draft-ietf-drip-reqs-07.txt		draft-ietf-drip-reqs-08.txt
	DRIP S. Card, Ed.		DRIP S. Card, Ed.
	Internet-Draft A. Wiethuechter		Internet-Draft A. Wiethuechter
	Intended status: Informational AX Enterprize		Intended status: Informational AX Enterprize
	Expires: 19 August 2021 R. Moskowitz		Expires: 20 August 2021 R. Moskowitz
	HTT Consulting		HTT Consulting
	A. Gurtov		A. Gurtov
	Linköping University		Linköping University
	15 February 2021		16 February 2021
	Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP) Requirements		Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP) Requirements
	draft-ietf-drip-reqs-07		draft-ietf-drip-reqs-08
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document defines terminology and requirements for Drone Remote		This document defines terminology and requirements for Drone Remote
	Identification Protocol (DRIP) Working Group solutions to support		Identification Protocol (DRIP) Working Group solutions to support
	Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification and tracking (UAS RID)		Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification and tracking (UAS RID)
	for security, safety, and other purposes. Complementing external		for security, safety, and other purposes. Complementing external
	technical standards as regulator-accepted means of compliance with		technical standards as regulator-accepted means of compliance with
	UAS RID regulations, DRIP will facilitate use of existing Internet		UAS RID regulations, DRIP will facilitate use of existing Internet
	resources to support UAS RID and to enable enhanced related services,		resources to support RID and to enable enhanced related services, and
	and enable online and offline verification that UAS RID information		will enable online and offline verification that RID information is
	is trustworthy.		trustworthy.
	Status of This Memo		Status of This Memo
	This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the		This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
	provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.		provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
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	This Internet-Draft will expire on 19 August 2021.		This Internet-Draft will expire on 20 August 2021.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
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	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
	1.1. Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2		1.1. Motivation and External Influences . . . . . . . . . . . 2
	1.2. Concerns and Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		1.2. Concerns and Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	1.3. DRIP Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		1.3. DRIP Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	1.4. Document Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		1.4. Document Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	2. Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		2. Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	2.1. Requirements Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		2.1. Requirements Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	2.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		2.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	3. UAS RID Problem Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17		3. UAS RID Problem Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
	3.1. Network RID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19		3.1. Network RID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
	3.2. Broadcast RID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21		3.2. Broadcast RID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
	3.3. USS in UTM and RID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25		3.3. USS in UTM and RID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
	3.4. DRIP Focus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26		3.4. DRIP Focus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
	4. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27		4. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
	4.1. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27		4.1. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
	4.2. Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29		4.2. Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
	4.3. Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30		4.3. Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
	4.4. Registries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32		4.4. Registries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
	5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33		5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
	6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33		6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
	7. Privacy and Transparency Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . 34		7. Privacy and Transparency Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . 35
	8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35		8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
	8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35		8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
	8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35		8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
	Appendix A. Discussion and Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38		Appendix A. Discussion and Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
	Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39		Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	1.1. Motivation		1.1. Motivation and External Influences
	Many considerations (especially safety and security) necessitate		Many considerations (especially safety and security) necessitate
	Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Remote Identification and tracking		Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Remote Identification and tracking
	(RID).		(RID).
	Unmanned Aircraft (UA) may be fixed wing, rotary wing (e.g.,		Unmanned Aircraft (UA) may be fixed wing, rotary wing (e.g.,
	helicopter), hybrid, balloon, rocket, etc. Small fixed wing UA		helicopter), hybrid, balloon, rocket, etc. Small fixed wing UA
	typically have Short Take-Off and Landing (STOL) capability; rotary		typically have Short Take-Off and Landing (STOL) capability; rotary
	wing and hybrid UA typically have Vertical Take-Off and Landing		wing and hybrid UA typically have Vertical Take-Off and Landing
	(VTOL) capability. UA may be single- or multi-engine. The most		(VTOL) capability. UA may be single- or multi-engine. The most
	skipping to change at page 5, line 39 ¶		skipping to change at page 5, line 39 ¶
	Figure 2: "Notional UAS Classification"		Figure 2: "Notional UAS Classification"
	ASTM International, Technical Committee F38 (UAS), Subcommittee		ASTM International, Technical Committee F38 (UAS), Subcommittee
	F38.02 (Aircraft Operations), Work Item WK65041, developed the widely		F38.02 (Aircraft Operations), Work Item WK65041, developed the widely
	cited Standard Specification for Remote ID and Tracking [F3411-19]:		cited Standard Specification for Remote ID and Tracking [F3411-19]:
	the published standard is available for purchase from ASTM and as an		the published standard is available for purchase from ASTM and as an
	ASTM membership premium; early drafts are freely available as		ASTM membership premium; early drafts are freely available as
	[OpenDroneID] specifications. [F3411-19] is frequently referenced in		[OpenDroneID] specifications. [F3411-19] is frequently referenced in
	DRIP, where building upon its link layers and both enhancing support		DRIP, where building upon its link layers and both enhancing support
	for and expanding the scope of its applications is a central focus.		for and expanding the scope of its applications are central foci.
	In many applications, including UAS RID, identification and		In many applications, including UAS RID, identification and
	identifiers are not ends in themselves; they exist to enable lookups		identifiers are not ends in themselves; they exist to enable lookups
	and provision of other services.		and provision of other services.
	Using UAS RID to facilitate vehicular (V2X) communications and		Using UAS RID to facilitate vehicular (V2X) communications and
	applications such as Detect And Avoid (DAA), which would impose		applications such as Detect And Avoid (DAA), which would impose
	tighter latency bounds than RID itself, is an obvious possibility,		tighter latency bounds than RID itself, is an obvious possibility,
	explicitly contemplated in the United States (US) Federal Aviation		explicitly contemplated in the United States (US) Federal Aviation
	Administration (FAA) Remote Identification of Unmanned Aircraft rule		Administration (FAA) Remote Identification of Unmanned Aircraft rule
	[FRUR]. However, applications of RID beyond RID itself, including		[FRUR]. However, applications of RID beyond RID itself, including
	DAA, have been declared out of scope in ASTM F38.02 WK65041, based on		DAA, have been declared out of scope in ASTM F38.02 WK65041, based on
	a distinction between RID as a security standard vs DAA as a safety		a distinction between RID as a security standard vs DAA as a safety
	application. Although dynamic establishment of secure communications		application.
	between the Observer and the UAS pilot seems to have been
	contemplated by the FAA UAS ID and Tracking Aviation Rulemaking
	Committee (ARC) in their [Recommendations], it is not addressed in
	any of the subsequent regulations or technical specifications.
	[Opinion1] and [WG105] cite the Direct Remote Identification		[Opinion1] and [WG105] cite the Direct Remote Identification (DRI)
	previously required and specified, explicitly stating that whereas		previously required and specified, explicitly stating that whereas
	Direct RID is primarily for security purposes, the "Network		DRI is primarily for security purposes, the "Network Identification
	Identification Service" [Opinion1] (in the context of U-space		Service" [Opinion1] (in the context of U-space [InitialView]) or
	[InitialView]) or "Electronic Identification" [WG105] is primarily		"Electronic Identification" [WG105] is primarily for safety purposes
	for safety purposes (e.g., Air Traffic Management, especially hazards		(e.g., Air Traffic Management, especially hazards deconfliction) and
	deconfliction) and also is allowed to be used for other purposes such		also is allowed to be used for other purposes such as support of
	as support of efficient operations. These emerging standards allow		efficient operations. These emerging standards allow the security
	the security and safety oriented systems to be separate or merged.		and safety oriented systems to be separate or merged. In addition to
	In addition to mandating both Broadcast and Network one-way to		mandating both Broadcast and Network one-way to Observers, they will
	Observers, they will use V2V to other UAS (also likely to and/or from		use V2V to other UAS (also likely to and/or from some manned
	some manned aircraft). These reflect the broad scope of the European		aircraft). These reflect the broad scope of the European Union (EU)
	Union (EU) U-space concept, as being developed in the Single European		U-space concept, as being developed in the Single European Sky ATM
	Sky ATM Research (SESAR) Joint Undertaking, the U-space architectural		Research (SESAR) Joint Undertaking, the U-space architectural
	principles of which are outlined in [InitialView].		principles of which are outlined in [InitialView].
			ASD-STAN is an Associated Body to CEN (European Committee for
			Standardization) for Aerospace Standards. It is publishing an EU
			standard "Aerospace series - Unmanned Aircraft Systems - Part 002:
			Direct Remote Identification; English version prEN 4709-002:2020"
			[ASDRI]. It will provide compliance to cover the identical DRI
			requirements applicable to drones of classes C1 - [Delegated] Part 2,
			C2 - [Delegated] Part 3, C3 - [Delegated] Part 4, C5 - [Amended] Part
			16, and C6 - [Amended] Part 17.
			[ASDRI] provides UA capability to be identified in real time during
			the whole duration of the flight, without specific connectivity or
			ground infrastructure link, utilizing existing mobile devices within
			broadcast range. It uses Bluetooth 4, Bluetooth 5, Wi-Fi NAN and/or
			Wi-Fi Beacon modes. The EU standard emphasis was compatibility with
			[F3411-19], although there are differences in mandatory and optional
			message types and fields.
			The DRI system broadcasts locally:
			1. the UAS operator registration number;
			2. the [CTA2063A] compliant unique serial number of the UA;
			3. a time stamp, the geographical position of the UA, and its height
			AGL or above its take-off point;
			4. the UA ground speed and route course measured clockwise from true
			north;
			5. the geographical position of the remote pilot, or if that is not
			available, the geographical position of the UA take-off point;
			and
			6. for Classes C1, C2, C3, the UAS emergency status.
			The data is sent in plain text and the UAS operator registration
			number is represented as a 16-byte string including the state code.
			The private id part contains 3 characters which are not broadcast but
			used by authorities to access regional registration databases for
			verification. The target is to revise the current standard with
			additional functionality (e.g., DRIP) to be published before 2022.
	Security oriented UAS RID essentially has two goals: enable the		Security oriented UAS RID essentially has two goals: enable the
	general public to obtain and record an opaque ID for any observed UA,		general public to obtain and record an opaque ID for any observed UA,
	which they can then report to authorities; enable authorities, from		which they can then report to authorities; enable authorities, from
	such an ID, to look up information about the UAS and its operator.		such an ID, to look up information about the UAS and its operator.
	Safety oriented UAS RID has stronger requirements. Aviation		Safety oriented UAS RID has stronger requirements. Aviation
	community Standards Development Organizations (SDOs) set a higher bar		community Standards Development Organizations (SDOs) set a higher bar
	for safety than for security, especially with respect to reliability.		for safety than for security, especially with respect to reliability.
			Although dynamic establishment of secure communications between the
			Observer and the UAS pilot seems to have been contemplated by the FAA
			UAS ID and Tracking Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) in their
			[Recommendations], it is not addressed in any of the subsequent
			regulations or technical specifications.
	1.2. Concerns and Constraints		1.2. Concerns and Constraints
	Disambiguation of multiple UA flying in close proximity may be very		Disambiguation of multiple UA flying in close proximity may be very
	challenging, even if each is reporting its identity, position, and		challenging, even if each is reporting its identity, position, and
	velocity as accurately as it can.		velocity as accurately as it can.
	The origin of all information in UAS RID is operator self-reports.		The origin of all information in UAS RID is operator self-reports.
	Reports may be initiated by the remote pilot at the Ground Control		Reports may be initiated by the remote pilot at the Ground Control
	Station (GCS) console, by a software process on the GCS, or by a		Station (GCS) console, by a software process on the GCS, or by a
	process on the UA. Data in the reports may come from the UA (e.g.,		process on the UA. Data in the reports may come from the UA (e.g.,
	skipping to change at page 11, line 38 ¶		skipping to change at page 13, line 5 ¶
	communications (typically RF data link) over which the GCS		communications (typically RF data link) over which the GCS
	controls the UA.		controls the UA.
	DAA		DAA
	Detect And Avoid, formerly Sense And Avoid (SAA). A means of		Detect And Avoid, formerly Sense And Avoid (SAA). A means of
	keeping aircraft "well clear" of each other and obstacles for		keeping aircraft "well clear" of each other and obstacles for
	safety. "The capability to see, sense or detect conflicting		safety. "The capability to see, sense or detect conflicting
	traffic or other hazards and take the appropriate action to comply		traffic or other hazards and take the appropriate action to comply
	with the applicable rules of flight" [ICAOUAS].		with the applicable rules of flight" [ICAOUAS].
	Direct RID		DRI (not to be confused with DRIP)
	Direct Remote Identification. EU regulatory requirement for "a		Direct Remote Identification. EU regulatory requirement for "a
	system that ensures the local broadcast of information about a UA		system that ensures the local broadcast of information about a UA
	in operation, including the marking of the UA, so that this		in operation, including the marking of the UA, so that this
	information can be obtained without physical access to the UA".		information can be obtained without physical access to the UA".
	[Delegated] that presumably can be satisfied with appropriately		[Delegated] that presumably can be satisfied with appropriately
	configured [F3411-19] Broadcast RID.		configured [F3411-19] Broadcast RID.
	DSS		DSS
	Discovery and Synchronization Service. Formerly Inter-USS. The		Discovery and Synchronization Service. Formerly Inter-USS. The
	UTM system overlay network backbone. Most importantly, it enables		UTM system overlay network backbone. Most importantly, it enables
	skipping to change at page 35, line 24 ¶		skipping to change at page 36, line 24 ¶
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,		DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
	[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC		[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
	2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,		2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
	May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.		May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
	8.2. Informative References		8.2. Informative References
			[Amended] European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), "Commission
			Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/1058 of 27 April 2020
			amending Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945", April 2020.
			[ASDRI] ASD-STAN, "Introduction to the European UAS Digital Remote
			ID Technical Standard", January 2021.
	[CPDLC] Gurtov, A., Polishchuk, T., and M. Wernberg, "Controller-		[CPDLC] Gurtov, A., Polishchuk, T., and M. Wernberg, "Controller-
	Pilot Data Link Communication Security", MDPI		Pilot Data Link Communication Security", MDPI
	Sensors 18(5), 1636, 2018,		Sensors 18(5), 1636, 2018,
	<https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/18/5/1636>.		<https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/18/5/1636>.
	[CTA2063A] ANSI, "Small Unmanned Aerial Systems Serial Numbers",		[CTA2063A] ANSI, "Small Unmanned Aerial Systems Serial Numbers",
	September 2019.		September 2019.
	[Delegated]		[Delegated]
	European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), "Commission		European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), "Commission
End of changes. 15 change blocks.
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