city in Malopolska, that is Krakow.
Similarly to the situation in wider Poland majority of immigrants holding
valid residence cards in the region come from Ukraine (22.616), then
smaller groups of immigrants come from Russia (1.565), Italy (1.410) and
Belorussia (1.348). Majority of immigrants in Malopolska have temporary
residence permits (at the end of August 2019, 25554 persons). In contrast to
data from the whole Polish territory the second largest group of registered
immigrants in Malopolska region is made up of persons who are not holding
permanent residence permits, but the EU citizens living in Poland (over 10
thousand of such persons lived in the region at the end of August 2019). It
proves high attractiveness of the region not only among the immigrants
arriving to Poland from the East but also from the West. Alike in other parts
of Poland, there are more male (25383) than female (17080) immigrants in
the region. They are usually young persons between 20-39 years of age
Page 13
(almost 65% of persons) with smaller groups persons in the age group 40-59
(20%), below 20 years of age (13%) and 60-79 or more (2%) (UDSC 2019).
The region hosts one of the oldest universities in Europe (Jagiellonian
University founded in 1364) and is a home of many other institutions of
higher education that
attract every year increasing number of foreign
students. There were 6 thousand foreigners studying at Malopolska region in
the academic year 2014-2015 and their number rose by 22% in the following
year to 7,3 thousand persons (GUS, 2016). At the beginning of 2019 there
were over 8,200 foreign students studying in one of over twenty Krakow’s
institutions of higher education with the highest number at the Jagiellonian
University (2.244 students), Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Krakow University
(1.905), Cracow University of Economics (982), Collegium Medicum of the
Jagiellonian University (691) and University of Science and Technology
(624). In the whole region there were almost 8.500 foreign students
enrolled for full-time or part-time studies in institutions of tertiary
education (GUS, 2019). The majority of students come from Ukraine (65%)
but substantial groups (over 5%) are also from Norway (the vast majority
studying medicine) and Belorussia (GUS, 2016).
Page 14
3. MIGRATION POLICIES AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRATION AT
THE NATIONAL LEVEL
Following the Interreg Europe Programme definition, a policy instrument is
understood in this document as “a means for public intervention. It refers
to any policy, strategy, or law developed by public authorities and applied
on the ground in order to improve a specific territorial situation.”
(INTERREG 2019) In the case of the analysed migration policies it concerns
any public interventions in the domain of human mobility beyond the
country’s borders. It applies not only to the outflow but also inflow of
people to the country.
In spite of the growing mobility of people across the Polish borders since
the collapse of Communism Poland has not developed a coherent migration
policy but only ad hoc semi-policies (Matyja, Siewierska-Chmaj, &
Pędziwiatr, 2015). Initially in the 1990s the Polish authorities tried above all
to remove barriers for mobility for Polish citizens. Thus, visa-free
agreements were signed with numerous countries of Western Europe and
Poland agreed to re-admit those migrants who have illegally entered to
these countries from or through Poland. At the same time the country
Page 15
opened up to foreigners. Some of them started to arrive to Poland and file
the applications for international protection yet at the beginning of1990s.
Thus, Polish government was forced to quickly develop a system of dealing
with persons applying for asylum (Wach, 2018: 347-351). However, the
political, economic and social problems of the country undergoing deep
transformations have successfully pushed away the issues of migration
management from the law-makers list of priorities for many years. The
first phase of the development of the migration policy instruments has been
taking place from 1989 till almost the end of 1990s, and according to some
researchers
even
till
2001,
and
is
usually
called
the
phase
of
institutionalisation (Lesińska, 2016). One of the key moments in it was the
passage through the Parliament of the Act on Foreigners in 1997.
The second phase of the formation of Polish migration instruments had
taken place ahead of 2004 accession of Poland to the European Union. The
Europeanization of the Polish migration policy meant the
adoption of
instruments developed elsewhere in Europe to the county’s conditions. As a
result of the implementation of these European solutions, Polish migration
policy
had
become
increasingly
restrictive,
aimed
at
discouraging
immigrants from settling in Poland and thus avoiding complications related
Page 16
to the phenomenon of settlement immigration. Besides, the economic
conditions of the country at that time (e.g. very high unemployment) were
not conducive for the emergence of significant immigrant communities
(Weinar 2012).
The third phase of the development of the migration policy in Poland is
usually associated with the post-accession realities up until the so called
“migration-refugee crisis” in 2015. Łodziński and Szonert call this period a
moment of mature migration policy (2016: 33-54). One of the most
important episodes within this phase was the development by the
government (in collaboration with partners from academia and civil society)
of the first comprehensive migration policy document entitled “Poland’s
migration policy – current status and postulated actions” (2012). It not only
for the first time systematically dealt with issues of migration but
developed also a set of recommendations to be implemented by state
agencies at various levels of governance. Apart from this document of high
importance for the migration management in the country in the Polish
migration Law was substantially enriched by the amendment to the existing
Act on Foreigners (April 2012), the adoption of a new Act on Polish
Citizenship (April 2009), the development of another new Act on Foreigners
Page 17
(December 2013) and the amendment to the Act on Assistance Provision to
foreigners
on
Polish
territory
(July
2015)
was another
important
development in the analysed period. Very important in the analysed period
was also partial opening of Polish labour market to foreigners. As Łodziński
and Szonert aptly point out Poland, as a result of the liberalization of
labour law regulations, become practically the only country in the European
Union in which citizens of several Eastern European countries have gained
open access to the market of temporary and seasonal work (2016: 33- 53).
Although Poland was not affected by the migration and refugee crisis, the
figure of a refugee started to play a crucial role in the country’s key
political narratives since the parliamentary elections in 2015 (Legut &
Pędziwiatr, 2018; Pędziwiatr, 2016). The unprecedented politicisation of
migration, (especially forced migration) prior to the parliamentary elections
in October 2015 and after it, marks the beginning of the fourth phase of the
Polish migration policy developments. It is characterised on the one hand,
by further liberalization of the labour law regulations concerning the
employment of immigrants and, on the other hand, by strong securitization
of forced migration and racialisation of some groups of migrants (in
particular Muslims).
Page 18
Apart from developing a strong securitization narrative about the processes
of forced migration, the government led by the Law and Justice Party (PiS)
has also implemented new securitization practices for example with regards
to asylum seekers at the Polish border. The reports of international
organisations and Polish and Belorussian civil society point out that
foreigners seeking international protection have been increasingly pushed
back and denied their rights to seek asylum and security (Chrzanowska et
al, 2016). Moreover, EU funding from the Asylum, Migration, and Integration
Fund that until 2015 had been channelled by the government mostly to civil
society organisations supporting the integration of migrants, were now redirected to state agencies and organisations selected by the government
(Gostyńska-Jakubowska, 2018). In 2016 the key migration policy document
„Poland’s migration policy – current status and postulated actions” (2012),
developed by previous government in collaboration with partners from
academia and civil society, was suspended. Although it was supposed to be
swiftly replaced by a brand new policy strategy, this has not happened to
this day.
In this context, at the end June 2019, a document entitled “Polish
migration
policy”
prepared
by
the
Ministry
of
the
Interior
and
Page 19
Administration (with date 10.06.2019) was revealed during a conference
held in the Parliament and communicated to its participants. The Ministry
has never officially published this document claiming on its Twitter account
on 24th June that “this is a draft version for internal communication” and
that only the “final version” will be disclosed to the public (Szymczak,
2019). However, the draft was disseminated on the Internet through the
web page of one of the civil society actors, namely the Association for Legal
Intervention.
The 70-page document begins with depicting the major reasons for the new
migration policy, including among others: cancelation of the earlier key
policy document, demographic crisis, one of the lowest total fertility rates
in the world, dynamically ageing population, migration processes and
depopulation of the country. It ambitiously aims at contributing to building
“a Polish model of active migration policy” that would improve the
management of emigration and immigration processes and integration of
foreigners, as well as, create incentives for foreigners to settle in Poland.
All these actions need to be taken, according to the unknown authors of the
document, in such a way that they would not jeopardize security of the
state (MSWiA, 2019).
Page 20
The category of “security” which appears twice already on the first page of
the introduction and over 70 times in the whole document creates one of its
dominant frames. This frame is at odds with Polish migration realities, in
which the immigrants in Poland are rarely involved in acts of law violation.
However, this feature of the document is closely linked with the
aforementioned government’s strong securitization of some types of
migration in the form of a speech acts, as well as, bureaucratic and
technical practices.
Contradictorily, on the one hand, the analyzed
document acknowledges that immigrants are needed in order to mitigate
some of the future problems of the country and, on the other, depicts them
as prospective threats to security of the country, and Polish culture. In the
last category places above all people seeking international protection. The
draft of new migration policy of Poland mentions them most of the time in
the context of a security threat and envisages further restrictions of their
reception. As a consequence, the proposed recommendations, if put in
place, could further endanger the rights of people seeking asylum in
Poland.
In contrast to earlier migration policy document the new draft document
lying down main features of the supposed new Polish migration policy have
Page 21
not been consulted it with key stakeholders in migration field: research
centres, NGOs or the Committee of Migration Studies of the Polish Academy
of Science. Members of the academia and civil society have strongly
criticised both the content and the processes of development of the
document (Jaskułowski & Matusz, 2019; KBnM, 2019). These reactions would
possible lay ground for the beginning of work on the new policy document
in cooperation with the key stakeholders.
Figure 3. Attitudes towards refugees in Polish society
Source: CBOS 2016.
Page 22
As far as the attitude of the Polish society towards migrants is concerned, it
is fairly positive with exception of attitudes towards some types of
refugees. While in May 2015 the vast majority of the society (72% of Poles)
either strongly or mildly supported the opinion that Poland should accept
refugees from countries affected by military conflict, this situation started
to change in the months before the parliamentary elections and after them,
all as result of the high politicisation of the so called migration-refugee
crisis and racialisation of the migrants from the Middle East and North
Africa. A year later only 33% of respondents surveyed by CBOS supported
the idea of accepting refugees and 67% opposed it. At the same time the
attitude to receiving Ukrainian refugees from areas affected by armed
conflict has remained fairly positive since the beginning of the military
conflicts in Ukraine in 2014. For example, in April 2016 60% supported this
policy while one-third opposed it (CBOS, 2016). At the same time, the
sympathy towards Ukrainians who form the largest immigrant group in
Poland has increased from 12% in 1993 to 24% in 2018, and the antipathy
decreased from 65% to 40% (CBOS, 2018).
Page 23
4. POLICIES SUPPORTING ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP
During the Communist period entrepreneurial activities were severely
limited so after 1989 they started to grow almost from zero. Hence, the
level of development of majority of Polish firms does not match those
achieved by their Western counterparts. However, as recent research shows
their share in GDP creation was 39% in 2018 and micro and small enterprises
in Poland accounted for 31% of total employment, which means that around
5 million people worked in them in 2018 (PARP 2018). Yet, a different
report that sheds light on the Polish entrepreneurship in the comparative
perspective shows that Poland’s rates of self-employment at over 20% are
much higher than the EU average of 15,5% (OECD 2019). Single-person firms
are partially responsible for this phenomenon. The policies supporting
entrepreneurship and social entrepreneurship, however, play some role in
this too.
Alike economic entrepreneurship also social entrepreneurship started to
rapidly grow from the beginning of the 1990 when the legislative acts on
civil society organizations were adopted. If in 1990 there were only 600
registered associations and in the following years the NGO sector has
Page 24
undergone very rapid growth. According to the data from 2018 there were
143.000 associations and foundations in Poland. However, Klon/Jawor which
has been monitoring the sector since 2000 claims that up to 35% of them
might be non-operational (Wiktor-Mach, 2019).
The major role on the national level in the promotion and support of
entrepreneurship plays the Polish Agency for Enterprise Development (PARP
– in Polish “Polska Agencja Rozwoju Przedsiębiorczości”). The legal basis for
its creation was the Act of Parliament from November 2000. The Agency is
closely linked with a political establishment at a given time, as the
chairman of the Agency is nominated by the Minister of Development and
appointed by the Prime Minister. The Agency’s key goals are the
implementation of economic development programs supporting innovative
and research activities of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs),
regional development, export growth, development of human resources and
the use of new technologies in business operations. It implements projects
and programmes financed from structural funds, the state budget and
multi-annual programs of the European Commission (PARP 2019).
Page 25
The key projects implemented by the PARP at the moment are: POIR –
Intelligent Development Operation Program (in Polish “Projekt Operacyjny
Inteligenty Rozwój”), POPW – Eastern Poland Operational Program (in Polish
“Projekt Operacyjny Polska Wschodnia) and POWER – Knowledge Education
Development Operational Program (“Projekt Operacyjny Wiedza Edukacja
Rozwój”). These projects usually aim at enterprise development and
involve training, consultancy and financing programmes mostly for SMEs.
The Agency conducts also research activities in the areas of enterprise,
innovation, the condition and development of human resources, businessrelated organisations and enterprise support services. As for now, it does
not have any programmes aiming at migrants and stimulating migrant
entrepreneurship (Ibid).
The only national programme that has a component of labour market
integration is aimed at persons who possess a refugee status or (from 2008
also)
a
status
of
supplementary
protection
(In
Polish
“ochrona
uzupełniająca”). There has been almost 5 thousand persons who have
profited from Individual Integration Programme (IPI) by the end of 2015
(Wach, 2018). Projects that deal with different aspects of integration of
migrants including dimensions of entrepreneurship are most commonly
Page 26
developed at the local level by non-governmental organizations, local
authorities and municipalities. Some of the major ones are analysed in the
following part of the report.
As far as the growth of the social entrepreneurship in Poland is concerned
one of the important stimuli of it was introduction from 2004 the statute on
public good activity and volunteering. In the light of this legislature public
charitable organizations (in Polish “organizacje pożytku publicznego”) are
allowed to receive 1% of income tax from individuals. In order to obtain
such status a given organization has to be a non-governmental organization
involved in specific activities related to public good as described by the
law, and be sufficiently transparent in its activities, governance and
finances (Baczko & Orgocka 2008).
There are also numerous policies and projects aimed at stimulating
entrepreneurship within a wider society and immigrant communities
developed at the local level by regional or city authorities and nongovernmental organizations. One of them is, for instance, initiated in
January 2017 by the Cithy of Krakow the City Support Program for
Entrepreneurship and Economic Development 2016-2020. It replaced earlier
Page 27
entrepreneurship development programmes. Its overarching goal is to
create a city that is “investor-friendly, creating equal opportunities and
attractive conditions for the development of small and medium-sized
enterprises; a center for effective cooperation between city authorities,
business communities and the scientific and research sphere”. It wants to
achieve this goal inter alia through the promotion of activities related to
supporting entrepreneurship, supporting young entrepreneurs, promoting
entrepreneurial
attitudes
among
young
people
and
the
academic
community and by providing support for existing enterprises (Krakow City
Council, 2017).
Similar types of policies have been also developed by numerous other cities
and regional authorities. Due to relative novelty of the significant migration
influx most of these initiatives do not have a special focus on migration
processes and migrants. Some of the policies that do are analyzed in more
depth in the following section.
Page 28
5. MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION POLICIES ON REGIONAL AND LOCAL LEVEL: AN
OVERVIEW OF SELECTED CASES
As shown in the previous sections, the number of immigrants arriving and
settling in various Polish cities started to grow particularly dynamically
after the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the break out of the war in
Eastern Ukraine in 2014.
After the parliamentary elections in 2015 the
government of Poland started to disengage from the implementation of the
immigrant integration policies initiated by former government and in 2016
it abandoned it all together.
In this situation many Polish cities have engaged with additional eagerness
in developing their own migration and integration policies (Socha, 2018).
Many of them, ruled by the presidents and parties who are in opposition to
the current Law and Justice led government, do it particularly happily to
demonstrate that their approach and attitudes to a diversity of issues linked
with the processes of migration are different from those represented by the
central authorities. The engagement of local authorities in migration and
integration initiatives in many cases springs from the urgency of issues
linked with the emergence of significant groups of immigrants within their
Page 29
territory.
In many ways the large cities in Poland, similarly to their
counterparts in other European countries, have been not only implementing
the integration policies designed at the central level, but also creatively
developing their own. Matusz-Protasiewicz and Kwieciński rightly point out
that the development of such policies can be also seen as a form of the
reaction of the local authorities to the growing popularity of anti-migration
narratives and a case of promotion of the given city as diverse and open to
foreigners. In this way city authorities want to encourage prospective
immigrants to settle in the given city and thus fill in the gaps in the local
labour market
(2018: 132). However, in each region and city in Poland
there are usually a unique set of reasons for which the local authorities
decided to actively engage in migration policy activities and also their
character is different. As it will be shown below in some cities the
migration processes are in the forefront of the proposed policies, whereas
in the other the management of the cultural diversity is conceived more
broadly.
The following analysis looks into some of the most mature examples of local
migration policies to be found in Poland. They are being implemented by
the city authorities in Krakow, Gdansk and Wroclaw. In each case 1) the
Page 30
main reasons behind the launching of a given initiative will be analysed, as
well as, 2) the process of development of a given policy initiative, 3) its key
goals and 4) the method of implementation.
Although, the migration and integration policy developed in the largest city
of the Malopolska region was adopted by the City Council of Krakow on 14th
September 2016 the origins of the “Open Krakow” Programme go back at
least 5 years earlier. They can be traced back to the engagement of the
Municipality of Kraków, in partnership with the Association Interkultarlni.pl,
in the project “Against racism and xenophobia: developing a city strategy of
prevention and response”. As a result of this project the document “Draft
strategy of prevention and response to acts of racist and xenophobic nature
in the city public space – a proposal for the local self-government of the
City of Kraków (2012-2016)” was prepared and published in 2012 (Krakow
City Council, 2018). Important additional information about various
dimensions of the integration of immigrants in the city, that were used in
the preparation of the “Open Krakow” Programme, were provided by the
Małopolska Region’s project "Analysis of situations and needs related to the
integration of foreigners with Polish society based on the example of thirdcountry nationals settling in the region of Lesser Poland", implemented
Page 31
in 2014 (Brzozowski & Pędziwiatr, 2014). These early engagements of local
authorities with the issues of diversity management and lessons learn from
the thematic research project led the authors of the “Open Krakow”
Programme to the conclusion that “Immigration and the phenomenon of
multiculturalism must be first seen in terms of a chance and new
opportunities, not just as a threat” and the must be “adequately managed”
not only at the state level, but above all at the regional and local level.
Importantly, they also noted in the introductory part of the Programme
document that “experiences of other countries accepting foreigners allow
us to conclude that these activities should not be delayed until the
immigrants appear in large numbers – but rather planned in advance, when
the group of newcomers is still relatively small”. So the intention of the
programme was to prepare the city and its residents to “appropriately
respond to the influx of foreigners”. (Krakow City Council, 2016: 2-3).
As far as the key reasons behind the launching of the migration and
integration policy in Gdańsk are concerned they are of similar nature to
those in Krakow. In the lengthy (in Polish over 120 pages document)
describing the “Immigrant Integration Model” accepted by the Gdańsk City
Hall in June 2016, one may read that “Migration has now become a global
Page 32
challenge - one that needs to be addressed by all cities, including Gdansk.”
Alike in Krakow the preparation of this strategic document started much
earlier. Late Paweł Adamowicz, former Mayor of Gdańsk brutally murdered
in January 2019, in the opening part of the document wrote that he had
established a task force (in 2015) to develop the Immigrant Integration
Model at the moment when it was the best time to address the challenges
of migration and use its potential. He argued that “There are no ethnic or
religious conflicts in Gdansk, and the number of immigrants, although on
the rise, remains relatively small”. These conditions, in his view gave a
chance to start a dialogue, develop a mutual understanding, and find
solutions. Furthermore, he argued that “One of the lessons that we have
learnt from our European peers is that building a coherent and inclusive
community encompassing different cultures, backgrounds and religions is a
process that needs careful management and a variety of solutions” (Gdansk
City Hall, 2016: 1).
In Wrocław, the migration and integration policy initiative is conceived
within a broader framework of strengthening social cohesion in the city and
fostering intercultural dialogue. The key policy document entitled the “The
Strategy for the Intercultural Dialogue in Wrocław” was launched in 2018
Page 33
with the overall vision to be “the tool that will support efforts of citizens to
build social bonds and a community based on mutual respect”. The
migration processes are a key thread running through the whole document
that is more than 50 pages long, however not the only one. Significant
space of the document is also devoted to the other areas linked with the
issues of building a cohesive society/community such as solidarity, trust,
security, collaboration and enhanced communication. The authors of the
Strategy claim that is was created because of “the social need” and link it
directly with the dynamic processes of immigration. However, at the same
time they claim that key vision behind the policy document is “Wrocław as
the community of citizens who live in mutual respect, regardless of their
origins, culture, language, or religion” (Wroclaw City Council, 2018: 1-13)
The most popular model of developing the analysed policies was the
participatory one. In particular this character had the processes of policy
development in Gdańsk and Wrocław, however in Kraków also the city
authorities heavily relied on the know-how of the civil society and other
social actors (e.g. from the academia) while developing its own policy.
These actions of the municipal authorities sprung from the earlier
engagements with the civil society from 2011 onwards that aimed at
Page 34
counteracting racist and xenophobic attitudes in the city space. Later in
2013 the Municipality established a Task Group for drawing up a draft
resolution
of
the
Kraków
City
Council
concerning
the
issues
of
multiculturalism, counteracting discrimination, racism and xenophobia in
the city. Such draft resolution, after consultations with the Kraków Board
for Public Benefit Activity and non-governmental organizations, was
presented to the Kraków City Council. In 2015 the draft resolution was reanalysed, amended and a new diagnosis was prepared. Then, the “Open
Kraków” Programme was once again subject to consultations with nongovernmental organizations and in 2016 approved by the City Council and
launched (Krakow City Council, 2018).
Alike in Krakow the preparations of the local migration policy in Gdańsk
started many years before the Immigrant Integration Model was launched.
The key partners of the city authorities in preparation of the Model came
from the civil society playing very important role in the integration
activities not only in Gdańsk, but also in other parts of the country
(Patrycja Matusz-Protasiewicz, 2013). While developing its policy the team
from Gdańsk benefited from international experience gathered by a
network of EUROCITIES cities and relied on the knowledge of international
Page 35
organizations such as for example International Organization for Migration.
During the intensive work on the document that took place between May
2015 and March 2016 the task force organized numerous public
consultations, meetings, conferences and study meetings in the European
Solidarity Centre. There were held in 8 thematic groups that dealt with
education, culture, housing, social assistance, employment, violence , local
community and health. All of the groups received support from national
experts who shared with them their knowledge and skills. The model was
developed using the resources and capabilities of numerous organizations
and institutions involved in these meetings with the leadership of the
municipality. Thus,
an important interdisciplinary and cross-sectoral
synergy was achieved (Gdansk City Hall, 2016: 10-16).
In Wrocław, the preparations of the main document comprehensively
describing the City’s intentions with regards to the processes of migration
started in January 2017 when the President of the city appointed the
Council of Intercultural Dialogue, including the representatives of social
organisations, churches and religious associations, universities, and the
business sector. It started its work from the analysis of resources and
revision of the work of existing teams that act in Wrocław within the area
Page 36
of intercultural dialogue, integration and migration. As a part of the
diagnosis and analysis of needs, similarly to Gdańsk, many meetings, forums
and conferences were organized between April and October 2017 and their
participants reported their needs and formulated applications constituting
the foundation of further works over the creation of the policy document. It
allowed the steering group to set the strategic goals of the planned
document in four areas: education, integration, security and collaboration.
Importantly also survey research was conducted to assess problems and
needs among foreigners living in the city. In the last months of 2017 social
consultations were held of the strategy project and in 2018 the Strategy for
the Intercultural Dialogue In Wroclaw was inaugurated (Wroclaw City
Council, 2018: 14-17). What is not without importance in all of the analysed
cases the key migration policy documents were at the time of their
launches or immediately after their inaugurations also translated into other
languages and thus became accessible to persons who are not fluent (yet) in
Polish language.
Page 37
As far as major goals of the analysed policies are concerned they are
sometimes defined quite broadly and at times very narrowly. For example
the main objective of the Open Krakow Programme is “to implement and
execute the policy of the openness of the city of Krakow to the
representatives of national and ethnic minorities and foreigners”. The
Programme wants to achieve this overall goal through a set of smaller
objectives that aim at: “1) building a sense of solidarity and awareness and
knowledge about the culture and customs of other nationalities among the
residents of Krakow; 2) shaping a tolerant attitude towards foreigners,
national and ethnic minorities; 3) identifying and solving problems related
to functioning in the community of an intercultural society.” Some of the
even more specific goals are: “the provision of equal access to the services
and benefits offered by the Municipality to foreigners, and members of
national and ethnic minorities; building an institutional framework for
cooperation between the representatives of national and ethnic minorities
and foreigners and the Municipality; creating a social platform for
consultation and the development of openness and multiculturalism
policies; implementing mechanisms for responding to racist and xenophobic
incidents as part of an inclusive policy and building intercultural awareness
Page 38
of the population”(Krakow City Council, 2016: 8). All of the aforementioned
general and specific goals of the Programme are coherent with the wider
development strategy of the city.
Gdańsk’s Model of Immigrant Integration defines its main goal in terms of
development of a migration management system in public institutions and
social purpose organisations in the city and enhancement of the integration
of immigrants in the followin areas: education, culture, social assistance,
housing, counteracting violence and discrimination, local communities,
employment and health. Then, it defines specific goals within each of the
aforementioned areas. For instance, in the sphere of education it wants to
“improve the immigrants’ educational and integration conditions among
school children, university students and local communities”. I also aims to
strengthen the role and competencies of education institutions in the
integration process. The Model plans to activate local community and
“Improve immigrants’ integration into the local community through
involvement of the social sector and integration of immigrants into the
existing social networks as well as local and civic collaboration
Page 39
programmes”. In the similar way it wants also the cultural organisations to
play more important role in the immigrant integration and evisages some
measures to support immigrant integration through culture. Gdansk
migration policy framework pays significant attention to integration through
labour market and hence it wants to improve the immigrants’ employment
situation
by
providing
comprehensive
information,
education
and
counselling to employers, labour market institutions and immigrants. It does
not forget also about the health dimension and plans to enhance access to
healthcare and improve the quality of medical services provided to
immigrants. Imporantly, it also promises to ensure safety and respect for
immigrants’ rights by improving the system for counteracting violence and
discrimination (Gdansk City Hall, 2016: 45-47).
The Strategy for the Intercultural Dialogue in Wrocław, instead of pointing
out one major goal, talks broadly about
“the vision of Wrocław as the
community of citizens who live in mutual respect, regardless of their
origins, culture, language, or religion” and defines four “areas of needs”
within which strategic goals are indicated (Wroclaw City Council, 2018: 2).
Page 40
These areas are: education, within which the key goal is “raising the
knowledge level and reinforcing intercultural competences”; integration,
where the key goal is defined as “building a sense of social belonging”;
security within the goal of “reinforcing safety of citizens”; and supposedly
linking them all collaboration and communication, which aims at “creating
the collaboration platformand reinforcing communication processes”. These
“strategic goals” are then divided into smaller “operational goals” and
numerous “actions” that should be taken in order to meet them. According
to the Strategy there is no hierarchy between these goals (all are equal)
and they set the action plan for 5 years (2018-2023) (Ibid: 19-60). As
Matusz-Protasiewicz and Kwieciński aptly point out the way how the
Strategy defines integration and cooperation is problematic. Integration is
an overarching process which encompasses various
areas including
education, whereas cooperation is a tool to implement the adopted
strategy and the objectives set out in it. Besides, the strategy does not
adequately address issues related to the integration in the labor market or
access to social assistance and no potential socio-economic areas have been
diagnosed. The focus of the Strategy lies mainly on strengthening soft skills,
Page 41
counteracting tensions and conflicts resulting from ignorance about cultural
differences (Matusz-Protasiewicz & Kwieciński, 2018: 134-137).
As far as the implementation of the local migration-integration policies is
concerned there are various organisational arrangements used, however in
all of them the municipalities play a key role. For instance, the Open
Krakow Programme is being implemented by the Krakow City Office
(Responsible unit is the Department of Social Policy and Health) in
cooperation with partners from the civil society and academia that form the
Interdisciplinary Team for the Implementation of the Programme (set up in
June 2019). Every year the City Office prepares a report on the
implementation of the Programme and publishes it on the Programme’s
website www.otwarty.krakow.pl. The results are evaluated mostly on the
basis of the quantitative rather than qualitative indicators. The funds for
the execution of tasks implemented under the Programme are planned
annually in the budget of the city of Krakow. The Programme tries to obtain
also financial resources from the various entities involved in the
implementation of the Programme and funding from budgetary resources of
the state, the European Union (in particular the European Social Fund),
Page 42
resources of non-governmental organizations and private and sponsorship
funds, however so far most of funding comes from the municipal budget.
In Gdańsk, the Model is being implemented by the cross-sectoral and
interdisciplinary IIM Implementation Team. It is led by the Social
Development Department of the Gdańsk City Hall, however the Team is
composed also of the members of the Steering Committee, Managing Group,
Integration and Migration Forum and the Immigrant Council. In other works
the participatory character of the development of the Model is clearly
reflected also in the method of its implementation. The municipal
Department of Social Development works together in the implementation of
the Model with other city departments as well as other municipal entities,
non-governmental organisations, public institutions, and other stakeholders,
including immigrants. The implementation of the Model is monitored the IIM
Implementation Team and periodically evaluated. The policy, in contrast to
for example Krakow, envisages evaluation that is carried out by an external
team of experts or investigators. Similarly to other cities in the
implementation of core tasks it relies on the municipal resources. However,
its authors are fully aware that the full implementation of the tasks
envisaged by the Model requires external funding from various sources such
Page 43
as: The Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (at national and European
level), the Minister of Family, Labour and Social Policy, the Office for
Foreigners, the Ministry of the Interior and Administration, the “Knowledge,
Education, Development” Operational Programme (foreigner integration,
including innovative projects), Pomorskie Province Regional Operational
Programme (foreigner integration), Norway Grants and EEA Grants,
the
European Commission and other European Union agencies for social
innovations or integration of immigrants, non-governmental organisations,
Corporate sponsorship, donations and private funding (Gdansk City Hall,
2016: 145-150).
The implementation of the Wroclaw’s Strategy has been coordinated by the
representatives of organizational units of the Wrocław City Office forming
the Team for the Strategy of Intercultural Dialogue. The Wrocław Centre for
Social Development has been coordinating the activities of the Team and
the Department of Social Affairs of the municipality is responsible for the
execution
of
the
Strategy.
The
members
of
the
Team
include
representatives of non-governmental organizations, churches and religious
Page 44
associations, services, universities and the business sector. Each year the
Team analyses the needs and accepts the actions for execution for the
given calendar year. The schedule of actions is prepared based on the
reported propositions along with the budgetary suggestions. Then, approval
of the city authorities is sought. In contrast to the aforementioned policies
the one developed in Wrocław does not mention other sources of funding
for the execution of the Strategy than the municipal budget. It assumes
that the implementation of the Strategy will be systematically monitored
and the decision about the continuation of execution of some projects will
be decided upon in the process of evaluation and verification. Similarly to
the Open Krakow Programme it envisages the preparation of annual reports
concerning the implementation of the Strategy (Wroclaw City Council,
2018: 20-21).
In conclusion, the migration and integration policies developed by various
local authorities have been playing a very important role in the situation
when Poland undergoes a transformation from the country of net
emigration to the one of net immigration and when the central authorities
suspended the migration and integration policy developed by former
government while failing to develop a new one (Pędziwiatr, 2019). The
Page 45
local policies have at least partially addressed some of the issues faced by
the immigrants deciding to settle in Poland and eased their integration with
the host society. They also remain in stark contrast with the state of affairs
in this domain at the central level. The recent Supreme Audit Office’s (NIK)
report on the preparation of the public administration to the processes of
immigration points out numerous failures of the state authorities to deal
with the increasing inflow of immigrants to Poland. It shows inter alia that
the legalization of foreigners in Poland that in 2014 used to take 64 days, in
2018 took on average 206 days. Apart from that the report notices that
there are no documents of a strategic nature that would comprehensively
define the migration policy of the state and coordination of institutions'
activities in this respect, despite the fact that the Council of Ministers
indicated the necessity of their preparation in February 2017 (NIK, 2019: 78). In such conditions local migration and integration policies would
probably continue to be dynamically developed not only in the analyzed
regions and cities but also in other parts of Poland.
Page 46
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